Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Dissertations (1934 -)

Dissertations, Theses, and Professional
Projects

The Mystical and Political Body: Christian Identity in the Theology
of Karl Rahner
Erin Kidd
Marquette University

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Christianity Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology
and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Kidd, Erin, "The Mystical and Political Body: Christian Identity in the Theology of Karl Rahner" (2016).
Dissertations (1934 -). 610.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/610

THE MYSTICAL AND POLITICAL BODY: CHRISTIAN IDENTITY IN
THE THEOLOGY OF KARL RAHNER

by
Erin Kidd, B.A., M.T.S.

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,
Marquette University,
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
May 2016

ABSTRACT
THE MYSTICAL AND POLITICAL BODY: CHRISTIAN IDENTITY IN
THE THEOLOGY OF KARL RAHNER
Erin Kidd, B.A., M.T.S.
Marquette University
Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner (1904-1984) is well known for initiating the turn to the
subject in Catholic theology. The heart of Rahner’s theological reflection is the
experience of God as encouraged by Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises. In
questioning how the subject experiences God, Rahner develops a theological
anthropology that attempts to elucidate the original unity of spirit and matter. As he
argues, the human being is “spirit-in-world,”—the one who actualizes her transcendence
in space and over time. While Rahner’s readers have been quick to draw out the
implications of the subject as spirit, they have been less attentive to exactly how this
spirit is in-world.
I argue that feminist philosopher Shannon Sullivan’s account of the self as transactional
can illuminate Rahner’s understanding of the subject as spirit-in-world. Her theory
provides a way of speaking about a freedom that is no less embodied or socially
embedded, and can therefore illuminate how the freedom to effect a fundamental option
for God is social and historical. More broadly, appropriating Sullivan’s work into a
Christian theology of the body provides a framework for talking about the intersection of
embodiment and Christian identity. In turn, Rahner’s theology allows us to evaluate
forms of identity construction according to the norms of love of God, neighbor, and self.
When we understand that human beings are precisely those spirits that accomplish
themselves in and through matter, what follows is an understanding of the human body as
simultaneously the site of the experience of God and political transformation. This
understanding of the human person ultimately calls forth a way of life—one that demands
solidarity with those who suffer, vigilance over our habits of bodying, openness to
mystery, and hope in the world to come.
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Conventions Regarding References to Karl Rahner’s Work
Bibliographic information for Karl Rahner’s writings has been provided for both the
English and German publications. Direct quotes are reproduced from the English
translations, unless otherwise noted. The following abbreviations of Karl Rahner’s major
writings will be of help to the reader:
Geist

Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt, second edition, ed. Johann B. Metz (Munich:
Kösel-Verlag, 1957) reprinted in Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt:
Philosophische Schriften, Sämtliche Werke 2 (Freiburg: Verlag Herder,
1996).

Spirit

Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, translation of the second edition, trans.
William Dych (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968).

Hörer (1941)

Hörer des Wortes: Zur Grundlegung einer Religionsphilosophie (Munich:
Verlag Kösel-Pustet, 1941) reprinted in Karl Rahner, Hörer des
Wortes: Scriften zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Grundlegung der
Theologie, Sämtliche Werke 4 (Freiberg: Verlag Herder, 1997).

Hörer (1963)

Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes, second edition, ed. Johann Baptist Metz
(Munich: Kösel, 1963) reprinted in Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes:
Scriften zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Grundlegung der Theologie,
Sämtliche Werke 4 (Freiberg: Verlag Herder, 1997).

Hearer

Karl Rahner, Hearer of the Word, translation of the first edition, trans. Joseph
Donceel (New York: Continuum, 1994).

Hearers

Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, translation of the second edition, trans.
Michael Richards (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969).

SzT

Karl Rahner, Schriften zur Theologie 1-15 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1954-84).

TI

Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations 1-23 (New York: Crossroad, 198292).

SW

Karl Rahner, Sämtliche Werke 1-32 (Freiburg: Herder, 1995-).

Two of Karl Rahner’s early books, Geist in Welt and Hörer des Wortes, were later edited
by his student, Johann Baptist Metz. The English reader of Rahner will not easily find a
translation of the first edition of Geist in Welt—even the Sämtliche Werke contains only
Metz’ edition. On the other hand, an English translation is available of the first edition of
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Hörer des Wortes while the translation of Metz’ edition has gone out of print. All this
leaves the English reader in the unfortunate situation of having to read Metz’s edition of
Geist in Welt but the first edition of Hörer des Wortes. I have made note of Metz’s
interpolations in Geist in Welt where necessary (excepting minor grammatical changes).
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Introduction
Zwischen den Hämmern besteht
unser Herz, wie die Zunge
zwischen den Zähnen, die doch,
dennoch, die preisende bleibt.
Between the hammers our heart
endures, just as the tongue does
between the teeth and, despite that,
still is able to praise.
- Rainer Maria Rilke1
This dissertation attempts to offer a theology of the body in light of contemporary
debates about the construction of the subject. What is the relationship between the subject
and her body? (Or between the body and her subject?) How do we reconcile moral
concepts such as freedom, agency, and responsibility with our awareness of the ways in
which subjects are formed by the worlds in which they live? What is the relationship
between self and world, and how is it mapped onto the body? How do embodied subjects
encounter the divine? These questions have reached a heightened importance as the
theological academy awakens to its own role in the exclusion of certain bodies in the
church, the academy, and the world.
My starting point is the theology of Karl Rahner, a 20th-century Jesuit thinker
known for his contributions to theological anthropology and, more specifically, for
initiating the turn to the subject in Catholic theology. Rahner gained a considerable
following for his work early in his career. Through his involvement in a number of
1

Rainer Maria Rilke, “Duino Elegies: The Ninth Elegy,” in Ahead of All Parting: the Selected
Poetry and Prose of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. and trans. Stephen Mitchell (New York: Random House,
1995), 385.
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theological encyclopedias and lexicons, he shaped much of German theology in the early
to mid-20th century. His advisory role as council theologian at the second Vatican
Council extended his international reputation and also symbolized a shift from Rome’s
suspicion of him to acceptance of his then rather innovative theological work.2
The heart of Rahner’s theological reflection is the experience of God as
encouraged by Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises.3 In questioning how the subject
experiences God, Rahner develops a theological anthropology that attempts to elucidate
the original unity of spirit and sensibility. Rahner’s readers, however, have struggled to
flesh out exactly how the two constitute a unity, and what the implications of that unity
are for understanding human freedom and Christian identity. The first goal of this
dissertation is to draw together Rahner’s writings on embodiment and to show how they
illuminate perennial debates in the secondary literature. The second goal of this
dissertation is to show how Rahner’s theological anthropology can be retrieved for a
feminist theological anthropology today.4 To this end, I turn to debates over the
construction of the body within feminist theory. By reading these discourses together, I

2

For an introduction to Karl Rahner, including biographical information about Rahner and an
overview of the impact he has had on Catholic theology, see Thomas F. O’Meara, God in the World: A
Guide to Karl Rahner’s Theology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007) and Herbert Vorgrimler,
Understanding Karl Rahner: An Introduction to His Life and Thought, trans. John Bowden (New York:
Crossroad, 1986).
3

For an introduction to Ignatius and his Spiritual Exercises, see Ignatius of Loyola, Ignatius of
Loyola: Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works, ed. George E. Ganss (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1991).
4

Nancy Dallavalle, in the conclusion of her chapter on Rahner and feminist theology, suggests
that “future feminist retrievals of Rahner’s theology might do well to focus less on what he did or did not
say about female persons or ‘women’s issues,’ and focus more on a critical retrieval of his theological work
as a partner for the fundamental theological questions raised by feminist theology. In particular, the
systematic interrelation of questions that drive feminist theological anthropology will come into play:
questions of a fully contextual reading of human personhood, questions of the significance of gender for
embodiment and social roles, and questions that engage the ecclesial context of theology,” “Feminist
Theologies,” The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 273-4. It is such a retrieval I intend in this work.
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highlight the body as the site of both the mystical experience of God and political
transformation.
In Chapter One, I begin with three of the most provocative critiques of Rahner’s
theology—those offered by Hans Urs von Balthasar, Johann Baptiste Metz, and Jennifer
Erin Beste. Hans Urs von Balthasar, a once close friend and theological collaborator, was
one of Rahner’s first critics. In a 1939 review of Rahner’s dissertation in philosophy,
Geist in Welt, Balthasar argued that Rahner’s transcendental project prioritized spirit over
sensibility, neglecting the form of revelation and treating the material world as only a
catalyst to spiritual experience. Later, in his 1966 book The Moment of Christian Witness,
Balthasar satirized Rahner’s notion of anonymous Christianity, for relativizing both the
gravity of sin and the necessity of the cross, and dispensing with the need for martyrdom
or other forms of Christian witness. Johann Baptist Metz, one of Rahner’s first generation
of students and one of the founders of contemporary political theology, also came to
criticize his theology as ahistorical. Metz argued that Rahner’s commitment to the graced
possibility of the world, even in the midst of great suffering, made light of the horrific
events of the 20th century and of catastrophe in general. More recently, Jennifer Erin
Beste has raised questions about the adequacy of Rahner’s theology in light of the grave
effect of trauma disorders on the operation of human freedom. As she argues, any
theology that places freedom at its center must attend to the way in which interpersonal
harm threatens human freedom.
These debates represent critical challenges to Rahner’s anthropology: Does
Rahner’s transcendental-idealism, in its guarantee of eschatological hope, ignore the
horror of individual suffering? Can it motivate a radical Christian praxis of discipleship?
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In short, does the transcendental subject have a history? As I argue, each of these
critiques—at least implicitly—calls into question Rahner’s understanding of
embodiment. And yet, little has been written about this category in Rahner’s thought at
all.
With these critiques in mind, Chapters Two and Three offer an examination of
Rahner’s theological anthropology, particularly his understanding of embodiment.
Chapter Two focuses on Rahner’s early work, particularly Geist in Welt. I argue that this
text ought to be read in light of Rahner’s broader theological commitment to reflecting on
Ignatian spirituality—particularly the commitment to finding God in all things and a
belief that the experience of God is available to all. Viewed in this way, Geist in Welt
does not merely offer a Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge, but an investigation into
the embodied subject and her ability to know and love God. The subject, as embodied
spirit-in-world, knows and loves God in and through her material existence.
In Chapter Three, I demonstrate how Rahner’s understanding of the embodied
subject’s relationship to God develops. In particular, Rahner’s later theology is a
reflection on the Ignatian process of discerning and effecting one’s “yes” to God.
Because the subject is spirit-in-world, such a “yes” must be embodied in one’s life. But
embodiment entails risk and ambiguity. While Rahner proclaims the universal freedom to
effect a fundamental option for God, both his academic and personal writings display a
deep attention to the potential limitations of that freedom. Since spirit and sensibility
exist in an original unity, one’s relation to the world, the divine, and the self is always
through the material and historical and therefore “still an interplay with everything that is
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not free, not spiritual, and so on.”5 Thus there is a great ambiguity in Rahner’s theological
anthropology: the bodily nature of the spirit is, at the same time, the condition for
freedom and its limitation. At the end of Chapter Three I look to the work of Carmichael
Peters and Bryan Massingale to demonstrate the liberative potential of this ambiguity, as
well as where it needs to be developed.
Together, Chapters Two and Three develop a Rahnerian theology of the body,
which offers a new way of understanding how many of Rahner’s larger themes cohere.
The object of this dissertation is not merely to wax exegetically, but to offer Rahner’s
account of the body as a way to navigate contemporary philosophical and theological
accounts of human freedom and identity construction. Chapter Four traces a debate in
feminist political theory over how to interpret the body as culturally constructed. After
examining Judith Butler and her critics, I turn to Shannon Sullivan’s pragmatist account
of the human body and its utility for combatting both racism and sexism.
Parallel to the theological difficulty in speaking of the Christian subject as both
free spirit and historically situated body is the philosophical difficulty of speaking of the
subject as simultaneously a moral agent and a culturally constructed body. Placing these
discourses in conversation with one another can yield productive results in thinking
theologically about the subject, embodiment, and Christian identity. In Chapter Five, I
argue that Shannon Sullivan’s account of the self as transactional can illuminate Rahner’s
understanding of the subject as both transcendent and historical, in part by explaining
how subjects can be morally responsible for the ways in which they are socialized. Her
theory provides a way of speaking about a freedom that is no less embodied or socially
5

Karl Rahner, “The Body in the Order of Salvation,” TI 17, 82: “Der Leib in der Heilsordnung,”
SW 22, 168.
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embedded. Appropriating Sullivan’s work into a Christian theology of the body provides
a framework for talking about the intersection of embodiment and Christian identity.
Together, these two thinkers offer a way of thinking about Christian identity as
incorporation into the mystical and political body of Christ.

7
Chapter 1
The Crises of the Transcendental Subject
Karl Rahner is well known for initiating the turn to the subject in Catholic theology. For
Rahner, the creation and redemption of human beings by the word of God is the story of a
God who has expressed Godself in and through human being.6 In addition to attending to
the experience of grace in the lives of believers, he argued quite forcefully that all
“dogmatic theology today must be theological anthropology.”7 This theological
anthropology must in turn be a transcendental anthropology. As Rahner explains, “A
transcendental investigation examines an issue according to the necessary conditions
given by the possibility of knowledge and action on the part of the subject himself.”8 In
other words, theology must turn to the human person and ask about the conditions of the
possibility of her knowledge and love of God.
Such analysis does not imply that one can deduce who and what God is from the
features of human existence. Instead, it recognizes that human beings are those for whom
the knowledge and love of God cannot merely be superfluous or irrelevant. A
transcendental anthropology attempts to show how God as ultimate mystery surpasses all
human understanding and that humans are fundamentally oriented toward being in
relationship with God; that God’s grace is a free gift not due to human beings and that it
6

For an overview of how the major themes in Rahner’s theology relate to his fundamental concern
for human being’s experience of God, see Gerald A. McCool, S.J., “The Philosophy of the Human Person
in Karl Rahner’s Theology,” Theological Studies 22 (1961): 537-62. For an introduction to Rahner’s
transcendental method, see Thomas Sheehan, “Rahner’s Transcendental Project,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Karl Rahner, ed. by Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 29-41.
7

Karl Rahner, “Theology and Anthropology,” TI 9, 28: “Theologie und Anthropologie,” SW 22,

8

Ibid., 29: 284.

283.
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relates to who human beings are in a deep and intrinsic way.9 Ultimately, Rahner argues,
to understand God is to understand humans as oriented to God.10 As spirits-in-world,
human beings are those beings who are always transcending themselves, their lives
oriented toward and open to the absolute mystery of God.
Rahner’s transcendental anthropology has been the object of much criticism.
Before we turn in this dissertation to a more detailed examination of Rahner’s theological
anthropology in general, and his understanding of embodiment in particular, it will be
helpful to review some of Rahner’s most provocative critics. In this chapter we will look
at the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Johann Baptist Metz, and Jennifer Erin Beste,
each of whom will introduce one of three crises of the transcendental subject: the
Ernstfall, Auschwitz, and trauma. Each of these dramatic interruptions in human
experience calls into question any optimistic and stable account of the subject and her
relationship to God. Carrying Rahner’s theology forward will depend on whether or not
his anthropology can address these crises or be modified to address them.
Balthasar, Metz, and Beste each raise questions about the adequacy of the
relationship between self, world, and God in Rahner’s theology. In particular, each of
these critics interrogates exactly how spirit is “in-world.” As I will argue in this chapter,
these three lines of critique converge on Rahner’s conception of embodiment. Thus the
future of Rahnerian theology demands thinking about the embodiment of the
transcendental subject.

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid., 36-7: 291.
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The Ernstfall
The Christian: You are associated with us! I know who you are. You are a decent
fellow. You are an anonymous Christian.
The commissar: Don’t be stupid, my friend. Now I’ve understood enough. You’ve
liquidated yourselves and spared us the trouble of persecuting you. Dismissed!
So ends the satirical interrogation of an anonymous Christian in Hans Urs von
Balthasar’s The Moment of Christian Witness.11 For Balthasar such a faith will not be
persecuted because it is not recognizable: “Karl Rahner frees us from a nightmare with
his theory of the anonymous Christian who is dispensed, at any rate, from the criterion of
martyrdom and nevertheless thereby has a full claim to the name of Christian if he,
consciously or unconsciously, gives God the honor.”12 While Balthasar allows the hope
that all be saved,13 he rejects an understanding of Christian identity that attempts to free
the subject from the demands of Christian vocation: a life lived in gratitude toward God,
a willingness to take up one’s cross, and ultimately to die for one’s faith.14 For Balthasar,
Rahner’s theory of the anonymous Christian relativizes both the gravity of sin and the
necessity of the cross, and dispenses with the need for martyrdom and other forms of
Christian witness.
This inattention to the Christoform shape of grace is the natural product, he
argues, of Rahner’s philosophy in Geist in Welt. At the time of its publication, Balthasar

11

Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Moment of Christian Witness, trans. Richard Beckley (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 130. The most comprehensive overview of Balthasar’s critique is
provided in Eamonn Conway, The Anonymous Christian – A Relativized Christianity? An Evaluation of
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Criticisms of Karl Rahner’s Theory of the Anonymous Christian (Frankfurt:
Peter Lang, 1993), particularly Chapters 2 and 3.
12

Balthasar, Moment, 101.

13

Ibid., 152.

14

Ibid., 20-7.
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expressed deep reservations over Rahner’s dependency on German idealism. In his 1939
review of the book, Hans Urs von Balthasar raises questions as to the adequacy of
Rahner’s transcendental philosophy to account for the possibility of divine revelation.15
Because Rahner begins with Thomas Aquinas’s epistemological insight regarding the
unity of knowledge and sensibility, the difficulty lies in explaining how one can have
knowledge of God—or any in-sensible thing. Balthasar locates the problem precisely:
“So the question is this: How is, out of the remaining plane of sensibility, nevertheless a
metaphysic, i.e. a disclosure of being, at all possible?”16 Rahner’s answer lies in his
transcendental appropriation of Thomas’s conversio and abstractio: the return of the
knower to herself in and through knowledge of the other. For Balthasar, this solution
shifts the place of divine revelation from God’s loving activity in the world to the
subject’s relation to herself. Consequently, the world is reduced to merely the material of
self-actualization, with a Fichtean ego at the center.17 Rahner’s philosophy is therefore
unable to provide an Objektmetaphysic, as it is locked up in reflection upon the subject.
For Balthasar, the development of Rahner’s “anonymous Christianity” proves that
these concerns were justified. In The Moment of Christian Witness, he provides a
genealogy of the contemporary “philosophical system,” tracing the anthropological
legacy from Kant, through Hegel and Fichte, to a generalized philosophy in which the
subject is the free and intellectual master over the natural world. This in turn reduces the
15

Hans Urs von Balthasar, Rezension von K. Rahner: Geist in Welt, Zeitschrift für katholische
Theologie 63 (1939): 371-9.
16
17

Hans Urs von Balthasar, Rezension von K. Rahner: Geist in Welt, 377. Translation mine.

Benedict M. Ashley has offered a similar critique of Rahner, alleging that his metaphysics
“reduces the physical world to a foil for reflexion on the knowing subject out of reach of the results of the
natural sciences,” in “Fundamental Option and/or Commitment to Ultimate End,” Philosophy & Theology
10, no. 1 (1997): 123.
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world to the material of freedom and self-actualization, which is no longer revelatory of
the divine. As Balthasar summarizes, “…because man is seen as the center and aim of
this process, nature itself loses its aura of a mediating agency for the divine purpose and
is reduced to being a ‘worldly world.’” In this closed system of subject and world, the
idea of God becomes superfluous.18
As Balthasar writes, transcendental philosophy exemplifies these tendencies:
Transcendental philosophy exhausts the notion of objectivity in order to develop a
philosophy of the intellectual control of the universe and therefore no longer has
this notion at its disposal for exploring man’s relation to God. In doing so it
completely fails to take into account the equally important truth about God that,
although “he is the All”, he is nevertheless not the world, and consequently,
between the two, there exists the primal phenomenon of a relationship in which
they are set over against each other.19
The transcendental subject attempts to control the world, to make it her own medium of
self-expression, and in so doing loses the ability for wonder. Wonder is only possible if a
difference between this world and the heavenly realm—between existence and essence—
is maintained.20 Balthasar argues that Rahner’s system flattens this difference by placing
divine revelation within a horizon of anticipation [Vorgriff].
But Christ cannot in any way be anticipated. According to Balthasar, Christians
occupy a place “in a position impossible to determine from the viewpoint of the world as
it was before Christ’s appearance.”21 Any attempt to situate this event within a
continuous horizon will miss the radical disclosure of absolute love:
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The Christian lives in the sphere of an event that signifies absolute love—that is,
in a boundless realm beyond which nothing greater can be imagined (id quo
maius cogitari non potest). If one tries to imagine something greater, to sail for
new horizons, he falls into a void that eventually destroys the man who was
created for the sake of something greater than the world we know. This is not
simply an “idea” transcending absolute “being”. It is expressly an event taking
place in the world and constituting the essence and sum total of that “being”—the
absolute triune love enacted between the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit. It
is a human and genuinely historical event because God became incarnate, and at
the same time it is an event that transcends history, which comes just as
immediately to me as to everyone else.22
Balthasar is concerned here that the relationship between the transcendental subject and
the world prevents the sort of radical disclosure of being in history that is necessary to
understand Christ’s life and, most importantly, the work of the cross. If the world is
simply the raw material of self-actualization then every historical event is equally a
disclosure of revelation in service to an indifferent transcendence. For Balthasar, the
Christ event must be a particular event in which God enters a world he is “set over
against.”23 This means that it equally has to be “a human and genuinely historical event”
but also truly a revelation of God and therefore something that cannot be anticipated or so
easily contextualized.
The goal is to hold these two things—the historicity and incommensurability of
the Christ event—in tension, but Balthasar accuses Rahner of flattening the difference
and thus failing to address either of these aspects of Christian faith adequately. Thus he
pointedly asks Rahner: “Do I see in the broken heart of the crucified Christ the love of
22
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the triune God—or don’t I?”24 Balthasar’s concern over an “objective metaphysics” is
thus motivated by the particularity of the cross as a revelation of the love of the Trinity
within human history. Rahner’s Christ on the other hand is merely “a higher phase of
development” which “does not seem indispensable.”25 In Rahner’s theology, the cross
expresses God’s saving will, it does not effect it, and therefore the work of Christ is
obscured.26 As Balthasar summarizes Rahner’s thought, “For according to what we have
said, man does not owe his redemption actually to Christ, but to the eternal saving will of
God, which is made manifest to him in the life of Christ. There is no need, then, for the
Ernstfall, and there is no more talk of it.”27
Much has been written in Rahner’s defense with respect to this criticism. To begin
with, Balthasar overemphasizes the role of Geist in Welt (and its alleged dependence on
German idealism) within the whole of Rahner’s work;28 he interprets what are largely
brief and ad hoc texts as overly determined by a philosophical system;29 and he in turn
neglects the influence of spirituality on Rahner’s writings.30 He ignores texts in which
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Rahner answers many of his challenges,31 including the fact that “anonymous
Christianity” is only an option for those who have not “heard, understood, and genuinely
accepted the gospel,”32 and he fails to provide an alternative account for his own hope
that all will be saved.33 Rahner himself, in a retrospective address, admits that his
theology downplayed the importance of sin and forgiveness but only in order to
emphasize the self-communication of God, which he focuses on precisely in order to
explicate Christ’s unique role in salvation history.34
As Phillip Endean notes, these responses have not quelled the tide of scholars and
laypeople who find The Moment of Christian Witness, and Balthasar’s critique of
Rahnerian theology in general, compelling. Endean suggests that Rahnerians not rush to
the defense, but attempt to understand the “primal clash of intuitions” behind their
respective theologies.35 Karen Kilby too argues that a more productive analysis is
possible: “All in all, the criticisms are more useful as a pointer to what it was that
Balthasar feared, what he saw as the dangers confronting theology and the Church, than
as a guide to understanding the real relationship between his thought and that of
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Rahner.”36 Balthasar admits as much in the afterward to The Moment of Christian
Witness, when he justifies his criticism against Rahner as more accurately levied against
the way his theology has been taken up by his disciples,37 and over the way catchphrases
like “anonymous Christianity” sound to the uninitiated.38 Balthasar’s concern is more
with the precedent that Rahner’s theology sets, and the dangers that Balthasar predicts,
than with Rahner’s theology itself. While Kilby pointedly asks whether or not “any
theologian, including Balthasar, could survive such treatment—a treatment in which the
full complexity of one’s position is ignored, and one is held responsible for the way in
which it may be misinterpreted and misused,”39 it can still be useful as a lens with which
to appraise the merits and pitfalls of Rahner’s work—particularly the dangers of pushing
Rahner’s theology forward.
The focus of Balthasar’s critique, and consequently of Rahner’s defenders, is on
the nexus of theological topics surrounding revelation and soteriology, particularly the
Christian’s relationship to the cross. However, Balthasar’s review of Geist in Welt and his
genealogy of philosophical atheism, demonstrate that these concerns emanate from a
profound disagreement with Rahner’s anthropology. Thus while his criticism of Rahner
extends beyond a critique of transcendental philosophy and the way it frames the
relationship between subject and world, it is still ultimately rooted in it. In Balthasar’s
analysis, “anonymous Christianity”—and therefore, anonymous atheism—is simply the
natural unfolding of the Fichtean subject at the center of Rahner’s philosophy. It is on this
36
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account that Rowan Williams argues that this debate over anonymous Christianity can in
fact “be seen as one to do with the problem in contemporary philosophy about the status
of the ‘autonomous’ subject or consciousness.”40
Further, Balthasar’s criticism over the possibility of revelation within Rahner’s
transcendental project can also be read as a criticism over Rahner’s ability to explain how
the subject is both spiritual and sensible. On the one hand, Balthasar alleges that the way
Rahner understands the union between knowledge and sensibility fails to allow for the
disclosure of Being within the realm of sensibility; on the other hand, Balthasar accuses
Rahner of relativizing sensibility—and along with it, the historical material world—in
favor of a formless transcendental experience of God. Both of these critiques hinge on
Rahner’s ability to truly unite the transcendental and the categorical, the a priori and the
a posteriori, in the subject’s relationship to the world. In Balthasar’s analysis, Rahner’s
theological anthropology fails to give an account of how the embodied subject relates to
the transcendent God in and through the historical particularity of the cross.
While Balthasar accuses the Rahnerian subject of indifference to the in-breaking
of the divine, Metz points to this same subject’s alleged immunity to more worldly forms
of interruption. The transcendental subject, he argues, is not only insufficiently historical
and interpersonal, but as a category of analysis prevents theologians from addressing
catastrophe and its threat to subjectivity. As we will see below, his critique only
heightens the urgency in answering whether Rahner’s theology successfully shows how
the subject is spirit-in-world.
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Auschwitz
Born in Auerbach, Bavaria in 1928, Metz came of age under the shadow of the Third
Reich.41 As a teenager he was conscripted into the military and placed at the front line in
a company made up of other teenagers. Recounting the experience almost 40 years later,
Metz describes a particularly horrific event that continues to traumatize him. After
delivering a message to headquarters, a young Metz travelled all night through the
burning countryside to find all of his comrades dead: “I remember nothing but a
soundless cry. I strayed for hours alone in the forest. Over and over again, just this silent
cry! And up until today I see myself so. Behind this memory all my childhood dreams
have vanished.”42 Telling the same story in 1998, Metz explains how this experience
ruptured his theological world:
A fissure had opened in my powerful Bavarian-Catholic socialization, with its
impregnable confidence. What would happen if one took this sort of remembrance
not to the psychologist but into the Church? And if one did not allow oneself to be
talked out of such unreconciled memories even by theology, but rather wanted to
have faith with them and, with them, speak about God?43
As part of the “impregnable confidence” of “Bavarian-Catholic socialization,” Metz
describes that as a child he was largely protected from any consciousness of the Shoah.
He writes for example that he was unaware that Dietrich Bonhoeffer was murdered only
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30 miles away from his childhood home.44 Thus Metz’s primary theological insight is the
desire to bring memories of suffering—both one’s own and those of others—into the
Church and into theological reflection.
As a young theologian, Metz believed such work could be done under the
umbrella of Rahner’s transcendental theology.45 As a graduate student at Innsbruck, Metz
studied under Rahner and devoted his research to promoting and developing Rahner’s
transcendental Thomism.46 His dissertation, Christliche Anthropozentrik, can be seen as
an apology for Rahner’s argument in Geist in Welt, and of the theological validity of the
“turn to the subject” more broadly.47 Even here, however, his work demonstrates a
profound concern for the historicity and materiality of human subjectivity, so much so
that Francis Schüssler Fiorenza writes that it foreshadows Metz’s later work: “Man’s
experience of the world as history is Metz’s point of departure for his later critique of
transcendental-existential philosophy, of his questioning whether anthropology is an
adequate horizon for our understanding of history.”48
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Metz collaborated with Rahner on a number of projects, including a couple of
theological dictionaries.49 Metz was also in charge of editing the second versions of both
Geist in Welt and Hörer des Wortes. While Rahner provided his stamp of approval to
both of these editions,50 they bear Metz’s unmistakeable fingerprints.
Most of Metz’s revisions of the 1957 edition of Geist in Welt (published in
English in 1968 as Spirit in the World) are minor and bear little on content, such as the
division into smaller chapters and sections and the translation of Latin passages into
German.51 The most significant contributions are those in which Metz responds—either
indirectly or directly—to criticisms offered to the 1939 text of Geist in Welt. Among
these is a response to Balthasar. Metz begins his page-long interpolation by asserting that
it is only through a transcendental deduction that one can avoid a self-enclosed
metaphysics—precisely the kind Balthasar accuses Rahner of promulgating. As Metz
argues, a transcendental deduction attends to the world precisely as its positive content,
not merely the negative material of actualization as Balthasar asserts. Rahner’s
transcendental approach investigates the conditions of the possibility of human
experience of revelation. In other words, the transcendental is precisely that which
“release[s] itself into the categorical,” and “as an a priori investigation it does not merely
consider physics, the “world,” the a posteriori, as real negativity…but that metaphysics
49
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itself, in its own a priori, first comes to itself in its content through the a posteriori.”52
Since the transcendental only exists—and is only discovered—in and through the
categorical, the transcendental and the categorical represent “one metaphysics of man.”53
Thus from Metz’ perspective, Balthasar errs in interpreting Rahner’s “spirit-in-world” as
a description of two phenomena set against one another rather than the one dynamic
nature of human being.
Despite this evidence that Metz believed Rahner’s theology to have successfully
posited the unity of the subject as spirit-in-world, he still had misgivings over this
formulation of human being. We can see proof of this in his 1963 revision of Hörer des
Wortes (published in English in 1969 as Hearers of the World). In a footnote to the
conclusion of his summary of the argument of Geist in Welt, Metz notes its lack of
interpersonal analysis, which he diagnoses as a consequence of Rahner’s Thomistic
approach. Since Rahner is approaching the question of human transcendence through
Thomas’s epistemology, Metz argues that it is natural that he reflects here on “an
objective world of things” rather than a personal Mitwelt.54 However, Metz’s
identification of this lack in Rahner’s thought motivates his revision of Hörer des Wortes.
In his edition, he attempts precisely to replace the Thomistic world of things with the
personal world in Rahner’s system.55
Indeed, Metz’s changes to Hörers des Wortes are on the whole more extensive,
effecting subtle but significant changes in both Rahner’s theology and ontology.
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Admittedly, many are simply attempts to update the work with the contemporary state of
Rahner’s theology—for example, inserting Rahner’s by then well-known concept of the
“supernatural existential.”56 While both Metz and Rahner allege that these changes do
nothing to the substance of Rahner’s work, Rahner’s readers have not always agreed. “It
is difficult to escape the impression that we are no longer reading a genuine Rahner
work,” Andrew Tallon writes in the preface to his own English edition of the original
1941 edition.57
Roger Dick Johns argues that of the overarching themes that emerge through
Metz’s revisions, the most critical of which have to do with Rahner’s metaphysics: “In
his changes Metz takes as his point of departure the concrete situation of man’s being-inthe-world, instead of Rahner’s abstract quest for Being itself.”58 This requires in part
reframing the relationship between transcendental and categorical revelation, so that
“world” is perceived not just as the limit, but the content (and thus the possibility) of
transcendental self-knowledge.59 This world (Welt), in turn, for Metz is not just an
environment in which human activity occurs, it is a social world (Mitwelt). Thus, Johns
states, “Metz’s ‘program’ can be said to be rethinking this entire theological project in

56

Ashley, Interruptions, 78. However, according to at least one critic, even this change is suspect.
Karen Kilby argues that Rahner’s later understanding of the supernatural existential—and the general
understanding of revelation it presumes—contradicts Rahner’s development of the word as concrete and
historical in Hörer des Wortes, Kilby, “Philosophy, Theology and Foundationalism,” 133.
57

Andrew Tallon, preface to Hearer, viii. Given Metz’s eventual position as a critic of Rahner,
Tallon argues it is all the more necessary to read the original edition, editor’s introduction to Hearer, ixxxii.
58

Roger Dick Johns, Man in the World: The Theology of Johannes Baptist Metz, Dissertation
Series 16 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1976), 73-4, quote on 74.
59

Johns, Man in the World, 75-6.

22
terms of an understanding of human existence as Mitsein and the world of man as
Mitwelt.”60
While Ashley argues that the second edition does not substantially change “the
approach of the original,”61 he notes that Metz’s forward signals a critical shift. Metz
introduces the work not as one about the relationship between philosophy of religion and
theology, but between the subject and her history.62 Of course for Metz these two
relationships are themselves intimately bound. In his summary of the argument of Hörer
des Wortes, he explains why an analysis of the human person as a hearer of the word
must necessarily be an analysis of the relationship between “man” and “history”:
Hearers of the Word—that biblical determination of man vis-à-vis revelation—is
here to be recaptured in a sketch of the philosophy of religion which comes close
to the thought of Thomas Aquinas but at the same time takes into account the
problems and attempted solutions of modern religious philosophers. Man hereby
becomes visible as that being which comes into self-recognition by means of
history (just as history itself comes into its own only by way of man); man must
listen in on history in order to encounter there the “word” that founds and
enlightens existence, this word to which the perceptive reason of man has always
been questioningly attuned. The founding of a faith-grounded existence upon the
historical word of God, therefore, is not arbitrary in the least; in fact, it coresponds in a deep and fundamental way to this existence.63
While these revisions represent Metz’s discomfort with Rahner’s inattention to the
interpersonal, they also signal that both Metz and Rahner believed at the time that such
analysis was in line with Rahner’s—and even Thomas Aquinas’—thought. Additionally,
Metz’s preface to the text indicates that he still felt Rahner’s fundamental theology was
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not only useful, but necessary to the development of contemporary theology.64 Thus,
contra Tallon, Metz’s eventual position as critic of Rahner’s theology make this edition
of Hörer des Wortes all the more useful in examining the limits of its project and its
potential for contemporary reflection on the subject. If it obscures an “original” or “pure”
Rahnerian theology, it also shows us a theology in progress, open to experimentation and
response to critique. It shows us to what extent Rahner was willing to accommodate
accusations that his subject was inadequately interpersonal and historical.
As late as 1966, Metz takes a Thomistic and Rahnerian starting point as a given in
writing about freedom.65 However, in a 1967 essay—later published as a forward to the
1968 English translation of the second edition of Geist in Welt—Metz offered an
appraisal of Rahner’s theology which combines both his admiration of his mentor and his
growing concern over his transcendental starting point.66 After spending the majority of
his time praising Rahner for being simultaneously creative and faithful to the deposit of
faith, Metz raises a series of critical questions regarding the transcendental and existential
foundation of his theology. In particular, Metz challenges the individualization and
privatization of faith under the transcendental-existential model, as well as its separation
from world-history and eschatology. Central to this critique is Metz’s claim that Rahner’s
theology of the subject is insufficiently historical:
Does not such a transcendental-existential approach (which defines man a priori
as that being characterized by absolute transcendence towards God) concentrate
the necessarily historically realized salvation of man too much on the question of
64
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whether the individual freely accepts or rejects this constitution of his being? Is
there not danger that the question of salvation will be made too private and that
salvation history will be conceived too worldlessly, breaking too quickly the point
of the universal historical battle for man? Anthropocentrically oriented theology
places the faith quite correctly in a fundamental and irreducible relationship with
the free subjectivity of man. However, is the relationship of this faith to the world
and history sufficiently preserved (aufgehoben)? …But the faith is and remains
(in the light of its biblical origins and its content of promise) in a social and
political sense worldly. Therefore, should not the transcendental theology of
person and existence be translated into a type of “political theology?”67
As Guenther notes, these questions contain “in germ” much of Metz’s later criticism.68
At this point, Metz did not see that these questions entailed an ultimate rejection
of Rahner’s theology. Indeed, language of “translation” into political theology suggests
that Metz’s own new political theology could be seen as such a translation. At the least,
Metz entertains the possibility that such theology could complement Rahner’s:
Such questions, coming out of Rahner’s program, need not be solved against him,
but rather can be tested and further developed in dialogue with him. For finally
Rahner’s theology in all the truly great and enduring things it has given us is
properly characterized by one overriding “tendency”: the ever new initiation into
the mystery of God’s love and the service of the hope of all men.69
Thus Metz’s early theological work is marked by an increasing desire to push Rahnerian
transcendental Thomism to a place where it could accommodate these critiques, while
still proclaiming that the affirmation of human beings as subjects before God was critical
to the Christian message.70 This would require that a transcendental project account for
the historicity of both human subjects and their actualization.71
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Metz’s optimism for the political potential of Rahner’s theology eventually
dissipated. He became increasingly concerned over a general tendency for German
theologians to ignore Auschwitz, even despite their alleged interest in historicity.72
Rahner was unfortunately one of these theologians. Metz speaks on multiple occasions to
his mentor’s silence in the face of this catastrophe. In his 1984 article “Facing the Jews:
Christian Theology after Auschwitz,” Metz provides a succinct explanation of his
departure from Rahner’s theology, one full of both praise and criticism of his teacher:
I had the good fortune to learn that Catholic theology which in my eyes was the
best of that time, and to it I owe everything that I can do theologically myself. I
mean the theology taught by Karl Rahner. To be sure, gradually, much too
gradually, it dawned on me that even in this theology Auschwitz was not
mentioned. Thus, in confrontation with this catastrophe, I began to ask critical
questions and to look for additional viewpoints of theological identity. Were we
still caught in a kind of historical idealism? Did the logos of Christian theology
still have much too high a content of apathy? Too much fortitude against the
abysses of historic catastrophes?73
Rahner’s theology “was the best of that time” and even still it turned its back on
Auschwitz; thus Metz implies a fortiori that no theology of the day was adequate to the
task of responding to this horrible interruption. Rahner’s sin of omission is critical to
Metz’s evaluation of contemporary theology, which he accuses of apathy and an
“inability to confront historical experience in spite of all its prolific talk about
historicity.”74
Auschwitz becomes for Metz a litmus test for whether talk about the historicity of
the subject is merely hypothetical. Moreover, he argues that a theology whose truth
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depends on ignoring the catastrophe of Auschwitz is a theology that is meaningless:
“…obviously there is no meaning of history one can save with one’s back turned to
Auschwitz; there is no truth of history which one can defend, and no God in history
which one can worship, with one’s back turned to Auschwitz.”75 To turn one’s face to
Auschwitz means first to recognize that the right to attempt to answer the question of the
meaning of suffering is given only to those who suffer—and certainly not to those who
are complicit in the causes of suffering,76 and second to commit oneself to a discipleship
rooted in the remembrance of those who suffer.77 For Metz this is not just one among
many theological tasks, it is the theological task. Only “in the face of the Jews” can a
theologian make claims about Christian identity. The realization that commitment to
those who suffer is in an intrinsic part of theology (and not merely its application) serves
as the starting point for Metz’s political theology.78
In his quest to do theology in the face of Auschwitz, Metz became increasingly
sympathetic to certain Marxist lines of critique, particularly those of Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno, two founders of the Frankfurt school. In their thought, he found an
explanation for the failure of contemporary theology to meet the challenge of Auschwitz.
J. Matthew Ashley writes that it is through their work that Metz connected this failure
with the transcendental subject as starting point: “He took over their critique of the
Enlightenment and of modernity under the rubric of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ and,
like them, became increasingly wary of any conceptualization of a ‘transcendental
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subject’ that could be formulated and utilized above or behind the backs of the terrifying
ruptures in history, paradigmatically represented by the Holocaust.”79 This critique
condemned exactly the sort of theological work that Metz had been doing under Rahner,
and he became increasingly suspicious of the adequacy of his mentor’s transcendental
approach to address the horrors of the 20th century.80
As he became more aware of the role of social location on the production of
theological discourse, Metz became more convinced that traditional theology was “closed
in on itself, sterile, cut off from the lived history of the endangered subject.”81 He looked
outside transcendental Thomism for a new language with which to speak about the
subject, turning in particular to “praxis” as a critical category for his theology, and
focusing his analysis on the historical becoming of faith, reason, and the subject.82 It is
not until the 1970s that this work is developed in a coherent way. By this point, Metz had
completely abandoned Rahner’s transcendental Thomism.83 Metz thus stands as first in a
long line of political and liberation theologians who recognize themselves as both
Rahner’s inheritors and critics, including Gustavo Gutierrez, Jon Sobrino, and Ignacio
Ellacuría.84
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In his 1997 Faith in History and Society, where he presents this theology most
systematically, Metz makes frequent, and sometimes rather scathing, comparisons to
Rahner’s theology. This critique is best understood in the context of Metz’s larger
argument, which begins with his definition of a “practical fundamental theology.” The
objective of all theology, Metz writes, is to provide “an apology for hope,”—in particular
the “the solidaristic hope in the God of the living and the dead who calls all persons to be
subjects in God’s presence.”85 A fundamental theology has a stronger responsibility to
this apologetic task, in offering a defense of the foundations of Christian theology. Such a
defense cannot be offered apart from the concrete practices of Christian living, or the
historicities of Christian faith.86 Thus practical fundamental theology recognizes that
Christian praxis is not merely application, but originary and intelligible in its own right.87
Traditional theologies have separated Christian praxis from dogmatics, and therefore
relegated praxis to the mere application of a purely theoretical Christian theology.88 As
Metz reminds us in the preface, his intention in developing a new political theology is
precisely to uncover the ways in which appeals to any pure theology are not, in fact,
“politically innocent,” but “evade the practical demands made by a radical
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Christianity.”89 But how do we place these demands back at the center of Christian
theology?
For Metz, answering this question requires that we turn to an analysis of our own
historical situation and the two contemporary crises that emerge for post-Enlightenment
Christianity.90 First, is Christianity’s own identity crisis as it becomes a minority religion
in an increasingly secular West. This decline in role challenges both the Church’s
articulation of its place in the modern world and its ability to minister to its members,
who find its mythology less and less compelling.91 For Metz, this presents two dangerous
alternatives: “extreme privatization on the one hand and a radical secularization on the
other.”92 But according to Metz, the Church must resist the temptation both to withdraw
from the world and to accommodate it. Second, is the crises of the subject precipitated by
the recognition that lurking behind “the ‘adult,’ ‘autonomous,’ ‘rational’ man of
modernity” was the bourgeois subject,93 one who privatizes morality and religion, usurps
authority and tradition, and reduces reason to a blunt and dominating rationality.”94 In
adopting this subject as its own religious subject, Metz argues that Christian theology has
contributed to the invisibility of other (particularly marginalized) subjects and has
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facilitated a worldview that, in reducing all to economic exchange and bureaucratic
process, denigrates the value of all human persons.95
Because Metz argues that the first crisis—that of Christianity’s role in the modern
West—is not a matter of message, “but rather a crisis of its subjects and institutions,”96
both of these crises center on the subject. They support and interpenetrate each other and
together lead to an increasingly “subjectless” theology.97 Theology must respond through
a re-turn to the subject, which resists the absolutization of any particular subject.98 This
turn to the subject must make all subjects visible; it must recognize suffering and
engender political action—in short, it must advocate for all to become subjects before
God: “Who will deny that Christian praxis must not only be concerned with one’s own
being a subject before God, but also has to be concerned precisely with how persons can
become and live as subjects in situations of misery and oppression?”99 With such an end
in mind, Metz sketches an image of subjectivity along the categories of memory,
narrative, and solidarity.
By placing memory and narrative at the center of Metz’s analysis of the subject,
he directs our attention to the fundamentally historical nature of human subjectivity. The
human person is not a static idea, but one who develops and becomes in history. Thus
one’s identity is something that is remembered and narrated. Here Metz refers to the fact
that oppression is often enabled by the erasure of historical identities—one is not just
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enslaved, but separated from one’s family and lied to about one’s history. Memory and
narrative are thus “dangerous.” They enable one to resist false narratives and to reclaim
one’s subjectivity, what Metz identifies as the first step in political empowerment.100
Thus Metz’s category of “dangerous memory” entails both looking back in solidarity
with those on the underside of history, and constructing a counter-narrative in order to
make a new future possible. It is a “form of eschatological hope.”101
Dangerous memory refers in an exemplary way to the memory of Christ’s
passion, in which God took the side of the invisible and the oppressed in order to
proclaim the Kingdom of God as one of liberation:
This memoria Jesu Christi is not one that deceitfully dispenses one from the risks
of the future. It is no bourgeois counterfigure to hope. On the contrary, it holds a
particular anticipation of the future as a future for the hopeless, the shattered and
oppressed. In this way it is a dangerous and liberating memory, which badgers
the present and calls it into question, since it does not remember just any open
future, but precisely this future, and because it compels believers to be in a
continual state of transformation in order to take this future into account.102
The fundamental mark of a “political consciousness ex memoria passionis”103 is a
willingnes to suffer with others. Such solidarity reclaims the “pathic structure” of praxis,
resisting both our apathy in light of suffering and the economic way of thinking of our
interactions with other human beings as transactions.104 Thus through this theological
anthropology of “memory-narrative-solidarity,”105 Metz connects the memory of Christ’s
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passion with the concrete histories of subjects and their actualization, and of the
solidaristic hope that all become subjects before God.
Rahner is a reoccurring foil in Metz’s development of this practical fundamental
theology. Two features of Rahner’s theology in particular are the subject of his critique:
Rahner’s evolutionary model of the world, and his transcendental analysis of the subject.
Working in tandem, they eclipse the historical becoming of the subject. In Metz’s
analysis, the scientific model of evolution has overly determined contemporary
understandings of the progress of human history. In the modern world, evolution
“functions as a root symbol for knowledge and logic in general, a symbol with a
theoretically unexamined totalizing tendency.”106 This model of evolutionary
development has facilitated an almost unanimous and unquestioned worldview in which
the free actions of individual subjects are seen as meaningless against the larger backdrop
of inevitable upward development:
Exposed to a bleakly tinged cosmos, locked into the infinite continuum of a time
devoid of surprise, people feel like they are being sucked into the waves of an
anonymous evolution that mercilessly rolls over everything from behind. With
this experience of a more fragile identity a new culture is in the offing, its first
name is apathy, the absence of feeling. It is important to pay careful attention to
the profound impact of this evolutionary consciousness, which shapes and
undergirds an entire theory of the world.107
What identity can stand against this steamrolling of evolution? What is the use of
solidarity with the oppressed if history and progress are out of our control? Thus, this
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model of progress “finally shuts down history, the subject, and liberation as authentic
realities.”108
At the same time that Rahner’s evolutionary model of history threatens to
overpower the significance of the subject, Rahner’s transcendental theology prevents one
from admitting that this subject is vulnerable. Metz defines transcendental theology as
that in which “the human being exists as the anticipatory grasp [Vorgriff] of God, and this
anticipatory grasp is the condition of the possibility of human knowing and acting.”109 At
a fundamental level, this theology begins with a reflection on the human being that
attempts to abstract from Christian praxis and from the historicity of subjects and their
actualization.110 It presents a universal subject defined without recourse to memory or
narrative. In short, Rahner’s theology, which ironically sought to privilege the place of
the subject and her experience of God, is ultimately incapable of allowing for the
historical structure of experience and the difficulties of becoming a subject before God.
Ultimately, Rahner’s theology stabilizes the identity of the religious subject at the cost of
not recognizing the subjectivity of those who suffer.111
Metz’s sharpest criticism emerges in an entire chapter devoted to contrasting his
theology with Rahner’s.112 While he admits that Rahner’s theology of the anonymous
Christian is the only consistent response so far to Christianity’s identity crisis, and
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respects both the mysterious nature of human being and God’s will that all be saved,
Metz argues that it is an inadequate response to the modern identity crisis facing
Christianity. It reduces explicit Christianity to a matter of knowledge available only to the
few and wise, while offering under the umbrella of “anonymous Christianity” a faith so
diluted as to include everyone.113 In both aspects it presents a version of Christianity that
demands little of the subject in terms of discipleship. In contrast to this, Metz argues that
“the full and explicit (!) knowledge of faith is itself a practical knowledge. In what is
most distinctive to it, the knowledge of faith is incommensurable with a purely scientific
and philosophical-idealist form of knowledge. It is rather the practical knowledge of
discipleship that is ‘arcane.’”114 If Christianity is a narrow road, it is because it calls the
subject to a difficult sort of praxis.
Metz clarifies the difference between his and Rahner’s theology through appeal to
the German fable of the hedgehog and the hare. In the story, the hedgehog “wins” the
race with the hare only because he has placed his identical wife at the opposite point in
the track. No matter how hard the hare runs, he sees a hedgehog ahead of him. Exhausted,
the hare eventually collapses. For Metz, the hare is the hero of the story. Despite his loss,
he is the only one who dared to run the race. Meanwhile, Rahner’s anonymous
Christianity is a trick akin to the hedgehogs’. Rahner assures us that the story ends well,
obscuring those for whom the road is dangerous, and freeing those who are comfortable
from the demand to suffer alongside them. What Rahner misses is that human persons
only become subjects precisely by running this race: “The ‘running’—in which one can
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also get left behind—is an integral part of securing one’s identity, together with the
dangers it brings; it cannot be compensated for transcendentally by anything else.”115
Only the one who risks losing her life has any chance of finding it. Metz urges us
therefore to take the “option for the hare.”116
Metz’s critique raises critical challenges to Rahner’s theological anthropology and
all anthropologies that treat the human being as static and ahistorical. If we state a priori
that the subject is characterized by the freedom to effect a personal decision for God, then
we will be blind to those who are struggling for freedom. If we begin an analysis of the
subject without any reference to historical context, it is likely that we will offer our own
experience as universal, justifying the marginalization of those whom we find different.
Finally, if we remain confident that all will be well at the end of the time, we may lose a
since of urgency in fighting for justice in this time. Thus the question of whether
Rahner’s subject is adequately embodied and in-world is not politically neutral.
The question at hand is therefore whether or not Metz’s assessment of Rahner’s
theology is accurate. First, is “transcendental-idealism” truly the starting point of
Rahner’s theological anthropology? If so, is such a starting point intrinsically inimical to
an understanding of the historicity of the subject? Is Rahner’s theology completely
wrong, or merely incomplete? There is significant debate over the answers to these
questions. A number of Rahner’s readers suggest that his theology could have easily been
expanded to provide a richer understanding of the subject.117
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Rahner himself responds to the critique in Faith in History and Society by saying
that, while it points out where his theology is incomplete,118 his understanding of the
relationship between the transcendental and categorical aspects of human experience
provides an answer to Metz’s criticism:
…it has always been clear in my theology that a “transcendental experience” (of
God and of grace) is always mediated through a categorical experience in history,
in interpersonal relationships, and in society. If one not only sees and takes
seriously these necessary mediations of transcendental experience but also fills it
out in a concrete way, then one already practices in an authentic way political
theology, or, in other words, a practical fundamental theology. On the other hand,
such a political theology is, if it truly wishes to concern itself with God, not
possible without reflection on those essential characteristics of man which a
transcendental theology discloses.119
For Rahner, the fact that the transcendental is always embodied in the categorical means
two things: first, that Metz is misreading him by focusing on the transcendental as if it
was not intimately connected with the categorical and second, that Rahner’s theology is
always and already political. However, recent work by Jennifer Erin Beste suggests that
Rahner’s understanding of the relationship between the transcendental and categorical
may not be as sufficient in responding to catastrophe as Rahner hopes.
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Trauma
In her book God and the Victim: Traumatic Intrusions on Grace and Freedom, Beste
challenges whether Rahner’s theology can adequately respond to cases of severe trauma.
While the study of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other traumatic disorders
is ongoing, there is a general consensus regarding the type of symptoms that survivors
present. These symptoms include difficulties with understanding time, experiencing and
articulating emotions, and making decisions regarding one’s life. In short, research in
trauma studies dispels the myth of the self as a cohesive rational agent, capable of acting
in her own self-interest.120 Beste’s research focuses in particular on children suffering
from severe and long-term abuse who, on account of trauma disorders, never develop the
capacity to relate to themselves or to others in a healthy way.121 Here Metz’s concerns
about the subject are again crystallized. Memory and narrative are precisely the cognitive
capacities affected in trauma disorders. Survivors lose the ability to experience memories
as in the past. Constant flashbacks disrupt their sense of time and prevent them from
understanding their lives under any cohesive narrative.
Early on in her theological education, fieldwork with such child survivors of
severe abuse prompted Beste to ask: “Do these kids really have the freedom to overcome
their self-destructive actions and cultivate healthy relationships with themselves and
others? How can a God who is truly loving allow these kids to be subject to such human
cruelty and be so damaged? How can we honestly have faith in the power of God’s grace
120

Jennifer Beste, God and the Victim: Traumatic Intrusions on Grace and Freedom (Oxford
University Press, 2007), 5-8, 37-53. For more on these generalized symptoms of trauma see Judith
Hermann, Trauma and Recovery (New York: BasicBooks, 1992).
121

Beste, God and the Victim, 4.

38
when confronted with the suffering of these kids?”122 It is with the “dangerous memory”
of these children in mind that Beste examines Rahner’s theology, whose emphases on the
inalienable freedom to effect a fundamental option depends on a universal account of
both God’s grace and human freedom.
As Beste summarizes, in Rahner’s theology all persons have, at the transcendental
level, the freedom to effect a fundamental option for or against God. This freedom is
determined at (though not exhausted by) the categorical level through one’s discrete
choices. This relationship in turn explains the unity between love of God and love of
neighbor in Rahner’s thought. The former Beste reads as a direct and proportional
function of the latter: “…growing in our love for others is the only way we respond
positively to God’s self-communication and experience human fulfillment.”123
Beste acknowledges that in Rahner’s theology, not all categorical acts are
actualizations of transcendental freedom, only those that are “sufficiently free.”
Extenuating circumstances, for instance, may cause someone to fail to love one’s
neighbor while their fundamental option for God remains intact. Thus while
transcendental and categorical freedom exist in unity, it is not possible to reason from
one’s visible choices to one’s relationship with God—even for oneself. Further it is
through the aggregate of one’s freedom over time, not a given individual act, which a
person effects a fundamental option for God.124
According to Beste, this distinction between one’s actions and one’s option for
God is not enough to answer the theological challenge trauma poses. The extent of the
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damage to one’s ability to act freely in the world is so severe in cases of early and
repetitive abuse, that it calls into question any theology of freedom: “…incest victims’
experiences and feminist insights concerning the pervasive extent to which the self can be
fragmented by oppressive discourses indicate that Rahner underestimates the extent to
which interpersonal harm can thwart the development of adequate subjectivity and
freedom,”125 without which, Beste argues, it is difficult to see how one is capable of the
self-disposal necessary for effecting a fundamental option for God. She goes on to ask:
“Could it be that the damage these incest victims and other trauma victims sustain means
that their freedom to effect a fundamental option may not be realized in their temporal
existence? If so what does this say about a theology of freedom that makes a fundamental
option the center of what it means to be human?”126
Ultimately, Beste argues that Rahner fails to adequately acknowledge the effects
of interpersonal harm on one’s capacity to realize the sufficient freedom to effect a
fundamental option. She diagnoses this failure as located in ignorance: Rahner was
nearing the end of his life during the rise of trauma studies as a field and Beste argues
that he would himself have revised his theology if he were aware of the challenge it
posed. Instead, she must undertake this revision herself. She argues that a theology of
grace and freedom must first acknowledge the power of sin to disable the neighbor’s
freedom and then articulate how grace is also mediated through loving interpersonal
relations. Here, she sees a grace that corresponds to the horrors of trauma: just as one’s
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permeability to and need of community is the precondition for severe personal harm, it is
also the precondition for healing. Grace is mediated socially.127
Beste’s critique is most forceful if one agrees with her that salvation must involve
a free response to God’s offer, and that the freedom to effect a fundamental option is
dependent on one’s freedom to make healthy, rational, loving decisions in general.128 The
dissolution of the self that trauma survivors experience is a tragedy in its own right, and
one that raises critical questions about both God’s goodness and human vulnerability to
harm. However, to speak of the implications of this dissolution for one’s relationship
with God—and not merely one’s perception of one’s relationship with God—requires
identifying precisely the relationship between one’s transcendental and categorical
freedom.
Part of the problem entails mapping the type of self-disposal threatened by the
symptoms of trauma disorders onto Rahner’s theology of freedom. On the one hand, we
are not speaking merely of “external threats” to freedom. While the source of severe
interpersonal harm is external to the self, what is threatened is not merely one’s
relationship to the world and her ability to act freely in it, but one’s relationship to
herself. Thus such violation of one’s freedom affects her entire self-relation at the root.
On the other hand, even such self-relation—as it exists in space and time and is available
to reflection (by the self or others)—is not simply identical with what Rahner refers to as
theological freedom.
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But such hair-splitting does not resolve Beste’s questions. Even if the sort of selfdisposal threatened by severe interpersonal harm is not identical to one’s freedom to
effect a fundamental option for God, we are still left with the question of how these
freedoms relate. If the option for God is conceived (even analogously) as self-disposal
and/or self-relationship, in what way can we say it is embodied categorically when those
capacities are damaged? If theological freedom is severed from one’s freedom in history,
is the Rahnerian subject free simply by fiat? Ultimately, is it possible to maintain that
transcendental freedom is actualized categorically without also admitting the possibility
that external forces can threaten one’s theological freedom? A spirit-in-world seems to be
by definition vulnerable to that world and therefore to severe harm.
Whereas Metz is concerned that a commitment to a transcendental analysis of the
subject obscures the historical struggle for subjectivity, Beste is worried that the loss of
subjectivity is determinative of one’s relationship with God. While these analyses run in
different directions they both highlight the difficulty of speaking universally and
optimistically about the subject’s relationship with God when a casual glance at the world
shows that many are fighting just to be subjects. More relevant to our task, each
demonstrates the stakes of speaking adequately to the subject’s spiritual-embodied
nature. A theological anthropology must speak of both the subject’s vulnerability to
catastrophe as well as its potential for resistance, and this entails determining in what
ways the subject is constituted in and through transaction with the world.
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Conclusion: Resurrecting the Body in Rahner’s Theology
We have examined three distinct crises of the transcendental subject: the Ernstfall,
Auschwitz, and trauma. These crises represent critical challenges to the adequacy of
Rahner’s anthropology: Does Rahner depend too much on a philosophical account of the
subject who has no need of the cross? Does his transcendental-idealism, in its guarantee
of eschatological hope, eclipse the plight of those who are struggling to become subjects
before God? Does his understanding of freedom as essential to salvation undermine the
ability to offer hope for those who suffer severe interpersonal harm? At the least, these
questions indicate where Rahner’s theology is unclear, and at most where it is inadequate.
The lines of each of these critiques cross on the body. Balthasar, Metz, and Beste
each question whether or not the relationship between the transcendental and categorical
in Rahner’s thought is sufficient to explain how the subject is in-world. To raise this
question is also to raise the question of embodiment. It is through the body that the
transcendental is actualized in the categorical; it is as embodied that the spirit is in-world.
Despite this fact, neither of these figures address in any substantial manner Rahner’s
writings on the body. In fact, little has been written on Rahner’s theology of embodiment
at all.129
This neglect is likely because Rahner’s more concrete and ad hoc writings about
the Christian life—in which a more historical and embodied subject emerges—have been
eclipsed by more philosophical titles like Hörer des Wortes. For example, Phillip Endean
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and Karen Kilby have argued that the role of Ignatian spirituality in Rahner’s work has
often been ignored in favor of his alleged philosophical commitments (a point confirmed
by two of Rahner’s biographers, Karl Neufeld and Herbert Vorgrimler).130 Endean and
Kilby even suggest that Balthasar’s criticisms are rooted in this misreading. If however,
Rahner’s writings on Ignatian spirituality and his more pastoral and spiritual writings on
the difficulties and challenges of Christian life are made central to his theological
anthropology, a more robust theology of embodiment and Christian discipleship emerges.
As Harvey D. Egan writes, Rahner “unfolds these mysteries [of the Trinity, incarnation,
and grace] into every dimension of human life, even into a ‘theology of everyday
things’—a theology of work, of seeing, of laughing, of eating and sleeping, and of
walking and sitting.”131 It is this theology of everyday things that we will attend to in this
dissertation.
As we examine Rahner’s writings, we will look for aspects of his theological
anthropology that might counter his more transcendental and idealist impulses, and lend
texture and history to his subject. In short, we will seek to uncover—perhaps even
resurrect—the body in Rahner’s theology. As I will argue in the next chapter, even when
Rahner is operating in his most abstract philosophical register, such as Geist in Welt, his
work attends to the paradox and ambiguity of the embodied nature of human being. In
later chapters, we will see how this understanding of embodiment develops in his
thought, and show how it may be carried forward in response to these crises.
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Chapter 2:
The Subject as Spirit-in-World
As we saw in the last chapter, much of the criticism of Rahner’s transcendental subject
focuses on the extent his philosophical dissertation, Geist in Welt, influences his
theological anthropology as a whole.132 To Balthasar, this text exposes Rahner’s later
ideas—particularly that of the anonymous Christian—as rooted not in revelation but in a
Fichtean philosophy of the subject. To Metz, Rahner’s analysis of the subject in Geist in
Welt neglected the personal Mitwelt and made the matter of salvation too individual and
ahistorical. While Beste’s criticism relates more precisely to Rahner’s later development
of a theology of freedom, her interrogation of the ability for Rahner’s theology to account
for interpersonal harm can be seen as a development of Metz’s concerns. Each of these
critiques implicitly calls into question whether Rahner’s theological anthropology offers a
sufficient account of embodiment. In this chapter we turn to an analysis of Rahner’s
understanding of the body, beginning with his early work and focusing in particular on
Geist in Welt.
It is the fact that Geist in Welt is the object of so much critique that makes
focusing on it worthwhile in studying Rahner’s theology of the body. If this text
represents Rahner at his most philosophical and idealistic, then it can serve as a limiting
case for Rahner’s writing on embodiment. A limiting case represents the outer limits of a
function under extreme variables. Here those extremities are represented by the purpose
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and scope of the project, a development of a Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge, and
by the material condition of the project, a dissertation in philosophy. In short, we have
every reason to expect this text to offer the least historical and least theological account
of the subject. Taken as a limiting case, analysis of this text can help us determine more
precisely the nature of Rahner’s understanding of embodiment, and of its potential
weaknesses. Likewise, any defense of Rahner we can posit from this text alone should
support his work as a whole.
While Rahner’s ultimate goal in Geist in Welt is to develop a metaphysics of
knowledge, his argument turns on an ontology of human being as that which becomes
itself precisely in, with, and through the other. In interpreting how Thomas’ axiom that
all knowledge is rooted in the senses can be reconciled with the possibility of
metaphysical knowledge, Rahner proposes the paradoxical idea that spirit accomplishes
transcendence because of, and not despite, its existence in the material world. This
requires an examination not only of the knowing subject’s relationship to the material
world, but to her own materiality. Thus the nature of the body—while Rahner rarely uses
the term—is a central part of this text.
In reading Geist in Welt, we will take a broad view of the argument as a whole,
zooming in on those portions of the text where Rahner specifically develops an
understanding of embodiment. As we will see, his argument not only addresses early
20th-century debates on Thomistic epistemology, but also the nature of the experience of
God. To see this, we will need to examine Geist in Welt within the context of some of
Rahner’s other early works. Read in light of his early writings on spirituality, it becomes
clear that what Rahner develops in Geist in Welt is a theology of an embodied subject in
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her relationship to God. Thus while many have argued that Geist in Welt sets out the
philosophical foundations of Rahner’s theology,133 I will argue that it represents just one
spring through which Rahner’s deeper theological commitments come to the surface.
The Early Rahner’s “Ordinary Mysticism”
While Geist in Welt is often taken as a philosophical starting point for his whole
theology, Rahner’s first writings were actually on the history of spirituality. In 1922,
briefly after his graduation from high school, Karl followed in his brother Hugo’s
footsteps and joined the Jesuits. Shortly after, in 1924, he published his first article, “Why
We Need to Pray.”134 As a student of theology at Valkenburg he began collaborating with
his brother on a number of projects on Ignatian theology.135 Between 1922-37 he and his
brother Hugo developed a catalog of early Ignatian primary sources.136 The impact of
Ignatian spirituality on Rahner’s thought is confirmed in the work of Karl Neufeld,
Herbert Vorgrimler, Annemarie Kidder, Philip Endean, and Harvey D. Egan, who all
argue that Rahner’s first major publications in 1932 through 1934—on the spiritual
senses in Origin and Bonaventure and on Evagrius Ponticus’ spiritual writings—emerge
from his attempt to wrestle theologically with Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises.137
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In particular, Endean notes that Rahner develops his understanding of the
immediate experience of God (unmittelbare Gotteserfahrung) along the lines of
Bonaventure’s spiritual touch: “[Unmittelbare Gotteserfahrung] indicates something dark
and often tacit, more a matter of feeling than of knowing.”138 In this way, Rahner rejected
the terms of the turn of the 20th-century debates on the nature of mystical experience,
which offered the following dichotomy: either all people were called to a prayer life with
no direct experience of God or that a direct and miraculous mystical experience was
reserved for the few.139 Rahner’s appeal to Bonaventure’s spiritual touch offered a third
way—an intimate union of God and the self that involves no mental representation.
Rahner’s use of the word “immediate [unmittelbare]” here refers not only to the
experience of the direct touch of God, but to the fact that such a relationship is not
mediated by thought or language. As Endean explains, “Thus the word “immediate” here
does not mean clear and distinct: rather “[it] refers to an immediate contact between the
self and God—a contact to which our conscious awareness has some access, but normally
of an obscure and oblique kind.”140
Through the metaphor of contact rather than traditional epistemological models,
Rahner was able to explain how the experience of God is possible without appealing to
the miraculous. This allowed him further to argue that the experience of God is intrinsic
and necessary to the subject—and therefore available in some vague way to reflection—
rather than a violation of laws governing experience. This metaphor ultimately allowed
him to proclaim that the extraordinary experience of God is profoundly ordinary. While it
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is difficult to prove definitively, Endean suggests that this reading is motivated by an
Ignatian understanding of the centrality of the experience of God to the Christian life.141
In 1935 Hugo and Karl produced a German translation of Jerónimo Nadal’s
address on prayer.142 In their introduction to this text, they name two principles of
Ignatius’ theology as “fundamental and distinctive in the Jesuit calling”—finding God in
all things, and being contemplative in action.143 Endean suggests that it is in translating
Nadal that Rahner gets the insight that “openness to the transcendent God does not
preclude human activity, but indeed demands it” and that this in turn leads him to rethink
the fundamental theology of his training.144
Rahner’s superiors had planned for him to teach philosophy, and sent him to study
at Frieburg. There he took a seminar under Heidegger and wrote the dissertation that
would become Geist in Welt under Martin Honecker, finishing in 1936. In Herbert
Vorgrimler’s words, its thesis was that “human knowledge comes about first and
foremost in the world of experience, as the human spirit is always directed toward the
phenomenon (conversio ad phantasma).”145 Given the work that Rahner had been doing,
this project appears to be motived by a desire to theorize about the experience of God
presumed in the Spiritual Exercises. How is it possible to find God “in all things?” Thus,
as Vorgrimler writes, Rahner’s analysis of Thomas in Geist in Welt should not only be
placed in dialogue with Kant and Heidegger, but also “Ignatius and the significance
141
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which human sense have for him in relationship with God.”146 Rahner’s development of a
Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge is part of a larger analysis of the subject’s
relationship to God.
Geist in Welt
According to Rahner, his purpose in this text is to demonstrate “how, according to
Thomas, human knowing can be spirit in the world.”147 This construction “spirit in the
world”—more accurately translated “spirit-in-world”148—refers to both the human
being’s transcendence of and embeddedness in the material world. Rahner defines the
two terms dialectically: “By spirit I mean a power which reaches out beyond the world
and knows the metaphysical. World is the name of the reality which is accessible to the
immediate experience of man.”149 Human knowing, as spirit-in-world, is therefore that
which reaches beyond what is immediate to know the metaphysical. The question is how
this reaching is accomplished. If spirit is in-world, how can it transcend that same world?
Thus Rahner’s task is to provide a metaphysic of knowledge that can explain how beings
in the world can have knowledge beyond what is immediately accessible. While his
argument initially addresses the possibility of metaphysics—as that which by definition
exceeds an intuition delineated by space and time—Rahner is ultimately concerned with
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the possibility of knowing God.150 How is that finite beings can know and love an infinite
God?
In the register of human knowing, spirit is represented by the agent intellect as the
capacity that reaches out beyond the world. Likewise, that which is immediately
accessible to human knowledge is available through sensibility. To ask how “human
knowing can be spirit in the world” is thus to ask how the intellect knows the
metaphysical via sensibility. How can the human being know through sense experience
what is by definition beyond sense experience?
It is important to emphasize at the outset that Rahner’s goal is not to provide a
general account of the subject as spirit-in-world, but of the knower as spirit-in-world.
Thus his analysis of both the transcendence and in-world-ness of the subject are cached
out in epistemological terms. At times, “spirit” and “intellect” are used interchangeably in
this text. It would be a mistake to interpret this limitation as evidence that Rahner defines
the subject as solely, or even primarily, a knower—or worse, that spirit increases
proportionally to one’s intellectuality. Rahner states that “the problem of receptive
knowledge is identical with the question of man” only insofar as they both understand the
subject as one whose “presence-to-self” is always a “being-with-the-other.”151 In this
sense, what is foundational to the human subject is this relationship to the other, not the
intellect as such. Rather, the intellect is that constituent of human knowing that “reaches
out beyond the world.”
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The Conversion to the Phantasm
Rahner’s analysis centers on Thomas’ doctrine of the conversion of the intellect to the
phantasm. He begins the dissertation with an excerpt of the article in which Thomas
describes this doctrine,152 and the first of three parts of the dissertation is Rahner’s
exegesis of this text. Rahner describes his method of reading Thomas as philosophical
rather than historical. Whereas the latter would focus on the sources Thomas Aquinas
used and the person Thomas Aquinas was, Rahner’s philosophical reading attempts to
follow the internal logic of the argument itself:
…If what matters is to grasp the really philosophical in a philosopher, this can
only be done if one joins him in looking at the matter itself…So our procedure
here cannot be that of gathering together everything and anything that Thomas
ever said, as though all were of equal weight, and organizing it according to some
extrinsic principle…Rather what we must try to do is grasp his philosophy anew
as it unfolds from its first and often hardly expressed starting point.153
Rahner learned this method from Heidegger. When looking back on the significance of
the philosopher’s work on his life, Rahner cited less the content of Heidegger’s
philosophy and more its process:
He taught us how to read texts in a new way, to ask what is behind the text, to see
connections between a philosopher’s individual texts and his statements that
wouldn’t immediately strike the ordinary person, and so on…In my manner of
thinking, in the courage to question anew so much in the tradition considered selfevident, in the struggle to incorporate modern philosophy into today’s Christian
theology, here I have certainly learned something from Heidegger and will,
therefore, always be thankful to him.154
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One can see this particular way of reading in this dissertation of Rahner’s. Rahner’s
exegesis of this article is shaped less by a concern for historical accuracy—note the
relative lack of attention to any historical sources—than it is by following a Thomistic
line of questioning from inside what Rahner saw to be the philosophies of his day.
Rahner begins this analysis by following Thomas’ definition of the conversion to
the phantasm as the intellect’s “reference of the universal to a ‘this,’”155 in an act of
judgment. Broadly speaking, the doctrine states that the human intellect knows only
through a turn to the phenomenon. All objective knowledge requires a concrete reference
to the material world. “Something” Rahner writes, “is always known about
something.”156 No judgments can be made, no universals can be thought, apart from such
reference. Conversely, Rahner notes that one cannot think of an object without reference
to a universal: “An “it” alone, without a “something” about it, cannot be conceived in
thought at all.”157
The doctrine of the conversion to the phantasm signals that the human intellect
cannot exist apart from sensibility (or the capacity for sensibility, the imagination), but in
fact requires sensibility “to be able to be itself in actuality.”158 The intellect does not
operate in the body like an astronaut manning a vessel in an uncharted world. Rather, the
intellect becomes itself only in union with sensibility: “Thus the human intellect appears
precisely not as a fixed quantity based on itself; it is itself only in a union with what is not
intellect (corpus passibile-phantasma)…In the radical unity of intellect and imagination,
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the essential unity of passible body and intellect comes to light for the first time.”159 To
say that all knowledge is a conversion to the phantasm is therefore to speak of the radical
union of intellect and sensibility that constitutes human being.
The doctrine of the conversion to the phantasm places the human being firmly and
unambiguously in the world. But this appears to threaten the possibility for her to “reach
out beyond the world” and know things outside of it. “Thus,” Rahner writes, “the
question of the conversion to the phantasm is the question about the possibility of
metaphysics based on an intuition which takes place within the horizon of space and
time.”160 What remains is to explain how it is that the intellect knows the metaphysical
despite the doctrine of the conversion to the phantasm.
Rahner’s answer to this question is somewhat paradoxical. He argues that it is the
very constitution of the subject—in which the intellect is only itself in union with
sensibility—that enables knowledge of metaphysical things and, ultimately, orients the
subject toward God. Thus what seems to be at odds, the subject’s identity as “spirit” and
her existence “in-world,” are aspects of the one human being that increase in direct
proportion. To understand how this is possible, it is necessary first to start with Thomas’
own definition of what knowing is, and its relationship to being.
In Thomistic metaphysics, knowing is being present-to-self. By this definition, it
would seem that the subject only has access to her own being as an object of knowledge.
Knowledge of the other would only be possible if, in Rahner’s words, “the knower itself
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is the being of the other.”161 However, this is, he argues, precisely what we find to be true
of human being. What is distinctive about the human intellect (as opposed to, for
example, the angelic intellect) is that it is embodied. Rahner’s retrieval of the doctrine of
the conversion to the phantasm entails that the intellect is only itself in union with
sensibility—in short, only in union with what is other. Thus the intellect is capable of
knowing the other because itself has “already and always entered into otherness.”162 This
does not mean simply that the knower is sensible and therefore receptive to knowledge of
the sensible. As “the being of the other” the knower is fundamentally constituted for the
other. This being for another is the condition of the possibility of knowledge of the other,
since Rahner writes,
Only if a being is ontologically separated from itself by the fact that it is not the
being of itself, but the being of what is absolutely “other,” can it have the
possibility of possessing a foreign ontological actuality as its own in such a way
that everything that is its own is by that very fact another’s because the being of
the knower in question is not being for itself, but being for and to another.163
One’s ontological separation from oneself is the possibility for receptive knowledge of
another. The human being is defined by relationality and alterity at her most fundamental
level.
For this entering into otherness to count as true “being of the other,”—and not
merely an inhabiting of the other—the relationship between intellect and sensibility must
somehow be intrinsic to the actualization of the intellect itself. If spirit is to know the
other, it must know itself as the other, and therefore must produce sensibility in such a
way that it remains an intimate part of itself. The language that Rahner uses to describe
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this relationship is potency. Rahner writes that spirit “produces sensibility as its potency”
in such a way that it “thus retains in itself sensibility’s accomplishment as its own.”164
This means in turn that sense intuition is not merely something added extrinsically to the
activity of the intellect:
Hence conversion to the phantasm does not mean intellectual knowledge
“accompanied by phantasms” (which after all are not things, but a content of the
one human consciousness to which thought also belongs), but is the term
designating the fact that sense intuition and intellectual thought are united in the
one human knowledge.165
The intellect accomplishes knowledge, and thus actualizes its own potency, only in and
through sensibility. Rahner refers to this aspect of human spirit as possible intellect:
intellect that requires material to actualize itself.166 As the being of the other, the human
being requires the other in order to come to herself.
The intellect accomplishes knowledge through sensibility, but sensibility, as the
being of the other, is always an abandonment of self to the other. Through it, the knower
abandons herself to undifferentiated union with the world:
…If sensibility is to be the first and original reception of the other, of the world, if
it is to be receptive intuition, it made this possible only by the fact that it became
an ontological abandonment to the other, an act of matter. Therefore, it cannot let
the other stand over against it at a distance as object because it is not “subjective”
enough itself, it is too “objective,” it is always and essentially actuality of the
other.167
By entering into the otherness of its own embodied sensibility, the intellect unites itself
with the otherness of the world. Thus, Rahner writes that, “sensibility could be more
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correctly defined Thomistically as the a priori possession of world as such.”168 That is,
prior to any act of knowledge the subject exists in an undifferentiated unity with the
world on account of the fact that she herself is constituted by spirit’s abandonment of
itself to the other—and therefore the world.
Given this possession of the world, typical epistemological problems concerning
the correspondence between “interior” mental states and the “exterior” world become
absurd:
…The interiority of sensibility as the act of matter is precisely its exteriority, and
vice versa.”169 However, such a possession of the world is not knowledge, strictly
speaking, because it does not make a distinction between subject and object. The
real epistemological challenge is not to show how the divide between the subject
and object can be overcome, but how subject and object can be differentiated:
“Thus for the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge the problem does not lie in
bridging the gap between knowing and object by a “bridge” of some kind: such a
“gap” is merely a pseudo-problem. Rather the problem is how the known, which
is identical with the knower, can stand over against the knower as other, and how
there can be a knowledge which receives another as such.170
In other words, how does the knower know the object as another and not merely as an
extension of herself? And how does the knower, as the being of the other, become a
subject?
Knowledge requires a process of objectification, in which the knower recognizes
herself as a subject standing against an object. Rahner refers to this process as
abstraction. Because human knowing originates in a primary “being-with-the-world”
(Bei-der-Welt-Sein) or “being-with-another” it must set itself against the other in order to
know it in-itself (Ansich): “But human knowing is first of all being-with-the-world (Bei-
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der-Welt-Seing), a being-with-another in sensibility, and therefore knowledge of this
other in its in-itself (Ansich) as proper object is only possible by setting the other opposite
and referring the knowledge to this other which is set opposite and exists in itself.”171
Briefly put, Rahner defines abstraction, as the “liberation of the subject from sensibility’s
abandonment of the other of the world.”172 In abstraction, a judgmental affirmation is
made about the object, in which the intellect recognizes the object as an instantiation of a
universal.173
Only in this abstraction from the original apprehension of the world does the
distinction between subject and object emerge. As the knower stands against the object so
she too becomes a subject for the first time. Her self-knowledge is the corollary rather
than the ground of knowledge of the other.174 She does not exist fully present-to-self and
then come into contact with possible objects of knowledge. Rather she comes to know the
object and herself as subject in the same movement of abstraction:
When man begins to ask about being in its totality, he finds himself already and
invariably away from himself, situated in the world, in the other through
sensibility. Sensibility means the givenness of being (which is being-present-toself) over to the other, to matter. So the sensible is always situated at that
undivided mid-point between self-possession through a separative setting-self
over against every other (Sichabsetzen), and a total abandonment (Verlorenheit)
to the other which would completely conceal the existent from itself. But man
asks about being in its totality, he places it in question comprehensively and in its
totality (and thereby himself), and by doing this he places himself as the one
asking in sharp relief against all the rest, from world and from himself as being
already and always in the world through sensibility. Thus he “objectifies” the
other and his abandonment to it that is already realized in sensibility. He returns
from “outside,” where he already and always was. The other, which he himself
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was in sensibility, which he received and which was conscious to him in such a
way that as sentient knower he could not separate himself from it, since sensibility
as such only receives the other in that it becomes it: this other now places itself at
a distance from the knower, it becomes object (Gegen-stand)… It is not until then
that man stands in the world as man…175
Thus the intellect can be defined not only as that which emanates sensibility as a part of
itself, but as that which returns from sensibility to stand against the object. In Rahner’s
words, the intellect is “the capacity of the one human knowledge to place the other,
which is given in sensibility, away from itself and in question, to judge it, to objectify it
and thereby to make the knower a subject for the first time, that is, one who is present to
himself (bei sich selber) and to the other (beim andern).”176
Through this process of abstraction, the knower can be said to “return” to herself,
though not in such a way that would imply an original fully-formed subjectivity prior to
the encounter with the other. There is no self before this return. Since the knower is the
being of the other, self-presence is accomplished via the other. As Rahner summarizes,
“coming-to-oneself (Zu-sich-selbst-kommen) is a coming-from-another (Von-einemandern-herkommen).”177 Such a return does not entail leaving the other to come back to
oneself. One’s coming-to-oneself does not occur in a rejection or negation of the world.
The return is not “a complete liberation from the sentient possession of the world,” but
rather “is always a coming from world and can only exist as a continual coming from
world.”178 Thus, the human being is one who through continual engagement with the
world comes to herself.
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The Vorgriff auf Esse
As we have seen above, abstraction entails a judgment about a concrete referent with
respect to a universal.179 However, according to the doctrine of the conversion to the
phantasm, human knowing begins with knowledge of the concrete individual. This means
that the intellect contains no a priori categories or universals, but must deduce these
solely from what is given in sense intuition. This appears to render null the possibility of
judgment. If all knowledge begins with the individual, where do the universals required
for such judgment come from?
In order to show how human knowing can be spirit-in-world, Rahner must show
how the intellect can transcend mere statements about thisness to statements about
whatness. In other words, how do I identify that this individual furry grayness beside me
is just one instantiation of a category of things we call “cat”? I have a concrete sense
intuition of this particular creature, but not of cat-ness itself. According to the doctrine of
the conversion to the phantasm, I must somehow intuit cat-ness via sensibility.
For Rahner, the condition of this possibility is “an anticipation [Vorgriff]
(although empty) of the world in general, of space and time as a whole.”180 To explain
what he means by this anticipation [Vorgriff], it is helpful to use the metaphor of sight,
where seeing an object corresponds to knowing it. We could argue that true seeing
requires an active looking on the part of the subject. Similarly, Rahner argues that the
condition of the possibility of objective knowledge is the subject’s active and outward
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relationship to the world. She must be constituted by a dynamic openness. Because this
dynamism is always self-transcending, Metz refers to the Vorgriff as “a negative limitexperience [eine negative Grenzerfahrung].”181 Tallon offers “a reaching out without
grasping” as an alternative which highlights both the insatiability of the Vorgriff as well
as the impossibility of grasping absolute being—which, we will see below, Vorgriff is
oriented toward.182
I prefer the common English translation “anticipation.” The semantic range is
broad enough to cover the restless striving of spirit under many registers of analysis, not
just human knowing. It is active (opposed to a term like “waiting” or “receptive”) but
does not describe an intentional act (as does “reaching”). Compared to Metz’s and
Tallon’s options it is more obviously connected with desire. It is easy to imagine
anticipation as something transcending the categories of thought, affect, and will—
something more interior to the subject’s identity as well as her relationship to the world.
This translation choice risks the misunderstanding that Vorgriff precedes objective
knowledge temporally. As Tallon clarifies, “Rahner does not mean an apprehension that
occurs before the concept, but rather an action interior to and constitutive of the concept
and of objective knowledge.”183 Here we can return to our sight metaphor to clarify why
this is true. Vision is a condition of the possibility of my seeing an object. In this way it is
logically prior. However, there is no vision that exists chronologically prior to sight of the
object. I am conscious of my vision only on account of what I see. Likewise one’s
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anticipation, as the condition of the possibility of knowledge of an object, is coextensive
to the object it exceeds.
One beholds an object as object only if it appears against a background. From the
perspective of the knower, recognition of an object therefore requires a field of vision
larger than the object. The possibility of having an object in sight therefore entails a
distinct relationship between the viewer—who casts her vision beyond the object—and
the world—against which the object appears.
In a similar manner, Rahner argues that this empty anticipation of the world
allows the intellect to perceive the object against a horizon of possibility.184 Now this
horizon cannot be another object. If it were, then it would need to appear against another,
larger, horizon. The anticipation of the horizon must be a fundamentally different sort of
act than the apprehension of an object. It is therefore important to distinguish anticipation
from any cognitive or content-laden understanding of the world. Likewise, the subject
does not compare the object against the horizon as if they were two objects. Again this
would require another horizon against which they could appear. Rather, in one act of
knowing, the subject apprehends the object against its horizon.185
In doing so, the subject recognizes the object as finite. Against the horizon, the
object appears as an instantiation of limitation. Just as an outline demarcates the space
within from the space without, the comprehension of the object entails also an awareness
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of its infinite possibility. Thus, Rahner argues, what is given in sensibility alone prompts
the intellect to recognize an object as a form limited by matter.186 The intellect escapes
the limits of “thisness”—transcending the raw sensory data given by the object—
precisely because the object is always given in relief against such potentiality.
Thus the synthesis entailed in judgment is not a matter of uniting two concepts
with some sort of mental copula. The mind does not have access to this-ness on the one
hand and what-ness on the other, in order to place them together in a flash of inspiration.
This would require that sensibility and intellect were two separate but parallel
constituents of human being. It would also violate the doctrine of the conversion to the
phantasm. Rather, synthesis is a unified reference to an object, which on account of the
empty anticipation of world appears as form limited by matter. We can thus revise our
definition of judgment as the synthesis of an object with a universal that is itself always
and already referential, albeit to an ambiguous “this.”187 To speak of the knowing
subject’s anticipation of the horizon of being is therefore to speak of one dynamic
relationship between the subject and world, within which objective knowledge is
possible.
We are now in a position to see why the relationship between conversion and
abstraction is not sequential but simultaneous. Logically speaking, each presupposes the
other.188 We have seen above why the intellect is blind without the conversion to the
phantasm. In the absence of a priori mental categories all knowledge is a turning to
matter. The agent intellect or spirit produces sensibility, a process that constitutes in itself
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what Rahner calls “the decisive conversion to the phantasm.”189 That is, our very
selves—not just discrete acts of knowing—are oriented to the phantasm. This means
however that the conversion to the phantasm arises out of spiritual ground. The sensible
“bears the mark of the spiritual,”190 remaining always under the law of spirit. Conversion
likewise presupposes an abstraction, in so far as an object of knowledge can only appear
given the “empty anticipation” of world on behalf of the intellect. Thus, Rahner writes,
“Hence conversion to the phantasm does not mean intellectual knowledge ‘accompanied
by phantasms’ (which after all are not things, but a content of the one human
consciousness to which thought also belongs), but is the term designating the fact that
sense intuition and intellectual thought are united in the one human knowledge.”191 They
are “two sides of the one process,”192 we more accurately should describe as an
“abstractive conversion.”193 Together they describe the one human knowing, in which
subject and object emerge from the profound unity of self and world.
Like vision of an object, knowledge of an object entails a particular relationship
between the world and the intellect that anticipates it. The intellect perceives the object in
relief, and therefore as a form limited by matter, precisely because the intellect
anticipates a horizon against which the object appears. The predicate of a judgment is
therefore not a concept the intellect makes use of like a building block, but is itself
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already an ambiguous reference to the world, which is made concrete in the affirmative
synthesis.
Unlike sense intuition, this anticipation extends beyond space and time.
Otherwise, space and time would not themselves appear against it. Anticipation exceeds
intuition. Thus it is precisely because all knowledge is grounded in a conversion to the
phantasm—and not despite it—that metaphysics is possible. Drawing a functional
equivalence to Thomas’ excessus, Rahner argues that anticipation has as its proper end
absolute being, esse:
It is always true that man knows the finiteness and limitedness of a concrete,
ontological determination (of an existent) insofar as it is held in the broader
“nothing” of its potentiality; but this broader nothing itself is known only insofar
as it itself is held against the infinity of the formal actuality as such (of being),
whatever this might be: essence or esse. In the anticipation of this all knowledge
is grounded.194
The infinite potentiality of the form limited here by matter is itself visible. One
recognizes the object as form limited by matter against the broader horizon of being as
such. Just as the abstraction of form is the condition of the possibility of knowledge of
the object in-itself, so also “the abstraction of esse is the condition of the possibility of
the abstraction of form.” Thus, Rahner continues, “the in-itself is always grounded in an
esse.”195 Therefore each and every judgment entails a simultaneous anticipation of
esse.196
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We should not let the fact that being as such is often “designated after the manner
of a human object” 197 confuse us. The anticipation of being as such is not objective
knowledge. Being does not exist in the world alongside other objects; neither does the
anticipation of absolute being exist alongside the subject’s other relationships to the
world. Rahner uses language of the “whither” to describe this veiled disclosure of being
as such. In offering a tautology—that anticipation is directed toward a “whither”—
Rahner attempts to resist any naming that might promote the reification or objectification
of absolute being. This language also draws attention to the fact that the “whither”
discloses itself precisely only as that to which the anticipation is directed. That is, I am
only aware of a “whither” insofar as I reflect (and thus objectify) my own anticipation as
unthinkable without such a “whither.”198
In other words, I cannot focus my intellect on being as such. Rather, in making
my way as an embodied spirit-in-world I can bring to consciousness the restless striving
that animates my activity and can posit that it has a telos. Thus to say that the whither is
only revealed in the Vorgriff is to recognize that I can only know that my transcendence
has a “whither”:
the anticipation (and its “whither”) is known insofar as knowledge, in the
apprehension of its individual object, always experiences itself as already and
always moving out beyond it, insofar as it knows the object in the horizon of its
possible objects in such a way that the anticipation reveals itself in the movement
out towards the totality of the objects.199
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Following this line of reasoning, the possibility of metaphysics is a condition for the
possibility of objective knowledge. The burden of proof lies not on the one who has to
show how one can get from sense intuition to metaphysics, but on the one who thinks an
objective knowledge is possible apart from metaphysics. In this way Rahner has flipped
the original question of the work on its head.200
For Rahner, this has broader implications than merely the possibility of judgment
or metaphysics. Rather, it speaks to what it means to be human. The human spirit is
radically oriented to absolute being. Insofar as the possibility of human knowing
presupposes the anticipation of absolute being, so also does every concrete act of
knowing entail a motion toward that same absolute being. The telos of spirit is the
reception of being, which it has already anticipated: “Being as such in this material
fullness, absolute being, is therefore the end and goal of the spirit as such. Every
operation of the spirit, whatever it might be, can therefore be understood only as a
moment in the movement towards absolute being as towards the one end and goal of the
desire of the spirit.”201 Thus the human being exists already in a fundamental relationship
to absolute being as both the condition and the goal of all her knowing.
That the human spirit has absolute being as its telos signals to something even
greater. The anticipation of esse is simultaneously an affirmation of the existence of God.
Since esse is precisely that which the subject encounters as “able to be limited by
quidditative determinations,”202 Rahner argues that, “it shows itself to be non-absolute,
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since an absolute necessarily excludes the possibility of a limitation.”203 Only an
Absolute Being could fill the breadth of the Vorgriff. Rahner concludes then that in this
specific sense “the anticipation attains to God.”204
This Absolute Being must be affirmed as real; it “cannot be grasped as merely
possible.”205 Rahner distinguishes this argumentative move from what he calls the
“paralogism” of Anselm’s ontological argument.206 Rather, the subject affirms a
“whither” characterized by negative rather than privative infinity. In short, she affirms
that her anticipation is directed at something “more” rather than nothing. In this way God,
as the Absolute Being, manifests itself in the “whither,” insofar as “the affirmation of the
real limitation of an existent has as its condition the anticipation of esse, which implicitly
and simultaneously affirms an absolute esse.”207 However, Rahner clarifies that this is not
an a priori proof for the existence of God as such. Rather, God is the condition for a
posteriori knowledge of an object.208 The latter differs insofar as it requires a knowing
subject in the world who affirms God implicitly in her affirmation of the world.
As Metz clarifies in an addition to the text, because the subject encounters God as
the condition of the possibility of objective knowledge—and not as an object of
knowledge directly—this affirmation should be called an “unobjective-unthematic

203

Ibid., 181: 142.

204

Ibid., 181: 143. “Pre-apprehension” has been changed to “anticipation” for the sake of
consistency.
205

Ibid.

206

Ibid., 185: 145.

207

Ibid., 182: 143. “Pre-apprehension” has been changed to “anticipation” for the sake of
consistency.
208

Ibid., 181: 143.

68
consciousness” (Bewusstheit) or “transcendental experience” of the Absolute instead of
an “objective-thematic knowness” (Gewusstheit).209 In the sense that the subject’s
relation to Absolute Being is intrinsic to her constitution, this consciousness can be
termed an “a priori knowledge” of God, as long as it is clear that such knowledge cannot
be brought to reflection. Rather, it provides the condition for the necessary “thematic
knowledge of God.”210 Grounding the thematic knowledge of God in prior unthematic
consciousness is necessary according to Thomas’ metaphysics of knowledge. A purely a
posteriori knowledge of God, in which revelation defies any expectation, is impossible:
“God can never be a pure a posteriori if man is ever to know anything at all about Him.
An absolute a posteriori, and in this sense absolutely “unknown,” something “coming
from without” in every respect, is not knowable at all to a human subject according to
Thomistic principles. For knowing is essentially the self-present (beisichseiende)
actuality of the subject itself.”211 If God is wholly other, then no knowledge of God is
possible. If one accepts the fact that knowledge of God is possible, then it is necessary to
posit a union between subject and object. Metz continues,
Every knowledge of another by man is a mode of his self-knowledge, of his
“subjectivity”; the two are not merely extrinsically synchronized, but intrinsic
moments of the one human knowing. Now this holds also for man’s knowledge of
God. And his transcendental-a priori “knowledge” (Wissen) of the Absolute,
which is the condition of the possibility of an articulated, objective knowledge of
the Absolute, is only the application in the metaphysics of knowledge of the
“anima (which as itself is of course always subjectivity, “knowing”)
quodammodo omnia”.212
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Metz’s explanation here agrees with Rahner’s own declaration that this manifestation of
God in the “whither” is not to be taken as positive objective knowledge: “For although
esse is in itself the full ground of every existent, nevertheless, this fullness is given to us
only in the absolute, empty infinity of our anticipation or, what is the same thing, in
common being with the transcendental modes intrinsic to it. And so it remains true: the
highest knowledge of God is the “darkness of ignorance.”213
If this is true, we must revise our understanding of spirit as not merely that which
reaches to know the metaphysical but that which is fundamentally oriented to God. Just
as every judgment is simultaneously an affirmation of absolute being, so is it an
affirmation of God:
If the agent intellect is the highest faculty of man, and if it must be understood as
the faculty of man, and if in it absolute esse is simultaneously affirmed, then as a
matter of fact the agent intellect is the metaphysical point at which the finite spirit
comes upon his openness to, and his dependence upon, God. And that is true not
merely in the general way in which every finite being points to the Absolute
Being, but in such a way that the absolute esse is implicitly and simultaneously
affirmed (implicite mitbejaht) in every act of the agent intellect, in every
judgment.214
Thus Rahner’s purportedly philosophical text opens the way for talking about the
subject’s relationship to God. Here his epistemology emerges not only as anthropology,
but theological anthropology.
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The Theological Anthropology of Geist in Welt
Insofar as abstractive conversion refers to the constitution of human knowing as
intelligent and sensible, and to the necessary processes of judgment, it describes an
unconscious process capable of being reflected on only through transcendental analysis.
This is, however, only one register of human being as spirit-in-world. That human beings
achieve self-presence through the other is a fact that conditions all of human life. That
human being has God as its ground and goal affects the concrete and conscious lives of
human beings.
Rahner begins Part Two by placing his analysis of the conversion to the phantasm
under an existential and metaphysical approach to human being. Beginning with the
irreducible fact that human beings question, Rahner demonstrates that the process of turn
and return characterizes our entire being in the world. Rahner’s first move echoes the
structure of the larger text: he translates the metaphysical question into the question about
the subject herself. The one who questions simultaneously asks about the world and
herself, since to ask about being is simultaneously to ask about oneself: “being is
accessible to man at all only as something questionable [Fragbarkeit], that he himself is
insofar as he asks about being, that he himself exists as a question about being.”215 At a
personal level, knowledge of self and knowledge of world increase in direct proportion.
Thus for Rahner, the metaphysical question is always and already the transcendental
question, “which does not merely place something asked about in question, but the one
questioning and his question itself, and thereby absolutely everything.”216
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From what perspective does one ask the question about being in totality, and
about herself as the one “who must ask about being?”217 She cannot stand outside herself;
she cannot stand outside of being. It is a question that must be asked from within. The
starting point is not some place outside the subject’s relationship to the world, but the
question itself and her very need to question.218 The act of questioning, for instance,
assumes a prior undifferentiated union with the world. The subject must always and
already be in a (albeit implicit and unthematic) relationship with being. “Otherwise,”
Rahner asks, “how could he ask about it?”219 And yet her asking demonstrates that she
still lacks objective knowledge of being. What is implicit has not been made explicit.
The starting point is the question itself and the subject’s need to question. But
where is this subject who questions? She is always and already in the world she asks
about: “man is in the presence of being in its totality insofar as he finds himself in the
world.”220 No negation of the world—here Rahner mentions mysticism and suicide as
potential ways of rejecting the world—can ever erase the fact that the subject poses the
metaphysical question from within the historical messiness of the world. Thus even for
Thomas, Rahner writes, “there is only one knowing, in which man is himself: a knowing
being-with-the-world [ein wissendes Bei-der-Welt-Sein]. Only here is man called into the
presence of being in its totality. It is here that he carries on the business of his
metaphysics.”221
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The fact that metaphysical questions are always asked by people in the world is
not a simple truism for Rahner. It is a way of once again intervening into contemporary
debates about the status of mystical experiences and of revelation in general. It is his way
of definitively answering “no” to the possibility of experiences of God that do not abide
by the normal laws governing human experiences. If the subject is to have an experience
of God it is precisely in and through her being human and in-world, not despite it:
The world as known is always the world of man, is essentially a concept
complementary to man. And the last-known, God, shines forth only in the
limitless breadth of the anticipation, in the desire for being as such by which
every act of man is borne, and which is at work not only in his ultimate
knowledge and in his ultimate decisions, but also in the fact that the free spirit
becomes, and must become, sensibility in order to be spirit, and thus exposes
itself to the whole destiny of this earth. Thus man encounters himself when he
finds himself in the world and when he asks about God; and when he asks about
his essence, he always finds himself already in the world and on the way to God.
He is both of these at once, and cannot be one without the other.222
One is in relationship with God because of, and in proportion to, her being embodied and
embedded in the world.
In this existential analysis of human questioning, Rahner’s argument acquires a
fractal character. Here, the relationship between knower and world is recapitulated at the
level of subjectivity more generally. If our implicit relationship with absolute being is
made explicit in our self-actualizing encounter with the world, so also is that entire
structure of human being in the world made explicit in our reflection on the question of
being. “Spirit-in-world” thus refers not only to the fundamental constitution of human
being as embodied spirit, but the development of subjectivity over time in and through
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one’s encounter with the world. Parallel to the affirmation of God implicit in every
judgment about the world, is the affirmation of God implicit in our question about being:
At every level of knowing, the human spirit reaches outside itself:
The human spirit as such is desire (Begierde), striving (Sterben), action
(Handlung). For in itself it is possible intellect, that is, something which reaches
its full actuality from its potentiality, and in fact by its own action, since by its
own active power (agent intellect) of itself (always in act) it produces its object
(the actually intelligible) from something only sensibly given.223
From the emanation of sensibility to her inevitable questioning, she is constituted by a
restless desire for transcendence. In this restless transcendence, Rahner writes that the
“the last-known, God, shines forth.”224 Thus, all human striving is ultimately a striving
for God. This orientation toward God in turn constitutes the possibility of the subject
hearing and responding to divine revelation.225
As spirit-in-world, the subject is simultaneously in the world and with God: “man
is essentially ambivalent. He is always exiled in the world and is always already beyond
it.”226 Following Thomas in defining human being “as a certain horizon and border
between the corporeal and incorporeal”227 and “the horizon between time and eternity,”228
Rahner states that the human being is “the mid-point suspended between the world and
God, between time and eternity, and this boundary line is the point of his definition and
his destiny.”229 It is important not to misinterpret this language of suspension. The subject
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is not stretched across the vast distance between the world and God.230 Rather, the
revolutionary aspect of Rahner’s argument is the fact that these traditional antinomies are
no longer opposed. The subject’s anticipation of the metaphysical makes possible her
objective knowledge of the world, but in this objective knowing she encounters herself as
one dynamically oriented to God. These are not separate activities: “man encounters
himself when he finds himself in the world and when he asks about God; and when he
asks about his essence, he always finds himself already in the world and on the way to
God.”231 Thus Rahner writes, “each side of this ambivalence calls the other forth.”232 In
the following section we will examine embodiment as the locus of this ambivalence.
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The Body in Geist in Welt
As we have seen, in investigating “how, according to Thomas, human knowing can be
spirit in the world,”233 Rahner develops an ontology of human being as that which
becomes itself precisely in, with, and through the other. Embodiment is the result of
spirit’s emanation of sensibility, or what Rahner also refers to as the “abandonment to the
other of matter.”234 As Rahner clarifies, matter refers not to physicality but to possibility
and potentiality. Matter is that which is determined by spatiality and temporality. In other
words, in the emanation of sensibility, spirit becomes itself in space and over time.235
In regards to knowing, this entails more specifically that the intellect, which is an
active principle, develops a passive receptivity to the other that enables it to accomplish
objective knowledge of the world. Thus, paradoxically, the activity of the intellect is the
development of passivity. In Rahner’s words, “The spirit itself actively opens for itself its
access to the world in letting sensibility emanate; it forms of itself the horizon within
which the individual, sensible object can encounter it as already and always open.”236 The
agent intellect has to produce its own capacity to receive knowledge of the world. It is
important to note here that the structuring metaphor is not the penetrating gaze of the
fully autonomous subject, but the openness of a possible subject. She accomplishes
herself only in her exposure to the world. As we will see below, this exposure entails a
certain amount of risk.
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The human intellect requires sensibility “to be able to be itself in actuality,” it is
“itself only in a union with what is not intellect.”237 But this union is not the later
marriage of two fully autonomous individuals. The intellect emanates sensibility as
proper to itself. In this way Thomas’ doctrine of the conversion to the phantasm entails
the “essential unity of passible body and intellect.”238 The human spirit only exists as
embodied and it actualizes itself via this embodiment. In short, spirit accomplishes
transcendence because of, not despite, her embodied existence in world. Thus while
Rahner does not extensively develop “the body” as a category in this text, the body—and
problems of embodiment—are central to it. As Andrew Tallon writes, “implicit behind
the specific effort toward working out a metaphysics of human knowledge is the more
general motivating desire to establish a metaphysics of the human incarnate spirit, whose
mode of knowing is but a way in which spirit is and shows its openness to all being,
including God (as absolute Being).”239
This understanding of embodiment entails a fundamental ambiguity. Because
spirit and sensibility constitute a union, but not a simple identity, sensibility is neither
clearly identified with the self or the other. To speak metaphorically: it is truly I, not
simply my body, holding this mug. And yet in reflecting on the touch of warm ceramic I
objectify my own perceptions as data to be scrutinized, I posit myself as an “I” standing
over them. In a similar manner, as the actualization of the agent intellect and “the
receptive intuition of another as such,” sensibility is paradoxically both the “being-

237

Ibid., 31: 35.

238

Ibid., 31-2, 49: 35, 47.

239

Tallon, “Spirit, Matter, Becoming,” 160.

77
present-to-itself” and the “being-away-from-self-with-the-other” of the knower.240 In
sensibility, the intellect simultaneously abandons itself to matter and sets itself over
against it.241 On the one hand it represents the abandonment of spirit to the other in
conversion; on the other hand it is precisely that by which spirit comes to itself in
abstraction. Since abstraction and conversion are not two separate processes, but
constitute the one human knowing, sensibility must simultaneously be self and not-self in
its mediation between spirit and world. The resultant ambiguity of embodiment is not
merely available upon transcendental reflection but also is, as we will see in the
following sections, a feature of our conscious lives. The distance between spirit and
sensibility limits the exercise of human freedom and makes human beings vulnerable to
tragedy. But it also places us profoundly in community with one another as historical,
interpersonal, and political beings.
As we have seen above, the body is the product of spirit’s emanation of sensibility
from itself, by which the knower is the being of the other. This means at the outset that
spirit does not have being proper to itself. Rahner clarifies this point at length:
To understand correctly what follows it is to be noted at the outset that in the
question of the origin of one power from another and from the substantial ground
of the spirit, we are not at all dealing with the relationship between a finished,
complete existent as an efficient cause and an effect produced by it, but remaining
extrinsic to it. Rather we are dealing with the intrinsic metaphysical constitution
of an individual essence in itself as a single being in the plurality of its powers.242
Sensibility is necessary to spirit’s accomplishment of self.
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This understanding of sensibility as intrinsic not only satisfies the requirements of
Thomas’s metaphysics of knowledge—that knowing is the union of knower and
known—but indicates something fundamental about the human spirit. Simply put, it is
not self-identical. When speaking of the intellect Rahner describes the distinctiveness of
human being as its possible intellect. We may then also say that the human spirit is
possible spirit. It is fundamentally dependent on the other to come to itself.
Since it requires the other, the human spirit is not capable of full self-disposal. As
Tallon clarifies, only “pure Being is already with itself” and perfect self-presence is the
condition of perfect self-disposal. Thus, complete self-disposal is only possible for
absolute being: “Matter is the mark of and the means by, in, through, and with which a
different (and “lesser”) kind of spirit achieves, in many acts, acts that “take time” and
“take place” what that other kind of spirit does in one act. This is the condition of the
human spirit, whose self-presence is had only by first being present to other.”243 Tallon
describes the limitation of this self-disposal by appealing to the metaphor of two “gaps”
in the subject’s self-actualization. The first gap is the difference between spirit’s “actual
self and its possible self,” which spirit attempts to close via the emanation of sensibility.
Because this closure is incomplete—spirit does not accomplish itself perfectly via
matter—there is a second gap, between spirit and matter itself.244 Enumerating these gaps
highlights just how limited the subject’s self-disposal is. Not only does she have to
accomplish herself over time, but must do so through a resistant medium.
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In other words, self-actualization is something that occurs over time. I am not a
fully-formed subject. I must become who I am. This process of becoming occurs in and
through the material world. But here I experience another critical difficulty. The material
of my actualization frustrates my self-actualization. A runner must master the course and
herself. Likewise as I seek to close the distance between who I am and who I can be, I
find myself at odds with myself. I am susceptible to fatigue, injury and sloth.245
This gap however, between spirit and matter, is also the condition of the freedom
of spirit. It is precisely because spirit is capable of objectification, of abstracting from
sensibility, that it can transcend sensibility. The runner is not identical to her fatigue, but
capable of reflecting on it. While spirit is actualized via matter and only via matter, spirit
is not exhausted in that actualization, nor reduced to that actualization.246 In abstraction,
the subject distances herself from the object in order to know it as another. This distance
however, since the knower is the being of the other, is also an objectification of herself as
other. Simultaneous to the emergence of a subject against an object, is the emergence of
spirit against matter.247 In this way, Rahner writes, humanity is “essentially ambivalent.
He is always exiled in the world and is always already beyond it.”248
Thus, in our analysis of spirit’s self-disposal we have arrived at an understanding
of embodiment as fundamentally ambiguous. Spirit actualizes itself via sensibility but
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also encounters sensibility as other. The body is simultaneously the condition of selfdisposal and its resistance.
In spirit’s emanation of sensibility, it “exposes itself to the whole destiny of this
earth.”249 Such exposure cannot be without risk. The only concrete discussion of this
ambiguity is when Rahner, following Thomas, mentions the possibility of insanity and
senility as a consequence of this unity of intellect and sensibility in the conversion to the
phantasm: “….human thought is delivered over to the powers of this earth even to the
possibility of insanity (phrenetici) and senility (lethargici). The human metaphysical
consideration of what man is begins at this point because in every man there is already
realized what is to be understood conceptually in what follows: the human, intellective
soul has its face turned towards the phantasm.”250 For Thomas and Rahner both, the
doctrine of the conversion to the phantasm entails a fundamental human vulnerability.
Spirit’s abandonment to the other is not without risk. The intellect’s dependence on
sensibility to actualize itself entails that the capacity for human thought is subject to
decay.
Rahner does not clarify how this vulnerability to decay can be reconciled with
spirit’s freedom over against matter. How does one objectify one’s own rational
processes? How does one stand as a subject opposite her own mental illness? Despite
Rahner’s insistence that spirit transcends sensibility, insofar as spirit actualizes itself
through the sensible its fate seems bound to the material world. What good is a freedom
of spirit in the face of material destruction? There is an opening here to locate tragedy
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more centrally in Rahner’s fundamental and philosophical account of the subject. In fact,
Rahner’s later writings on the body—to which we will turn in the next chapter—extend
this understanding of the body as vulnerability to the other.
At every level the human being comes to herself from another. Spirit
accomplishes itself in and through materiality; the knowing subject emerges only against
the known object; one comes to know oneself as a being already in relation with God and
world. Rahner’s argument that coming-to-self is always a coming-from-another means
that the self in his anthropology is not fully formed, but always in process and always in
relation.
It is worth here returning to Metz’s criticism that Rahner’s transcendental method
inoculates his analysis of the subject from the categories of history, memory, and
solidarity. In Chapter One we reviewed Metz’s 1963 critique of Geist in Welt, embedded
in his introduction to Rahner’s Hörer des Wortes, that Geist in Welt lacks analysis of the
interpersonal nature of subjectivity. In particular, Metz charges that the focus on the
spirit’s transcendence vis-a-vis objects of knowledge ignores the development of
subjectivity vis-a-vis other subjects. We also examined Metz’s 1967 essay, provided as
the forward to the 1968 English edition of Geist in Welt—where he suggests that this
text’s own prioritization of freedom as a theological category necessitates the
development of a “political theology.”251 Metz’s ultimate position is that Rahner’s
transcendental theology leaves no space for the development of subjectivity in the face of
the other.
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To Rahner’s credit, while his transcendental method may appear to privilege a
fully-formed subject in its focus on the stable and universal conditions of the possibility
of human knowing, what Rahner names as the stable and universal aspect of human spirit
is that it becomes itself in and through the other. Andrew Tallon has argued that this
ontology opens the way for a theology of personization. Though Rahner does not us the
categories of “person” or “personization,” in this Geist in Welt, Tallon argues that,
“Rahner’s implicit concern, here in his earliest as well as in his later works, is
personization, but never as a private, selfish, individualistic cult of self-perfection: the
self-enacting of the person is through transcendence (openness) toward God as person,
known and loved in, with, and through knowing and loving human persons for
themselves.”252 Tallon admits that Geist in Welt alone is an insufficient account of the
person,253 but names it as a major step in developing precisely the “metaphysics of person
as personization” that “has made it more, not less, possible for him to go on to speak of
person as free, self-creative openness to all persons, through whom persons become
persons.”254
Tallon’s reading is generous. Geist in Welt offers a subject who comes to self
through the other, but—as Metz has made clear—not necessarily the personal other. Let
us consider Rahner’s own example of the inherent risk of human embodiment: the
possibility of senility and insanity. As we have discussed above, Rahner’s proclamation
of the unity of spirit and body appears to open a space for tragedy. Nevertheless, this
opening to tragedy remains apolitical. Insanity and senility appear as universally equal
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possibilities affecting the individual. This text offers no theoretical tools to analyze the
way risk increases due to interpersonal harm, or natural and manmade environmental
factors; of the intersection between access to treatment and one’s social location; or of the
network of caretakers (or lack thereof) surrounding the victim. A successful anthropology
will have the resources to ask, and propose solutions, to such questions. Such analyses
require seeing subjects as fundamentally historical beings responsible for a past and to
each other.
Admittedly, Geist in Welt is an idealized account of the human subject and not a
full-fledged anthropology. Its scope is limited to an analysis of the human knower as
spirit-in-world. Rahner’s purpose is both more fundamental and more modest than an
attempt to offer an account of subjectivity. Rather he speaks of the condition of the
possibility for subjectivity. Thus while I disagree with Tallon that in Geist in Welt we see
Rahner begin to develop a theory of personization, I do not think such a lack is
significant. The central interpretive question is whether Rahner’s analysis can be
developed in the direction of a historical, political, interpersonal understanding of human
being, or whether his starting point precludes such development. Is the personal other
included in the umbrella of receptive knowledge of the other as such? Or does this
metaphysics of knowledge diminish the ability for another subject to appear as anything
but the material of one’s self-actualization? On the one hand Rahner’s system places the
personal other under the subject of “other,” as if the person I meet face-to-face is one of
many objects in my horizon. On the other hand, Rahner’s entire ontology of human being
challenges the simple opposition of “self” and “other.”
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We have shown above how Rahner’s metaphysics of knowledge in Geist in Welt
turns on an ontology of human being as that which comes to itself in and through the
other. Within this ontology, the body emerges as an ambiguity. It both constitutes the
possibility of self-disposal and frustrates it; it expresses spirit and exposes it to risk and
decay; it is the “other” through which spirit self-actualizes. Embodiment represents a
liminal state between heaven and earth, home and exile, same and other. What remains is
to see if this understanding of embodiment is sufficiently robust to describe the lived
experiences of human beings. We turn now to the texts Rahner wrote immediately after
Geist in Welt, which will clarify some of Rahner’s argument, and further solidify the
place of Rahner’s anthropology in Geist in Welt in the context of an Ignatian
understanding of the experience of God.
Rahner after Geist in Welt
In Rahner’s own words, Martin Honecker failed the dissertation for being “too inspired
by Heidegger.”255 To Honecker, Rahner’s dissertation was overly determined by
contemporary concerns with the subject: he had replaced a classical analysis of revelation
with a transcendental analysis of the subject and the possibility of revelation.256 By that
time, however, Rahner’s superiors had already changed their plans for him. He would
teach theology not philosophy. Rahner quickly began a second dissertation, finishing it
shortly after arriving at Innsbruck.257 The dissertation, E latere Christi, is an analysis of
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the typology of Church as Eve in John 19. We know from letters to his brother Hugo that
he had already been working on this project by 1930.258 We know that Rahner exhausted
his free time in Valkenburg reading patristics.259 Thus it appears that prior to, and perhaps
concurrently with, his writing of Geist in Welt, he was developing an ecclesiology of
Christ’s wounded body. It was to this material that he happily returned.260
Rahner finished E latere Christi, which he called “a small, lousy, but at least
according to the standards of the time, adequate theological dissertation” in September
1936.261 As Brandon Peterson summarizes, “The dissertation’s ecclesiology is not
focused so much on the Church in se as a phenomenon, but upon the relationship of the
body of Christians to the Person of Christ through the Holy Spirit, as expressed in biblical
terms.”262 While the first five chapters of the dissertation runs through the history of the
typology, Rahner concludes with some constructive ideas for a Christology founded on E
latere Christi: that the piercing of Christ is important soteriologically; that salvation
involves a symbolic participation of the Christian into the life of Christ; and that such
participation is communal rather than merely individual.263 We mention this now to show
that Rahner developed his argument in Geist in Welt while also researching and writing
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about Christian identity as a mystical, embodied, and communal participation in the
person of Christ.
In 1937, Rahner wrote a series of prayers that would later be collected in the
volume Encounters with Silence [Worte ins Schweigen]. A number of themes from Geist
in Welt are repeated here: human being as that which restlessly seeks for the infinite;264
God as the horizon, “the infinitely distant One;”265 and the intimate connection between
knowledge of God, self, and world.266 Read in tandem with Geist in Welt, this text
clarifies a couple of major points with respect to Rahner’s overall argument.
First, Rahner is clear in this text that knowing represents a relatively narrow and
insufficient understanding of the human desire for being. In “God of Knowledge” he
writes that while it seems “that knowing is the most interior way of grasping and
possessing anything…knowing touches only the surface of things… it fails to penetrate to
the heart, to the depths of my being where I am most truly ‘I’.”267 Knowing itself is
inadequate. Rahner argues that it is only when knowledge results in love that one is truly
present to the object of knowledge, and only then does such knowledge actually effect a
transformation in myself.268 Such knowledge and love is accomplished not through study,
but through living: “Only knowledge gained through experience, the fruit of living and
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suffering, fills the heart with the wisdom of love.”269 Thus, Rahner’s choice to analyze
the human knower as spirit-in-world in Geist in Welt should not be taken as a privileging
of knowing as an activity of spirit. The intellect is not the seat of spirit; it is but one
expression of it. Further, this knowing born in living and suffering, present to the other in
love, and effecting self-transformation, is not the activity of a subject who apprehends or
comprehends the concept of God. Rather, Rahner says, “You have seized me; I have not
‘grasped’ You.”270
Second, Rahner offers some insight in how to interpret the claim in Geist in Welt
that the subject is always and already with God. On the one hand, Rahner argues that
there is a silence and hiddenness to one’s relationship to God. If we hope to say with
Augustine “You [God] were more inward to me than my most inward part,” Rahner
laments that we are often separated from our own inwardness: “Every time I try to pray, I
am doomed to wander in the barren wastes of my own emptiness, since I have left the
world behind, and still cannot find my way into the true sanctuary of my inner self, the
only place where You can be found and adored.”271 On the other hand, he proclaims that
relationship with God is a permanent element of human experience: “No matter how hard
men try to break off relations with You, You are always present to them. Even when they
attempt to lock and bolt their souls against You, You are there at the very core of these
futile efforts.”272
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Further, such always and already being with God does not negate the need for
mediation. While the Infinite God is everywhere, Rahner argues, “We must take the
‘indirect route’ leading through Your Son who became man. Your grace comes to us not
in the ‘always and everywhere’ of Your all-pervasive Spirit, but in the ‘here and now’ of
Jesus Christ.”273 It is only through Christ that we encounter God and it is also only
through Christ that we can truly encounter others.274 Thus Rahner’s insistence that we
exist always in relationship with God is not a dismissal of the need for God’s revelation
in Christ, only the condition of the possibility for us receiving that revelation.
Together these prayers flesh out the spirituality of Geist in Welt, offering us a
subject always in contact with God, even if it is a dark and silent touch. Knowledge of
self and knowledge of God are analogous precisely because neither is marked by the clear
sight of objective knowledge, but by presence. Only by the light of Christ do we
understand who we are, and who God is, more clearly.
In 1937 Rahner also published a small essay, “The Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in
the World.”275 Here, Rahner places his argument from Geist in Welt in the context of an
overall Ignatian theology. He begins with an analysis of the seemingly contradictory
notion of mysticism, which seems to indicate an abandonment of world, and joy in the
world.276 Part of the challenge in reconciling these two terms is the difficulty of defining
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“mysticism.” The problem is that mysticism seems to evoke an experience beyond
ordinary faith or belief, and yet a real union with uncreated grace—with God in
Godself—would not be a mystical experience but the beatific vision itself. The mystical
experience must be something between: “Theologically, therefore, the question would
have to be posed, whether and how there can be any middle term between faith and
immediate vision of God, and if not, how then mystical experience should be conceived
so that it remains really genuine and yet falls unmistakably into the sphere of faith.”277 In
this way of framing the problem we see support for Endean’s thesis that Rahner is trying
to intervene in contemporary debates about the nature of mysticism and the problematic
nature of separating mystical experience from a theology of grace more generally.
Unfortunately, Rahner does not continue his analysis here, but moves quickly
instead to a discussion of piety as a cipher for a deferred understanding of mysticism.278
As he defines it, Ignatian piety is simultaneously committed to the cross and to the God
beyond the world.279 In this duality lays the answer to the reconciliation between
mysticism and joy in the world. In its dedication to the cross, Ignatian piety is
fundamentally monastic. While the Jesuit does not necessarily leave the city like a
traditional ascetic, in poverty, virginity, obedience, and prayer, he renounces the world in
order to follow Christ.280 Thus whatever joy he has in the world, he does not have it apart
from renunciation:
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Ignatius does not admit for himself or his disciples any joy in the world in which
the world and God, time and eternity, are from the beginning reconciled in
amicable harmony. In the case of Ignatius, then, there can be no question of an
acceptance of the world by which man is in the first place and as a matter of
course in the world, that is by which he takes his first stand in the world, in its
goodness and its tasks, strives for the fulfillment of humanity within this world
and then finally—and as late as possible after this—also awaits happiness with
God, to guarantee which, over and above his obvious task in the world and a
moral life, he has to fulfill a few other conditions of a rather juridical and
ceremonial kind.281
Rahner states emphatically that for the disciple of Ignatius there can be no happy union
with God apart from renunciation. The way of the Jesuit is the cross. If Christ demands
that we too take up our crosses in denial of self and world, how is it that there can be an
Ignatian experience of joy in the world? Paradoxically, Rahner argues that it is precisely
this flight from the world that leads us to joy in it: “the basis of flight from the world
constitutes the intrinsic possibility of Ignatian acceptance of the world.”282
To demonstrate how this is possible, Rahner first has to set the cross in relief
against the God of philosophy. As the ground of the world this God would seem to be
present in it, but as free and personal, distinct from it. This God is ultimately hidden from
reason and metaphysical reflection. Thus the one who seeks after God must instead wait
and listen for this God to reveal Godself.283 Here, it should be noted, Rahner appears to
be summarizing his argument from Geist in Welt. As we saw above in this chapter,
Rahner refers there to the manifestation of God in the whither of our transcendence as a
hiddenness. His argument in Geist in Welt ends with the subject waiting for a word from
God in history.
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In pursuit of this hidden God, the temptation is to identify God with the world.
“But,” Rahner counters, “God is more than that. And as this more-than-the-world he has
broken in upon man’s existence and has shattered the world, that which theology calls
‘nature’. He has revealed himself in Jesus Christ.”284 The one from beyond the world has
entered into it. In turn, we are called out of the world—that is, out of the normal course of
events, out of our nature left apart from such revelation—and into God.285 While our
philosophical reflection leads us to a hidden God, the cross reveals a God beyond the
world who has dramatically entered into history to call us out of it.
This radical interruption of the natural course of the world exposes it as
insufficient and secondary:
And if God calls man in this command of his revealing word to a supernatural,
supramundane life, as has in fact happened in the revelation of Christ, then this
command must always necessarily be a breaking-up of the roundedness in which
the world seeks to rest in itself, and so it becomes a degradation, by which the
world—even the good world, the world in so far as it is the will and law of God
— is condemned to a provisional status, a thing of second rank, subject to a
criterion which is no longer intrinsic or proper to it.286
Insofar as the God beyond the world is recognized to be superior to the world, Christians
must flee from the world.
At the same time, God’s freedom and hiddenness demand that we attend precisely
to God’s word in the world, “for only his free action in history can reveal to us what he is
in himself and how he wills to be related to men.”287 This is, Rahner says, what the
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Exercises are intended for.288 Radically, this entails a commitment “to the Cross and to
the foolishness of Christ.”289 To add to this, precisely in such obedience to the cross,
one’s activity in the world is elevated so that it also points beyond the world.290
Suddenly, one’s ordinary life can be a sacrament of the extraordinary God. This is only
the case, however, if one first submits to God:
Ignatius approaches the world from God. Not the other way about. Because he has
delivered himself in the lowliness of an adoring self-surrender to the God beyond
the whole world and to his will, for this reason and for this reason alone he is
prepared to obey his word even when, out of the silent desert of his daring flight
into God, he is, as it were, sent back into the world, which he had found the
courage to abandon in the foolishness of the cross.291
Thus Ignatian immersion in the world is simultaneously recognition of the God beyond it.
From this perspective we can see the intrinsic unity, rather than contradiction,
between the principles of indifference and finding God in all things.292 The Jesuit
practices indifference precisely because God is beyond the world and therefore “all
possession of God must leave God as greater beyond all possession of him.”293 But this
also, paradoxically, means that God is beyond our privileged form of experiencing God.
Mysticism itself is thus relativized. We can see now why Rahner chose to substitute piety
for mysticism in his analysis: the mystical experience of God is, under Ignatian piety,
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itself just one way to God. In Ignatian indifference one refuses to absolutize such a way,
and is then open to seeing God in all things.294
If we are correct in identifying the allusions in this article to the argument in Geist
in Welt, then Rahner’s metaphysics of knowledge exists within a broader Ignatian
theology. Its description of the relationship between the self and God is merely a
background against which the cross can be seen in relief. Whatever the nature of this dark
touch, or of the Vorgriff auf esse, it does not develop in a linear fashion toward the
beatific vision of God. Rather, it must go through the cross.
This means further that to read Geist in Welt as solely a philosophical text—to
focus on its relationship to Heidegger and Kant for instance—is to miss that this entire
metaphysical project is relativized in light of the cross. Whatever our philosophical
reflections on the self, the world, and the Absolute, we wait for God’s word in history.
For Christians that word has come, and continues to come, in the cross.
Unless we assume that Rahner, in a mere matter of months, is contradicting the
overall thrust of his argument in Geist in Welt, these reflections on the God-world
relationship clarify in what way spirit is always and already with God. To begin with, this
essay challenges the idea that the unthematic union with God, implicit in every act of
desire, is sufficient for the Christian life. It is clear here that whatever the nature of this
union is, it does not free Ignatius, or his followers, from renunciation of the world.
Without the cross, God remains hidden; without renunciation of the world, it is not
possible to find God in all things.
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Conclusion: The Mystical Subject of Geist in Welt
Writing in the 1970s, Rahner retrospectively attributes the greatest influence on his work
to Ignatius and Ignatian spirituality more broadly.295 We have seen in this chapter that
Ignatian spirituality shaped even his earliest and most philosophical work, Geist in Welt.
Read alongside Rahner’s other works, we see that it is only one part of a larger
theological drama that Rahner centers on the disciple’s embodied relationship to the
cross. Rahner is not merely concerned to show how the knower is spirit-in-world, but to
theologize about the lived experience of God.296 The Ignatian influence is twofold:
Rahner is reflecting upon the embodied experience of God as the content of his theology,
but he is also reflecting on his own embodied experience of the Spiritual Exercises.
Many have read Geist in Welt as offering the philosophical foundation of
Rahner’s theology as a whole. Indeed, as both Karen Kilby and Philip Endean have
argued, the criticism Balthasar and his followers offer makes sense only if one assumes
that this work is foundational to the rest of Rahner’s theology. Placing Geist in Welt in
the context of Rahner’s prior and greater commitment to Ignatian spirituality, however,
demonstrates that this work is simply the application of Rahner’s theological insight to
the question of a metaphysics of knowledge. Here, Rahner’s lifelong commitment to
295

In a preface to his Theological Investigations 16, Rahner describes the Spiritual Exercises as an
experience “characterised by discernment of spirits, by the process of choice, by the practical search for the
will of God, to mention only a few aspects.” He goes on to say that such activity naturally expresses itself
in theological reflection and that all of his “theological thinking sprang from the practice of the Ignatian
Exercises,” Karl Rahner, preface to TI 16, viii and x respectively: SzT 12, 8 and 10. See also Endean, Karl
Rahner, 4-5.
296

Anne E. Carr describes the development in Rahner’s thought between Geist in Welt and Hörer
des Wortes, and Rahner’s later work, as an expansion from the human being understood primarily as
knower to a conception of her as an embodied whole, “Theology and Experience in the Thought of Karl
Rahner.” The Journal of Religion 53, no. 3 (July 1973): 359-76. Placing Geist in Welt in the context of
“The Ignatian Mysticism” highlights that an understanding of the human person as embodied was always
latent in his work.

95
proclaiming the ordinary character of the experience of God motivates him to engage in a
transcendental experiment in fundamental theology of the a priori conditions of
revelation. In Philip Endean’s words, “Rahner’s theology was driven by a passion to
articulate what the human person must be like if prayer is possible, if we human beings
can really make contact with God.”297 If the grace of God can be experienced in principle
by all, then what are the conditions of the possibility of that experience? Here a deep
underground river comes to the surface, but we should not mistake it for the river source.
Such a reading can explain the deep connections between Geist in Welt and Rahner’s
later theological ideas, without arguing that it provides their philosophical grounding.
Rather, in Geist in Welt, we see the philosophical argument of a thinker deeply devoted to
reflecting on the embodied experience of God.
It is in this broader context of theologizing about Ignatian spirituality that we
must interpret the place of the body in Rahner’s theological anthropology. As we have
demonstrated above, Rahner not only offers us an ambiguous body, but he offers it
ambiguously. That is, ultimately the relationship between the transcendental and the
categorical is still murky in these early texts. We do not yet have a robust understanding
of the interpersonal, nor of a theology of divine revelation, nor of history. Rahner’s texts
here, while they focus on the conditions of the possibility of the experience of God
provide little in the way of guidance for concrete discernment of such experience. We
turn now to Rahner’s development of these ideas in his later writings.
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Chapter 3:
Freedom Embodied
In the 1920s and 30s, Karl Rahner began to develop a theology rooted in the Spiritual
Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, as well as the spiritual writings of Evagrius Ponticus,
Origin, and Bonaventure. Central to this theology was the insight that the experience of
God is available to everyone. In order to explain how such an experience could be
integrated in the natural order of human lives without reducing God to something humans
can understand, Rahner appealed to the metaphor of the dark touch. Human beings
always and already exist in an intimate relationship with God apart from mental
representation or knowledge in the strictest sense. In the prayers gathered together in
Encounters with Silence, Rahner compares this knowledge of God to one’s knowledge of
self. Self-understanding resists and defies classification. For example, I cannot articulate
fully or even adequately who I am, or the complete motivations for what I do. And yet,
Rahner would say, this failure is not to be conceived in terms of distance or ignorance.
Whatever my relative success in self-reflection I remain myself. In a similar manner,
Rahner argues that all human beings abide in deep intimacy with God, even if no light is
ever shed on such union. Understanding the knowledge of God as a dark touch entails
that unthematic knowledge of God is both more integral to self-identity and more primary
in one’s relationship to God than any mental representation of God available to our
conscious reflection.
As we saw in Chapter Two, reading Geist in Welt in light of Rahner’s Ignatian
commitments exposes the text as not only a Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge, but
also a profound reflection on the possibility of embodied experience of God. In it, he
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examines the precise metaphysics of knowledge that would make such a dark touch
possible. Beginning with Thomas’ doctrine of the conversion to the phantasm, he
develops an ontology of human being as spirit-in-world. This spirit-in-world comes to
herself in and through the other. Paradoxically, she is defined as the one who transcends
herself. Her categorical experience of desire—seeking after truth, goodness, and
beauty—is just the visible surface of a being who fundamentally desires God. She who is
open to the other is radically constituted by openness for the Other. In this understanding
of the human person, embodiment is the medium for, rather than the obstacle to,
knowledge and love of God. Our unthematic knowledge of God via the dark touch is
actualized in the material of our embodied lives.
At hand in this chapter is the relationship between this dark touch and our
conscious religious (or non-religious) identities. In Rahner’s later work he continues to
develop the precise relationship between this unthematic connection with God and our
concrete, explicit, love of God. Some of his most famous and controversial ideas, like the
supernatural existential or the anonymous Christian, arise from his understanding of this
relationship. Rahner’s understanding of human being’s spiritual nature—encompassing
both her relationship to God and her relationship to self—is grounded on an ontology of
the human being as that spirit which becomes in and through matter. Thus the question of
whether or not Rahner has adequately theorized about the relationship between the
unthematic and explicit knowledge of God is ultimately a question about the adequacy of
Rahner’s account of embodiment. In this chapter, I argue that the unity Rahner identifies
between one’s fundamental option for God and her concrete activity allows us to locate
the decision for God in history, as effected in a life lived in love of one’s neighbor, while
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the distinction between them allows us to hold out hope for the possibility that what
appears as a “no” at the categorical level may in fact be an actualization of an ultimate
“yes” to God.
To see this, we must turn to those writings that address most specifically the
tensions and paradoxes of embodiment, particularly with respect to how one’s always
already relationship with God intersects with conscious religious activity. While Rahner’s
theological anthropology—including his account of freedom—is the subject of entire
books by Rahner, his writings on embodiment are scattered throughout his corpus, often
under the heading of other topics. Piecing together a cohesive account of the body
requires an interpretive dialectic, moving between Rahner’s often idealized accounts of
the subject to his concrete and pastoral accounts of the reality of human—and
Christian—existence.
We will begin with Rahner’s early theological writings following Geist in Welt,
particularly Hörer des Wortes, in which Rahner continues to develop his theological
anthropology.298 Within the context of offering a philosophy of religion, Rahner
describes the human being as one who waits for God’s free revelation in history and who
makes of her own history a “yes” or “no” to such a revelation. This broader
understanding of the relationship between freedom and historicity of spirit-in-world
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provides the contours of Rahner’s understanding of embodiment in general. Here he
continues to proclaim that, in the human person, free spirit only accomplishes itself in the
material of space-time. As Rahner develops in his later writings, this means that one
exercises one’s freedom within a network of necessity, and thus freedom is always “still
an interplay with everything that is not free, not spiritual, and so on.”299 In other words,
since the human being is spirit-in-world, her self-actualization is always mutually
constituted by the world in which she lives.
This universal feature of human existence becomes apparent when such worlds
are hostile to the exercise of freedom. At the end of this chapter, we will turn to
Carmichael Peters’ and Bryan Massingale’s understanding of black rage through the lens
of Rahner’s conception of spirit-in-world. As they argue, if the objective material
available to one’s freedom is precisely a world that rejects the operation and possibility of
that freedom, then one’s affirmation of God and self can only take the form of a
provisional “no” to the world.300 Their understandings of black rage as evidence that
spirit is inviolable and yet profoundly affected by the category of “world” offers a
concrete way to think of the relationship between the transcendental and categorical.
Since the hostility of one’s world is constitutive of one’s self-presence, Peters argues that
it is warranted to translate Rahner’s language of the “qualification of human
transcendental self-presence” to a more contemporary understanding of
“socialization.”301 Massingale goes further to argue that black rage is a mediation of
grace in the world. Together they expose where Rahner’s work can be developed and
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clarified for a theology of embodiment. This work will help prepare for a constructive rereading of Rahner’s theology of embodiment in Chapter Five.
Hörer des Wortes
Rahner finished his theological dissertation, E latere Christi, in 1936. In the summer of
1937, between finishing his Habilitation and beginning to teach at Innsbruck, he
presented a series of fifteen lectures entitled “On the Basis of a Philosophy of Religion”
at the Salzburger Hochshulwochen.302 These he eventually published in 1941 as Hörer
des Wortes.
The subject of these lectures is philosophy of religion. Theology is introduced
only as a helpful comparison, through which the meaning and foundation of philosophy
of religion can be deduced.303 The relationship of the two sciences is to be found in
understanding their relationship to the ground of all sciences: metaphysics. Since
philosophy of religion deals with “knowledge of the right relation between ourselves and
God, the human and the Absolute,”304 Rahner argues that it is itself an inner moment of
metaphysics. Thus, “the validation of the philosophy of religion coincides ultimately with
the self-validation of metaphysics.”305
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Theology however, is “a listening to the freely proffered self-revelation of God
through God’s own word.”306 The epistemic validation of theology, and therefore its
relationship to metaphysics, is more difficult to deduce. There is no standard, for
instance, against which God’s word can be judged. Thus theology’s epistemic grounding
must lie not in the validation of God’s word in history, but in the possibility of the human
being to hear it: “it [an epistemological validation of theology] can establish that it is a
priori possible for us to hear an eventual revelation of God.”307
This is exactly, Rahner argues, what metaphysics and philosophy of religion do:
Metaphysics, which is already a philosophy of religion, must acknowledge God as
the one who is free and unknown; it must understand human persons as beings
who, in our innermost spirit, live in history; it must refer us to our history and bid
us listen in it to an eventual revelation of this free unknown God. Such a
metaphysics will view God as one who is free and unknown, and who cannot be
clearly grasped by human groping. It will not make bold to decide a priori how
this free, personal, unknown God will behave toward us, how and in what guise
this God will be and can be revealed, how God will establish the relation between
God and humanity.308
Thus, Rahner argues, the question of the relationship between philosophy of religion and
theology ultimately comes down to metaphysical anthropology. Such anthropology
recognizes the human being as spirit—that is, standing before a free God—and
historical—that is, “oriented toward the historical event of a revelation, in case such a
revelation should occur.”309 If metaphysics identifies the human person as one who waits
for a word from God in history, then philosophy of religion identifies specifically the
relationship of this knower and the Absolute, and theology reflects upon revelation in
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history. The goal of this text, then, is to offer a philosophy of religion—that is, a
metaphysical anthropology—that shows how the human being is the one who waits for a
word from the Absolute God in history.
Rahner’s argument in Hörer des Wortes can be briefly summarized as following:
First being as such is present to self and therefore intelligible, the human being as spirit is
open to being as such and, therefore being as such is fundamentally intelligible to human
beings.310 Second, human beings are those who can and must inquire about being—can,
because being is intelligible to them, and must, because they do not have a priori
knowledge of being. As Rahner argues, pure being is free. Therefore God may choose to
disclose Godself or not. In his words, “the God before whom we stand in our
transcendence, is the free one.”311 Human beings are also free with respect to God. They
enact their transcendence in the form of a free decision. Third, human beings are
historical beings and therefore any possible revelation must take place in an historical
word and thus “humankind must in our human history listen for the historical revelation
of God which may come in the human word.”312
The reader will recognize many of these steps from Geist in Welt—for example,
beginning with the ontological starting point of the unity between being and knowing,
and the anthropological starting point that human beings ask about being. Here, as in
Geist in Welt, Rahner provides a metaphysical anthropology of the subject who, as spiritin-world, is open to God as the Absolute Being, whom she co-affirms in all judgment as
the whither of her transcendence. In many ways, this text is a sequel to Geist in Welt,
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which ends by proclaiming that the human being “can listen to hear whether God has not
perhaps spoken, because he knows that God is; God can speak because He is the
Unknown.”313 Where Geist in Welt addresses the general condition for the possibility of
metaphysics given that human beings exist in space and time, here in Hörer des Wortes
Rahner turns specifically to the condition for the possibility of hearing divine revelation.
Geist in Welt is a transcendental analysis of the fact that man fragt; Hörer des Wortes is
an analysis of the fact that man hört. The crucial difference in these arguments is the
analysis of God as a free, personal being who chooses whether or not to reveal Godself.
Here, Rahner clarifies that our unthematic knowledge of God does not render God’s
freedom null, nor God’s revelation redundant.
The Free Word of God
After summarizing the first two steps of his argument, in which he demonstrates that the
subject is open to being—which is luminous—and inquires about it, Rahner questions
rhetorically whether or not this relationship between the human being and being as such
excoriates the need for divine revelation:
What we have said hitherto might produce the impression that a revelation, in the
sense of the free unveiling of something of itself essentially hidden, is impossible,
because in principle every being is always already manifest, and does not need to
be revealed. In this event revelation would be nothing else than the immanent and
necessary unfolding of this openness of being that is the start always present in
the spirit as such.314
The challenge is to show how human beings, as spirit, are genuinely open to being such
that a revelation is possible. If the subject is closed off to being, she will have no ears to
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hear any word from God. If she is always and already in union with being, she will have
no need for a historical word. Thus Rahner moves on from the basic anthropology first
developed in Geist in Welt to ask the following question: “How can they [Christian
anthropology and metaphysics] explain human nature in such a way that, without giving
up either our transcendence toward being as such or the inner luminosity of being, human
transcendence does not anticipate the content of a free revelation?”315 This is the
question that drives much of what follows in Rahner’s argument. He goes on to say that
the answer resides in God’s nature as a free and personal being: “The solution of the
problem will have to show how a free self-manifestation of the free personal God remains
possible despite the fact that this free revelation can be addressed to a being who is
capable of perceiving it.”316
To begin with, Rahner notes that we can get a partial answer just by reflecting on
our status as finite beings and the resultant limitations of knowledge. However, Rahner’s
ultimate answer goes further than this—revelation is necessary not merely because we are
limited, but because God is free and therefore free to remain hidden:
It is not enough for us to know that God is more than what we have hitherto
grasped of God in our human knowledge, as we get to know it in an anthropology.
We must also know that God may speak and may refrain from speaking. Only
then can God’s actual speaking to us, if it really happens, be understood for what
it is: the unpredictable act of God’s personal love, before which we fall upon our
knees in worship.317
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In other words, God does not just exceed our categories, but can remain hidden in
another, more fundamental way—as a person God chooses whether or not to disclose
Godself.
Imagine that I stand before a person. This face-to-face encounter is on its own a
certain relationship, and satisfies the condition of the possibility of speech. But it is not
yet speech, nor is it a demand for speech. Unless the other chooses to disclose herself, I
cannot know her. She is doubly hidden: characterized by a depth I cannot exhaust, but
also free to communicate herself or not. Likewise, as spirits open to being we stand in
front of God and wait for a word. But this standing face-to-face does not force God to
speak, nor is it a sufficient revelation unto itself.318 This standing face-to-face is an
opportunity for revelation. The fact that we can and must inquire about God, then, is not
merely a statement about our being finite, or our position with respect to the infinite: it is
a statement about God, who as a personal being is free. Highlighting God’s nature as a
free, personal being, not only explains how revelation is still possible, but also
emphasizes that such a revelation, given in freedom, would be a gratuitous act of love.
Such a free revelation of oneself is qualitatively different than any other unfolding
of knowledge. It is not governed by any exterior circumstance. God’s self-revelation is
not determined by spirit’s natural openness for God: “Now a free activity is always
unpredictable, hence final and unique. Therefore such a revelation is not simply the
continuation of the manifestation of being that would already, although only inchoately,
have started for us in its definitive and final direction with our natural knowledge of
318
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God.”319 Divine revelation does not serve as a step stool, assisting us in grasping just
what is out of reach, or a telescope pointed further down a line we have already surveyed.
As a free, personal, being, God’s self-revelation is always gratuitous, always a disclosure
of the unknown, even when we are already standing face-to-face or united with God in a
dark touch.
Human Being as Hearer of the Word
Geist in Welt established the possibility of an intuition that reaches beyond space and
time, but this only places the subject before Absolute Being. In Hörer des Wortes, Rahner
clarifies that though she has ears to hear, she must still wait for God to speak. Two
significant aspects of Rahner’s anthropology come to light in this text: the subject’s
freedom and the subject’s historicity.
Just as God is free to disclose Godself or not, the human being is also free to
respond to such a revelation. As spiritual beings, we are capable of directing our own
lives. Such freedom is built into our most basic activities of knowing and doing.
Repeating his argument from Geist in Welt, Rahner identifies the return of the subject to
herself—who now stands against the world as hers—as constitutive of freedom:
Human activity is free. But there can a priori be freedom only where as acting
subjects we occupy a position that is independent of the position of the object of
our actions. Because in our judgments we return completely into ourselves, thus
occupying a position opposed to and independent of the objects of our knowledge,
we are free before this object and can freely act upon it. And the other way round:
the fact that we can act freely with the things of our world shows that, when we
act on purpose, we are self-subsisting in our knowledge and action.320
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In standing against the object of knowledge, the knower recognizes herself as separate
from it, and thus capable of judging and acting upon it. Independence from objects in and
through the return to the self is thus the most basic form of freedom and, therefore,
spirituality: “we are self-subsistent and capable of freely acting and deciding our own
destiny. We call this basic makeup of the human person, affirmed in every act of
knowledge and of freedom, our spiritual nature.”321
However, this is only half of the story. We know from Geist in Welt that human
knowledge is both active and passive, free and unfree. Before the subject stands against
the object, the object produces an effect upon her, it impresses itself on her senses. Here
we see freedom as part of a call and response between the subject and the world. The
freedom to judge and act upon the world is marked by separation, but not a complete or
primary one. The subject moves from receptive (the object impressing on her senses)322
to active (the agent intellect acting upon the object). Since we know from Geist in Welt
that conversion and abstraction are not two subsequent activities, but two simultaneous
moments that constitute the one knowing, so also the subject is simultaneously the one
acted upon and the one freely acting. This must affect how we interpret what Rahner
means by freedom. If the subject’s freedom—and therefore her spiritual nature—is
constituted by the ability to judge and act upon the world as a subject separate from it, it
is equally constituted by the ability to be acted upon by the world. The return to the self is
always a return from something. The subject who acts as a free agent in the world does so
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as one capable of recognizing and reflecting upon the impressions the world has made on
her—not as one who is by nature unimpressionable.
As Rahner argues, this freedom to determine oneself is itself an aspect of the
human being’s spiritual nature. This is because in and through such determination the
subject makes a decision about herself and about God. To understand how this is the case
we must first look at the peculiar nature of human freedom. Following Heidegger, Rahner
proclaims that human existence is thrownness [Geworfenheit]. That is, it is marked by a
radical contingency. I am indeed the product of other free beings, exercising free—and
thus unpredictable—choices. I can imagine the past otherwise. The world would be
intelligible without me. And yet here I am, and this “I” is itself a center of free activity,
which in exercising its will affirms its value over and against the world. Entailed here is a
paradox: despite our thrownness, “we must necessarily be present to ourselves, affirm
ourselves, posit ourselves absolutely.”323 That is, though we are contingent we take up a
relationship to ourselves that is absolute. We make a choice for ourselves.
To posit the contingent absolutely is by definition to will.324 Thus the primary
self-relation is one of will,325 and in this will, Rahner argues, we ratify God’s own choice
for us:
At the basis of human existence is always enacted [sich vollzieht] a necessary and
absolute affirmation of the contingent reality that we ourselves are, i.e., will. It
always goes together with an affirmation of the luminosity of being as such. It
follows that this necessary volitional affirmation can only be conceived as the
ratification [Nachvollzug: re-enacting] of a free absolute positing of something
that is not necessary. For should this absolute positing of contingent human
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existence not originate from a free will, the basic luminosity of being as such
would be eliminated.326
By affirmation, Rahner is referring to a radical, formal relationship to oneself
independent of the specific, categorical content of that relationship:
We necessarily assume an affirmative stance toward ourselves, because even
when in thought and in action we say “No” to ourselves, we still affirm ourselves
as being, because in the very act of such a denial we still presuppose ourselves as
possible object of such an act, hence as being…our existence is, despite and in its
contingency, something unavoidable for us, something we have to take up.327
In other words, whatever form my self-reflection takes—whether I consciously affirm
myself as made by God or fall into despair—I still affirm myself in some way. Both
acceptance and rejection of my own self as something willed by God affirms the fact that
I am something that demands accepting or rejecting, that I am a free, personal, being
whose presence demands a response, even from myself. Thus any act of will is implicitly
an affirmation that God has first willed me.
In recognizing that she could not have been, the subject understands herself as
freely willed by God. To be willed by God is to be loved into being: “For love is the
luminous will willing the person [gelichtete Wille zur Person] in his or her irreducible
uniqueness.”328 In positing her contingent self absolutely—whatever the form that selfrelationship takes—she too affirms herself as one willed and loved by God. This
affirmation is what makes God’s activity intelligible. We join God in God’s love and
affirmation of our uniqueness, and from here we can know and love God:
Now God’s free action is luminous for us only when we do not merely take it as
an act. We must also ratify [nachvollziehen: re-perform, re-enact, identify with,
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actively unite with] it in our love for it, thus experiencing [erleben] it, as it were,
in its origin and its production. Thus love is the light of the knowledge of the
finite and since we know the infinite only through the finite, it is also the light of
the whole of our knowledge. In final analysis, knowledge is but the luminous
radiance of love.329
Here love joins knowledge as the center of Rahner’s analysis of the subject as spirit-inworld and hearer of the word.330
But if every act of the will—including hatred of God and self—implicitly affirms
both God and self, then there exists an irreducible love of God in every human being:
At the heart of the finite spirit’s transcendence there lives a love for God. Our
openness toward absolute being is carried by our affirmation of our own
existence…This implies that our self-actualizing [sich vollziehende] standing
before God through knowing (which constitutes our nature as spirit) possesses, as
an intrinsic element of this knowledge, a love for God: our love for God is not
something that may happen or not happen, once we have come to know God. As
an intrinsic element of knowledge it is both its condition and its ground.331
This however seems to threaten the very freedom for which Rahner is arguing. Is the
subject, for instance, free to say “no” to God?
Rahner answers this question by affirming that all humans are free with respect to
finite objects and values.332 That is, with respect to any particular thing, the subject
exercises her will freely. And while affirmation of self and God are ultimately necessary,
Rahner argues that a person is still free with respect to the finite objects and values
through which she makes this affirmation: “Before single values, insofar as they are
given in our representations, we are free, because values are always represented as finite
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(although not necessarily affirmed as finite). In this way we are also free with regard to
the conditions of the possibility of our openness to value as such, if and insofar as they
become in our reflection, objects of knowledge.”333 This difference, between infinite and
finite values, is what allows Rahner to proclaim that the explicit rejection of self and God
coexists with a more foundational love of self and God:
This makes it possible to understand suicide or hatred for God, although
implicitly we continue to affirm ourselves and the absolute value, as the
conditions of the possibility of our negative attitude with respect to our own
existence and to the absolute value. As objects they are not conditions of
possibility and that is why we can be free with respect to them.334
Here Rahner makes a comparison with other axiomatic principles: “Love of God, which
is necessarily present deep down in human existence, may be explicitly welcomed by us
in our free activities, or the latter may contradict it, exactly as a single judgment may
agree with the first laws of being and of thinking, or may stand in contradiction to
them.”335 So then, affirmation of self and God exist even in their conscious denial, much
as the fact that the proposition “some statements are true” is assumed in its denial. Insofar
as the “self” and “God” exist as objects of thought, however, they can be denied.
At the same time, Rahner argues that our decision about finite values does impact
our radical openness toward being:
It is a fact that the free decision about single values (among which belongs also
the decision about the absolute value as objectified by our reflection in our a
priori openness to values) has a repercussion upon our fundamental openness for
the right order of values. This does not mean that this openness could be
altogether destroyed. But a free decision about a single value is ultimately always
a decision about and a molding of oneself as a person. In every decision we
decide about ourselves, not about an action or a thing. Thus in our free decisions
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we work back upon ourselves; we affect the very criteria of our love, which
determine our own being.336
In other words, “we do not simply perform good or bad actions: we ourselves become
good or bad.”337
Thus, there appears to be a basic, inviolable human affirmation of self and God,
which can either be contradicted or ratified over the course of one’s life, but can never
truly be erased. Even as one’s free choices place her further from God, by closing off the
avenues of her transcendence, her basic spiritual nature always persists. This basic,
inviolable affirmation does not render one’s “yes” to God irrelevant—rather it calls it
forth.
Just as the embodied subject must attend to God’s revelation in history, so also is
one’s “yes” to God effected in a turn to the concrete world. As Rahner argues, our love
for God is always “combined” with our love of finite objects:
The way we know and understand God is always also carried by the order or
disorder of our love. We do not first know God in a “neutral” way and afterwards
decide whether to love or hate God. Such a neutral knowledge, such “objectivity”
is an abstraction of the philosophers. It is real only if we suppose that our concrete
order of love is correct, that it agrees with the necessary order of love, which
comes from God and rules in our innermost being. The concrete way in which we
know God is from the start determined by the way we love and value the things
that come our way.338
Whatever this primary love of God is, it does not exist apart from our concrete existence.
The freedom to order finite loves is thus simultaneously the freedom to “[narrow] the
absolute horizon of our openness for being as such” and “[make] it impossible for the
word of God to say what it might please God to say, to tell us under what guise God
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wishes to encounter us.”339 Insofar as human beings are free with respect to finite values
and, through them, free to shut themselves off from the possibility of a divine encounter,
Rahner states that “we are the free ones, who decide about ourselves and thus make up
our minds whether and to what extent we wish to hear the truth and to let God’s light
shine in our spirit.”340 We as free beings await the free word of God in history. Thus, to
be human is to stand before the free personal God and wait for a possible revelation. But
while this openness to a divine word is an essential aspect of our spiritual, and thus
human, nature, it is also in Rahner’s words “determined by our free attitude.”341
Critical to Rahner’s argument in Hörer des Wortes is the fact that humans are
“fundamentally referred to history.”342 In order to explain why human beings can and
must look for a divine word from God in human history, he must first argue (contra
Lessing and his pesky ditch) that history is the site of metaphysical truth. To do so,
Rahner turns to analysis of the human person as embodied. Here, he refers back to his
ontology of human being in Geist in Welt, and the spirit’s entering into the other of
materiality. Recall that for Thomas, “materiality” is a reference to possibility, not
substance.343 To speak of spirit becoming matter is to claim that in human being, spirit
has entered into the realm of possibility—and, therefore, into the realm of space and time:
“It [matter] is the ground of the spatiality and the temporality of the being of which it is
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an essential component.”344 The indetermination of matter means that the material being
is always in progress, always in motion between different potentialities. Matter is also the
principle of individuation of a given being. It is what distinguishes this particular
instantiation of human being from another.345
The sum of these principles of matter is that an individual human being is
inherently limited, only ever actualizing some possibilities at a time. Thus it is only at the
level of humanity as a whole that the possibilities of human nature are realized:
This is why referring to other beings of one’s own kind, which everyone does as
this particular individual, is not something unimportant; it is a referring to a
multitude of human beings, to a humanity which, only as a whole, can really
make manifest that which is essentially given to each of us single persons deep
down in our possibilities, but only as possibilities. We are actually human only in
a humanity.346
All of this together gives us a grasp of what Rahner means by saying that human beings
are historical beings. We are spatio-temporal beings by nature who are not thrown into
the world of space and time like strangers in a strange land. We accomplish our
spirituality in space and in time, and therefore, as part of a historical human community:
“Thus we are essentially human in humankind; in space and time we carry out the work
of our freedom together with the whole of mankind. We live as historical beings.”347 It is
precisely because we ourselves are embodied in space and time that this is where we
must look to find metaphysical truth.
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Spirituality is accomplished within human history in such a way that historicity is
“an essential element of the transcendental spirituality itself.”348 History and metaphysics
are not distinct, nor opposed. History is the site and the material of human spirituality.
Human beings ask the question about being within history and come to know being
within history: “A spirit of this kind [that is, human] penetrates into matter in order to
become spirit. We penetrate into the world in order to reach being as such, which extends
beyond the world.”349
If there is to be a divine revelation—an appearance of God—it must be within
“the domain of transcendence which is also always already historicity.”350 This means
first, that a word from God must take place within history in order that humans hear it.
No ahistorical word can be heard. As a free, and thus unrepeatable word, this means that
it must take place in a particular space and time.351 Second, since the human being is that
spirit which accomplishes itself in history, it is fitting that such a word be spoken within
humanity itself.352 This reference to history allows Rahner to distance his anthropology of
the subject as spirit-in-world from two different hypotheses: that one could come to know
the extent of the Vorgriff apart from a particular object in a concept-less mysticism (or its
secular philosophical equivalent, German idealism)353 or that the “immediate intuition of

348

Ibid., 119: 212.

349

Ibid., 120: 214.

350

Ibid., 128: 226.

351

Ibid., 134: 238, 240.

352

Ibid., 138: 248. This is as close as Rahner gets in this text to saying why it is fitting that the
word takes flesh.
353

Ibid., 60-1: 116, 118.

116
God” would be owed the human person as the fulfillment of the Vorgriff.354 “Thus,”
Rahner writes, “every kind of rationalism, as an attempt to lift human existence above
history, must be rejected as inhuman and therefore also as lacking due respect for the
human spirit.”355 It is only in human history that human beings can await a revelation
from God.
So then, as Rahner summarizes at the end, theology is itself totally dependent on
this word of God which is given freely—God could have remained silent—and which is
not limited or determined by either philosophy of religion or metaphysics.356 At the same
time, there would be no word without those who could hear it.357 Thus theological
anthropology refers not only to the content of revelation that addresses humanity, but to
“the sense that some, albeit naive, unreflective self-understanding of human beings is the
condition of the possibility of theology.”358 That revelation is received entails
something—no matter how minimal—about the one who receives it.359 Thus “it follows
that theology presupposes a ‘theological’ anthropology which may be called fundamental
theological anthropology,” which, Rahner says, is the substance of these lectures, for a
fundamental theological anthropology and philosophy of religion are in the end identical
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“at least in their core.”360 Philosophy of religion is preparatory for the gospel insofar as it
addresses the relationship of the hearer to a potential word of God.361 Much as “The
Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in the World” did, Hörer des Wortes places Geist in Welt—
which, according to the taxonomy here, would also be a philosophy of religion—as a
preparation for, rather than replacement of, the gospel. It names the possibility of a
subject hearing revelation. It does not preclude the need for such a revelation but in fact
demonstrates its necessity, if God is to be known at all. Spirits-in-world can and must
inquire about Absolute Being and they turn toward history for that answer.
Andrew Tallon argues we can understand the argument of the book as a whole by
focusing on three key terms—spirit, freedom and history: “these three ideas really
constitute one complex idea, namely, that to be spirit is to be open to being, to be person
is to be spirit free to open or not to another, and to be finite spirit is to be person in
history, in space and time, the where and when of God’s incarnation in order for it to
reach and be reached by finite spirit.”362 That is, the spirit-in-world is open to God, but as
a being with freedom God remains hidden apart from revelation, which occurs in history.
Where Geist in Welt stumbles in being too abstract, too idealistic, too philosophical,
Hörer des Wortes highlights that the story of human spirit as open to being is a drama in
which free persons await a free word from God in history, and in which becoming a
subject entails loving who God loves, including oneself. As Tallon summarizes,
The heart of this entire metaphysics, and it is easily missed in the midst of so
much abstraction and especially with so much discussion of an terminological
orientation around cognition, is that being is personal. That is, as a person is free
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to reveal himself or not, to obscure or veil himself or not, so at the very core of
knowing and knowability (and thus of being), is will, and thus love. Being is
inadequately described or defined, therefore (and one cannot help wishing that
Rahner had put this even more forcefully), only as Beiseichsein, as self-presence,
consciousness, or self-consciousness; being is also good and will.363
It is for this reason, despite Rahner still preferring “human” and “spirit” over “person,”
that Tallon argues the text entails a robust personism—what Tallon defines as “focus[ing]
on freedom (will, love) and relationality rather than on knowledge (consciousness,
thought, mind, intellect, etc.) and substantiality as characteristic of man.”364
That being said, Rahner’s understanding of the relationship between the human
and the divine still raises questions, particularly insofar as how exactly this basic
affirmation of self and God is actualized in and determined by our love of finite objects.
Recall that even “when in thought and in action we say No to ourselves, we still affirm
ourselves as being, because in the very act of such a denial we still presuppose ourselves
as possible object of such an act, hence as being…our existence is, despite and in its
contingency, something unavoidable for us, something we have to take up.”365 Rahner
argues that even a radical denial of oneself, such as suicide, is at some basic level an
affirmation—of one’s activity as a free agent to perform such an act and of one’s
existence of an object of such an act. In this way, the “absolute affirmation of the
contingent reality that we ourselves are” is a necessary aspect of human existence.
Human being is that being which asks about being, it is that being which takes up a
position regarding itself. So then, even exercising one’s freedom in contradiction to
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God’s free love of the human being—either in hatred of self or of God—is still a
ratification of the freedom we exercise as a result of God’s loving us into being.
Just how substantial is this basic affirmation then, and what aspect of one’s
spiritual identity does it shore up? We know from our investigation in Chapter Two that
Rahner is concerned to show not only how an experience of God is possible, but how
such an experience might affect the subject as something intrinsic to her identity and
simultaneously available to reflection. By placing the decision for God into the very
nature of human being itself Rahner has done this—the human being is the one who, by
nature, makes a decision for God. She must make a decision one way or another, and she
does this through all of the decisions she makes, which implicitly are a decision for
herself as one loved into being by God.
Here, human freedom mirrors divine freedom. Just as divine freedom entails the
possibility of God’s silence, human freedom entails the possibility of saying “no.” God is
free to disclose Godself or not, but as Rahner notes, even silence is a certain form of
revelation—the revelation that God has chosen not to speak.366 In fact, it is only because
God could speak, only because there is a possibility that God could, that God’s silence
could be heard. Thus, the condition for the possibility of God’s freedom to reveal Godself
is the appearance of God within the horizon of the encounter—itself a form of revelation.
In a similar way, the human being’s freedom to accept God or not is predicated on a basic
affirmation as a result of her place as a spirit-in-world. She is set before God in such a
way that she can say “yes” or “no,” but she cannot leave the space of the encounter. Even
her silence is an exercise of freedom with respect to self and respect to God.
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So then, this basic and implicit affirmation of God and self does nothing but
demonstrate the necessarily spiritual nature of all human beings as subjects who stand
before God. It does not determine one way or the other what one says to God, only that
we are placed in a situation where even our silence cries out. Just as proclaiming human
beings as those open to being does not relinquish the need for concrete revelation in
history, neither does proclaiming human beings as those who implicitly affirm being
relinquish the need for re-enacting God’s love for us in our own lives.
Human beings in all their contingent particularity, all their thrownness, are willed
and loved into being by a gracious God. In all our knowing and doing we re-enact this
free creation, so that even when we say “no” in hatred of God or self, we expose the fact
that human beings are those to whom God has said “yes” and who are capable of offering
a loving “yes” back. At the same time, whether or not we say “yes” or “no” has an affect
on our ultimate openness to God—though not, however, enough of one to completely
close us off from God. On the one hand, our transcendental openness toward God is
always and already realized and determined by our concrete, day-to-day choices. On the
other hand, these choices never completely obliterate one’s transcendental openness
toward God. The transcendental is realized, but not exhausted, in the categorical.
Hörer des Wortes as Ignatian Theology
In Geist in Welt, Rahner grounded the possibility of metaphysics in the ontology of
human being as spirit-in-world, who actualizes herself in and through the other—
including materiality (that is, spirit’s entering into the spatial and temporal world) and the
object of knowledge (both personal and impersonal). In Chapter Two, I argued that Geist
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in Welt functions within a larger Ignatian theology. Asked to complete a dissertation on
philosophy, Rahner develops a metaphysics of knowledge in which the human subject is
oriented to absolute Being as the horizon of her experience. As Rahner’s writing months
later in “The Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in the World” shows, such a project serves to
highlight precisely the disruptive nature of the cross. The God of philosophy is ultimately
hidden, but Christian faith proclaims that God has manifested Godself precisely within
time and space. God has chosen not to remain hidden from the world as the whither of
our transcendence, but to enter this world and walk among us.
In Hörer des Wortes, Rahner clarifies that to be embodied spirit is to be free to
listen for and respond to God’s word in history. In turn, human beings, as spirits-inworld, make the world the material of their “yes” or “no” to God. This work also bears
the mark of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises, particularly its emphasis on the experience of
God in one’s life and the discernment of how to make that life a “yes” back to God. Thus,
even in his lectures on philosophy of religion, Rahner continues to speak of the human
being in light of the insights he learns from Ignatius.
We can see the continuity between Rahner’s theology and the Spiritual Exercises
in his own direction of them. Here Rahner speaks concretely to his retreatants about
effecting one’s “yes” to God in one’s everyday life.367 Rahner directed the Spiritual
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Exercise over 50 times. Writing in 1975, Rahner describes the Spiritual Exercises as an
experience “characterised by discernment of spirits, by the process of choice, by the
practical search for the will of God, to mention only a few aspects.”368 He goes on to say
that such activity naturally expresses itself in theological reflection and that all of his
“theological thinking sprang from the practice of the Ignatian Exercises.”369 In his 1978
“Ignatius of Loyola Speaks”—which he later described in 1983 as his “last will and
testament” to the youth of that day370—Rahner adopts the voice of Ignatius and speaks
provocatively about the certainty with which he has experienced God, at times taunting
modern theologians to try to explain it.371 It is this experience which Rahner wishes to
direct his retreatants, and it is the possibility and nature of this experience upon which
much of his theology reflects.
While Rahner only attributed the substantial influence of Ignatius and Ignatian
spirituality on his theology retrospectively, one can see the echoes of the Spiritual
Exercises throughout his theology. As we will see in the rest of this chapter, as Rahner
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develops his theology, he continues to examine how it is that the subject as spirit-inworld attends to the revelation of God in history, making her life a “yes” in response to
God’s “yes.” His theology bears the marks of a thinker not only academically committed
to an Ignatian understanding of mysticism and the Christian life, but one personally
formed by the Spiritual Exercises and Ignatian spirituality more generally.
The Later Rahner: On Embodying One’s “Yes” to God
In Rahner’s later theological writings, his analysis of the relationship between one’s
unthematic knowledge of God and the material of one’s life becomes more complicated.
Perhaps Rahner’s most significant contribution to theological anthropology is his
conception of the “supernatural existential,” a universal aspect of human experience
through which God’s grace is offered to all. By virtue of this supernatural existential, he
argues that all are given the freedom to effect a fundamental option for God—that is, to
accept God’s salvation. More controversially, Rahner proposes that this supernatural
existential is the ground for the possibility of an “anonymous Christian,” a subject who
can accept God’s offer of salvation without explicit affirmation, or even knowledge, of
Christ. The inter-religious and soteriological aspects of this part of Rahner’s theology
have been debated extensively.372 What I am concerned with here is the way in which this
theology develops the ontology of human being Rahner sets up in Geist in Welt,
particularly with respect to understanding the subject as embodied.
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In Hörer des Wortes, Rahner explicitly brackets the question of the grace needed
to hear or respond to God’s word. His analysis is of the a posteriori condition of human
being as spirit-in-world attendant to the revelation of a free God in history. This is
appropriate given that his lectures are on philosophy of religion and what he offers there
is a metaphysical anthropology. As Rahner develops his theological anthropology—
particularly as debates surrounding the relationship between grace and nature dominated
contemporary theological discussions—he has to investigate what aspects of this
capability to hear and respond to the word of God are gratuitous gifts of God and not
proper to human being itself.
It is in his entrance into the 1950s debates on nature and grace, particularly as an
attempt to offer a corrective to de Lubac’s theology, that Rahner first mentions the term
“supernatural existential.”373 In an essay titled “Concerning the Relationship between
Nature and Grace,” Rahner argues that the theologians of the so-called “Nouvelle
Theology,” in their rightful critique of traditional scholastic accounts of grace as extrinsic
to the human person, fail to maintain both that the human being is oriented to a
supernatural end and that grace is unexacted, without falling into contradiction.374
In order to show how an orientation toward God could be intrinsic to the person in
her depths, as well as a gratuitous gift of God, Rahner proposes the idea of a supernatural
existential. This theory states that, “the capacity for the God of self-bestowing personal
Love is the central and abiding existential of man as he really is.”375 As a result of God’s
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grace, concrete human existence—not, it is important to note, human being—has been
elevated so that it can respond positively to God’s word. In Foundations, Rahner
describes this elevation at “present in all men as an existential of their concrete
existence.”376 Thus, while this elevation is both universal, and prior to any human
reflection, it is not proper to human nature as such. This elevation is not sanctifying grace
itself, but as David Coffey says, “rather a relationship to this grace.”377 Through the
concept of the supernatural existential, Rahner is better able to say how all subjects are
oriented to God and have such orientation as a principle of their subjectivity, without
positing the fulfillment of that orientation as something due to humans.
If all human beings are gifted with the supernatural existential, then all human
beings are oriented to God and capable of responding to God’s word in history. Thus, the
supernatural existential is the ground for the idea of Rahner’s most often described as
“the freedom to effect a fundamental option for God,”378 that is, to the freedom to make
one’s life a “yes” to God. Before we address how this option is effected, and the
relationship between one’s fundamental option for God and one’s concrete acts, we need
to first examine what Rahner means by “freedom.”
In his essay “Theology of Freedom,” Rahner builds on the understanding of
freedom he set out in Geist in Welt and Hörer des Wortes. Freedom is by definition self-
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disposal.379 This capacity is not one among others, but rather an essential aspect of
transcendence, and therefore as permanent and constitutive of human being as spirit
itself.380 As self-disposal, freedom necessarily involves one’s relationship with oneself,
which Rahner refers to as “subjectivity,” and which is therefore also a permanent aspect
of human existence. This transcendent subject is one who is always present to herself and
who must therefore take up a position regarding herself.381 Since freedom has God as
both its horizon and object, this position ultimately is for or against God.382 Thus human
freedom is fundamentally the capacity to effect a decision for God.
Such a decision is always effected historically and categorically.383 As we saw in
Geist in Welt and Hörer des Wortes, freedom is the disposal of a self who is flesh, who
exists in space and time, and who makes the other the material of her actualization:
“…Man as spirit is not an abstract subject but an embodied, historical spirit who achieves
his transcendence precisely by means of the material of the world, of its bodily
corporeality and history.”384 Writing on devotion to the Sacred Heart, Rahner writes of
the fundamental unity of soul and body. Words like “flesh” and “heart” refer to a unity of
being “which is anterior to the dichotomy between body and soul, action and thought,
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external and internal.”385 It is this united human person who effects a free decision for
God:
This unity of man, original, originating and holding together what it originates is a
personal unity, that is to say, one which knows itself, ventures forth and freely
makes its own choice, which answers and—in love—affirms itself or denies itself.
It is the point where man borders on the mystery of God, the point where man,
whose own origins is from God, as God’s partner either leaves himself and gives
himself back to God in his original unity, or else blasphemously refusing himself
to Him and turning himself downward plunges into the void of his own
damnation.386
Since human beings are spirits-in-world, they effect their decision for or against God
bodily. One’s fundamental option for God is effected in and through one’s concrete
decisions.
Since freedom is by definition radical disposal of oneself, such a disposal cannot
be merely provisional. As such, Rahner argues that,
Freedom is not the power constantly to change one’s course of action, but rather
the power to decide that which is to be final and definitive in one’s life, that
which cannot be superseded or replaced, the power to bring into being from one’s
own resources that which must be, and must not pass away, the summons to a
decision that is irrevocable.”387
But in virtue of our being embodied, we exist in space and time and therefore are always
open to this sort of revision. Only in death does our exercise of freedom become
irrevocable. Thus to will that one’s life mean something irrevocably is to will death. 388
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The Body of Christ
In Rahner’s later theology it becomes clear that his understanding of human embodiment
is grounded not merely in an ontology of human being as spirit-in-world but in the
revelation of a God whose word effects the creation of human being, whose word
assumes human being, and who accomplishes salvation bodily. In Rahner’s words, this
entire history of salvation can be summed up as follows, “when God desires to manifest
himself, it is as man that he does so.”389 Thus despite the fact that, as embodied creatures,
we could look nowhere else for our salvation than in human history (as Rahner argues in
Hörer des Wortes), Christians owe a particular attentiveness to human history as the site
of revelation as a result of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Christ’s obedience is embodied
in space and time, in the shedding of blood. God has made it such that the material
historical world is the site of salvation:
We have been redeemed through an event which is, of course, spiritually free and
personal in its nature. But according to the Father’s will, it took place, and could
only take place, in this entirely concrete, bloody reality, given over to death. The
place where this love and obedience are to be found is therefore this bodily
existence, if love and obedience are what they are intended to be—i.e.
redemptive.390
This salvation is effected bodily, and only as such are we capable of taking hold of it.
It is ultimately this fact that the Word has been made flesh that shows us what it
means to be flesh, not the other way around.391 To be clear, Rahner is using “flesh”
following John’s use of sarx and defines it accordingly “[it] always means the whole
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man, but in his actual, bodily nature;”392 such that “flesh” is not opposed to “spirit.”393
The significance of human embodiment—not to be misunderstood as something over
against human spirituality—comes from its being the language of God’s self-revelation:
“flesh, man as a bodily, concrete, historical being is just what comes into being when the
Logos, issuing from himself, utters himself. Man is therefore God’s self-utterance, out of
himself into the empty nothingness of the creature.”394 The ultimate Christian answer to
the question about embodiment is thus simply this:
‘And the Word became flesh.’ The sarx is what comes into being when the Logos
becomes something which it is not already in itself, in its divine nature…The
flesh which is man is the self-utterance of God himself…The being of man is
what comes into existence when God utters himself into the otherness of
nothingness; and that means man, in so far as he is sarx.395
Thus, the emanation of spirit into what is not spirit described in Geist in Welt is part of a
much larger emanation of God into what is not God.
Furthermore, for Rahner, Christian theological anthropology presents a
fundamental continuity among all human beings. This continuity is what makes sense of
Christian understandings of sin and grace. My membership in the human family is what
implicates me in original sin;396 it is also what allows me to take hold of the redemption
offered in Christ. To borrow from Paul, “For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive
in Christ” (1 Corinthians 15:22 NRSV). We take hold of salvation in Christ not merely
because it happens within the horizon of space and time, but because it radiates through
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“this community of the body, this blood-relationship which binds [all] in Adam to a
common destiny.”397 The Word does not merely become a human, but enters into
humanity as a whole.
This concrete and bodily nature of salvation is why “the Church as a concrete,
bodily, sociologically constituted community sees itself as the Church that is necessary
for salvation,” and why “sacraments consisting of physical elements are necessary for
salvation.”398 They are salvific because of, not despite, the fact that they exist as incarnate
in human history. Against any false understanding of Christianity as the sphere of the
soul, Rahner states quite strongly that, “Christianity is continually concerned with the
body. It is a bodily, concrete, shaping, speaking, acting, organised, ecclesiastical,
sacramental religion, a religion which concerns itself in its dogmas with concrete things,
and expresses something through these dogmas.”399 Christianity is the realm of the body;
it attends to bodily things.
The Body as Symbol
This understanding of the body as site of salvation can be extended through Rahner’s
understanding of the body as symbol. Rahner contrasts his understanding of symbol with
that which views symbol as a connection between two objects, based on a relative
agreement perceived in the act of judgment. This is a derivative, not foundational, notion
of symbol.400 Rather, he argues that all finite beings are inherently symbolic in
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themselves. Since in them essence and existence are not simply identical, finite beings
are constituted by a plural unity. In this plural unity, beings achieve presence-to-self
through expression into the other, in such a way that the expression is still united with the
original unity. This expression or presence-to-self is not a secondary element, but is
precisely what we mean by being: each being is symbolic insofar as it realizes being. This
self-presence is not only the being’s fulfillment, but also the ground for it being presentto-us as an object of knowledge and love.401 From the side of the knower, knowledge is
“mediated” by the symbol: “The being is known in this symbol, without which it cannot
be known at all.”402
A paradigmatic example of what Rahner means by symbol is the body. Thus in
“The Theology of the Symbol” he uses language of “symbol” to translate the Thomistic
account of the person as composed of soul and prime matter: “It follows at once that what
we call body is nothing else than the actuality of the soul itself in the ‘other’ of materia
prima, the ‘otherness’ produced by the soul itself, and hence its expression and symbol in
the very sense which we have given to the term symbolic reality.” 403 This dynamic
concept of symbol points to the transcendence of the human person over against a
reductionistic empiricism that preaches the independence of the “material reality of the
body,” while also admitting that we are limited in a real way by the determinations of
concrete matter. In short, we are both more than and circumscribed by our bodies.404
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That God is triune—and therefore plurality and simplicity are not contradictory—
grounds Rahner’s metaphysic of plural unity. Thus our own plurality is not only a marker
of finitude, but also an indicator of our being made in the image of God. We are symbolic
because God is symbolic. Divine self-expression is the generation of the Word, the image
of the Father, which constitutes the Father’s own self-knowledge. Thus, it is appropriate
to speak of the Logos as the symbol of the Father, the self-expression through which God
comes to know Godself and in which God has God’s being. 405
The Incarnation of the Logos is a continuation of this expression.406 In expressing
itself, the Logos does not merely take on humanity like a uniform—in that case Jesus
would only be able to proclaim the Logos, but not present the Logos. Rather, the
expression of the Logos into the other constitutes the humanity of the Logos: “The
humanity is the self-disclosure of the Logos itself, so that when God, expressing himself,
exteriorizes himself, that very thing appears which we call the humanity of the Logos.”407
The humanity of Christ is thus the Realsymbol of the Logos of God.408 While other signs
and symbols will vanish at the eschaton, the humanity of the Logos has eternal
significance: “here, and now, and always, my salvation, my grace, my knowledge of God,
rests on the Word in our flesh.”409 It will continue to immediately mediate even in the
beatific vision.410 Devotion to the sacred heart of Jesus, as “the original centre of the
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human reality of the Son of God” is therefore also “the centre of mediation, through
which all our movement must pass if it is really to arrive at God.”411
Rahner’s understanding of Christ as the Realsymbol of God grounds his larger
understanding of the relationship between God and humanity. Humanity is that which is
created when God speaks Godself into what is not God. As God’s self-utterance,
humanity constitutes the obediential potency of the hypostatic union, which is precisely
God’s gift of Godself in an ultimate and irrevocable way.412 Since God is the only one
who can create such that the creation acquires autonomy, “radical dependence upon him
increases in direct, and not in inverse, proportion with genuine self-coherence before
him.”413 Freedom is therefore not opposed to dependence on God, and the autonomy of
Jesus’ human will does not threaten his divinity. Further, humanity, in its radical
openness to the transcendent, is oriented toward the beatific vision. This telos is achieved
in Christ, so that the union of the Logos with Christ’s humanity fulfills rather than
subsumes that humanity. Therefore in Christ who constitutes the perfect relationship
between Creator and creature, the human and the divine increase in direct proportion.414
We should therefore not interpret his two natures as somehow waging war, so that a
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robust understanding of one leads to the denigration of the other. Christ, as the symbol of
God, truly makes the Father present while fulfilling what it means to be human.
The Christ-event does not only fulfill the telos of humanity and the history of the
world; through the Incarnation, the symbolic nature of all finite beings is infinitely
extended. That which has been assumed by the word is now radically and substantially
altered so that the created order no longer merely points to God as its cause, but “as to
him to whom this reality belongs as his substantial determination or as his own proper
environment.”415 What was before a natural transcendence toward God as creator is now,
by the grace of God through the incarnation of the Word, the manifestation of God in our
symbolic world. Thus all reality is capable of transcending itself to speak of all reality
and, ultimately, God. 416
Understanding the body in light of Rahner’s theology of symbol places his
conception of the human person as spirit-in-world within a broader constellation of
Christian ideas. Here we see that spirit pouring itself into matter is an extension of God’s
creation of the human person in the image of God. The symbolic nature of human beings
is metaphysically grounded in the symbolic nature of God, who expresses Godself in the
creation of and incarnation in human being. In Christ we also see the perfection of
humanity as openness and obedience to God.
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Love of God and Love of Neighbor
If the finite world is capable of manifesting the symbolic presence of the divine, then the
human person—as the one who is created through and assumed by the Word—is the
privileged form of such revelation. It should be no surprise then, that Rahner proposes a
“radical identity” between the love of neighbor with the love of God.417 While it is
generally recognized that those who love God do so via the love of neighbor, Rahner
makes the more controversial claim any love of neighbor is an act of the love of God—
even if the lover does not explicitly intend so.418
As we saw in Hörer des Wortes, one’s decision for God—the ultimate Good—
must be embodied through one’s relationship to finite goods. Privileged among these
“finite goods” is the neighbor, love of whom is “the original relationship to God.”419 Thus
Rahner speaks of the unity between love of God and love of neighbor such that “the one
does not exist and cannot be understood or exercised without the other, and that two
names have really to be given to the same reality.”420 The unity is not founded on the
command: love of neighbor is not simply proof of love of God. Rather, Rahner points to
the synoptic tradition that what is done to the least of these is done to Jesus, and to the
Johannine tradition that God is love, as evidence that how we treat one another is
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ontologically how we accept or deny Jesus in our lives.421 We who cannot see God can
only love the “God in us.”422 The neighbor serves as an icon of God. Since true love of
neighbor is made possible by supernatural grace, in both act and its object it is a
participation in divine love.423
But Rahner takes this unity to its rather provocative end: “that wherever a genuine
love of man attains its proper nature and its moral absoluteness and depth, it is in addition
always so underpinned and heightened by God’s saving grace that it is also love of God,
whether it be explicitly considered to be such a love by the subject or not.”424 Rahner
clarifies that this is possible precisely because of the distinction between an action’s
“explicit object” and its “a priori formal object, the transcendental horizon or ‘space’
within which a determined individual object is encountered on the other hand.”425 At the
formal level the two loves are not identical. One can pray, for instance, without holding
the neighbor as an explicit object of thought. However any true love of the neighbor that
disposes of the self radically, “where the whole ‘transcendental’ depth of interhuman love
is realised and represented”—that is, a love that ratifies one’s transcendental openness to
being—is therefore also an implicit love of the whither of that transcendence.426
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It is this union of love of God and neighbor that Rahner identifies as the
presupposition of his controversial understanding of “anonymous ‘Christianity.’” Rahner
argues that, on account of the grace offered to all, all moral acts are potentially salvific:
that wherever man posits a positively moral act in the full exercise of his free selfdisposal, this act is a positive supernatural salvific act in the actual economy of
salvation even when its a posteriori object and the explicitly given a posteriori
motive do not spring tangibly from the positive revelation of God’s Word but are
in this sense ‘natural.’ This is so because God in virtue of his universal salvific
will offers everyone his supernaturally divinising grace and thus elevates the
positively moral act of man. Furthermore, the thereby already given,
supernaturally transcendental even though unconscious horizon of the spirit (its a
priori orientation towards the triune God of eternal life) includes an element of
(transcendental) revelation and possibility of faith which also gives such an act
that sufficient character of ‘faith’ necessary for a moral act being a salvific act.427
Insofar as love both most engages one’s transcendental depths and orients one to the
neighbor in whom God lives, love of neighbor is such an act of self-disposal par
excellance:
The act of personal love for another human being is therefore the all-embracing
basic act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure to everything else.
If this is correct, then the essential a priori openness to the other human being,
which must be undertaken freely, belongs as such to the a priori and most basic
constitution of man and is an essential inner moment of his (knowing and willing)
transcendentality. Precisely this a priori basic constitution (which must be
accepted in freedom, but to which man can also close himself) is experienced in
the concrete encounter with man in the concrete. The one moral (or immoral)
basic act in which man comes to himself and decides basically about himself is
also the (loving or hating) communication with the concrete Thou, in which man
experiences, accepts or denies his basic a priori references to the Thou as such.428
In the neighbor we affirm or deny our radical being for the other, and thus implicitly
affirm or deny the other for whom and by whom we are ultimately constituted. As such,
love of neighbor is “the one basic human act.” In this sense, refusal to love the neighbor
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is a refusal of one’s own transcendence, simultaneously cutting oneself off from God and
one’s humanity: “‘no’ to it imprisons the whole man within the deadly lonely damnation
of self-created absurdity,” and likewise, “the totality of reality, which freely gives itself
and is accepted and understood as the blessed incomprehensibility—which is the only
self-evident thing—opens itself only if man opens himself radically in the act of love and
entrusts himself to this totality.”429
Since it is through love of neighbor that we love God, Rahner argues that even
acts that have God alone as their proper object—for example, prayer—are made possible
only by love of neighbor.430 One’s fundamental option for God, made possible by an
offer of grace made to all humans, is effected not in some “gnostic-mystic interiority
alone,”431 but embodied in the love of neighbor. In the concrete act of loving my
neighbor I ratify my profound being-for-other. I dispose my whole self in an act of love
and thus participate in divine love itself. Thus Rahner writes that our freedom to effect a
fundamental option is identical to our capacity for love.432
To summarize: one makes of one’s life a “yes” to God in disposing of oneself in
love of the neighbor. Such disposal is finalized in death, making one’s choice of the
neighbor and of God irrevocable. Since all such disposal is (through the supernatural
existential) salvific, the life of Christian perfection does not belong to Christians in name
alone. Indeed, it might not even belong to some Christians. Thus, Rahner’s understanding
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of the demand to embody one’s “yes” to God through love of neighbor also opens up the
possibility that some may love God without explicit knowledge of it.
Concupiscence
As the subject disposes herself, shaping her life into a “yes” to God over time, in space,
through the concrete choices she makes to affirm all that is good, true, and beautiful, she
encounters resistance. There exists in her own person desires that precede any rational
will. One’s attempt to exert rational control over one’s life is not merely limited by
external constraints, but by the utter spontaneity of one’s own will, which like a grocery
cart with a loose wheel, surprises one at every turn.
The sum of this spontaneity is how, Rahner argues, we ought to understand the
Christian doctrine of concupiscentia.433 These desires may incline her toward good or
evil, but in either case they are not, specifically speaking, anything for which she is
morally responsible. Rather, Rahner refers to them as “pre-moral.”434 However, such
spontaneous inclinations are included in the material of her self-disposal. Will she act on
this desire? How will she integrate this desire into her life?
Lest we misinterpret this as resting on some sort of ontological dualism, Rahner is
clear that these desires can be “spiritual” or “sensual.” Both lust and despair can be
examples of spontaneous impulses over which the subject has no control. Thus this
understanding of concupiscentia does not depend on a false dichotomy between spirit and
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body, but of the existence of the whole person in space and time: “It is not that the
ontically lower in man is intrinsically at variant with the higher, but that man is divided
against himself.”435 While it is easy to read this as spirit encountering resistance in
sensibility, Rahner challenges an overly simplistic account:
Here too is to be found the nucleus of truth in that otherwise too crude distinction
between the spirit as the freely operative principle and the sensibility as the
principle which resists this free decision. In reality of course the whole ‘nature’
given prior to freedom offers resistance to the ‘person’s’ free and total disposition
of himself, so that the boundary between ‘person’ and ‘nature’ stands as it were
vertically in regard to the horizontal line which divides spirituality from
sensibility in man.436
That is, we are not talking merely or simply about the ontology of spirit actualizing itself
as matter, but of the whole person—the spirit-in-world—making her life the material of
her free decision.437
Critical to this idea of concupiscentia is the metaphor of embodiment as mass.
The metaphor works in two specific ways. First, one’s life has weight. It must be taken
up, it must be formed, it must be carried along the way. Self-disposal is not a matter of
simply choosing what life one wants to live, but involves the practice of daily exercise, as
we embody that will in the material of our own lives. To use a pun, one’s life matters.
Second, one’s life has inertia.438 As individual acts become habits, they shape even our
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spontaneous desires. Each choice we makes propels us in a certain direction, so that over
time the energy of the free decision converts what is initially resistance—what Rahner
calls “passive sluggishness”—439into momentum. By consistently choosing the good, we
accrue speed, and the resulting momentum means that any spontaneous inclination to evil
will have less effect.
Such dominion is never effected completely:
The free act does indeed dispose of the whole subject, in so far as it is as free act
an act of man’s personal centre, and so, by the root as it were, draws the whole
subject in sympathy with it. And yet man’s concrete being is not throughout its
whole extent and according to all its powers and their actualization the pure
expression and the unambiguous revelation of the personal active centre which is
its own master.440
There remains always a distance between the free act and its expression in the subject’s
life. So while what Rahner refers to as concupiscentia [Konkupiszenz] is merely the
spontaneous desire that precedes a free act, he reserves the term concupiscence
[Begierlichkeit] for this resulting distance. Concupiscence in the narrowest theological
sense refers only to this second concept:
Concupiscence [Begierlichkeit] consists essentially in the fact that man in this
regime does not overcome even by his free decision the dualism between what he
is as nature prior to his existential decision and what he becomes as person by this
decision, not even in the measure in which it would absolutely speaking be
conceivable for a finite spirit to overcome it. Man never becomes wholly
absorbed either in good or in evil.441
To the extent that this concupiscence can incline us to good or evil—Rahner writes that
“Both the good and the bad moral decision encounter the resistance, the solidity and the
impenetrability of nature. Concupiscence in the theological sense shows itself for
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instance just as much when a man blushes in the act of lying as when the “flesh” refuses
to follow the willingness of the “spirit” for the good”—442it is morally neutral just as its
predecessor concupiscentia. However, phenomenologically speaking, insofar as we
experience concupiscence as that which limits our free activity, we experience it as
something that ought not to be.443
It is this narrow meaning of concupiscence [Begierlichkeit]—not desires
themselves but their frustration of one’s will—which the gift of integrity removes.444 As a
counter-factual, Rahner explains that the story of Adam and Eve is the story of two
people who, precisely because of a lack of concupiscence, were able to take up the
material of their own lives with complete control. Only as such are they able to utter a
perfect “no” to God.445 Likewise Rahner argues that the telos of Christian perfection is
the dominion over desire, not its eradication.446 Nowhere is this clearer than in Christ,
who while he did not lack integrity, demonstrates such desire when he cries in the
garden.447 Since such desire persisted even in Christ’s perfection, concupiscentia
[Konkupiszenz] must not be something that is antithetical to human freedom.
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The distinction between concupiscentia [Konkupiszenz] and concupiscence
[Begierlichkeit] is critical because it clarifies that human perfection does not require the
eradication of our desires, nor some battle between spirit and sensibility:
A man who possesses the gift of integrity is no less ‘sensitive’, he is no more
‘spiritual’ in a Neoplatonic rather than a Christian sense, involving the lack of an
intense vitality. Rather he is free really to dispose of himself through a personal
decision in so sovereign a way that within the area of his being there is no longer
anything to resist this sovereign self-determination by a sort of passive
sluggishness.448
Integrity grants one the opportunity to exercise one’s will in the fullest sense, to make of
one’s life the perfect expression of one’s freedom:
For integrity is in face that makes possible the exhaustive realization of the
tendency associated with every free decision: the tendency of the person totally to
dispose of himself before God. Without the gift of integrity this tendency, which
is undoubtedly proper to every free decision, will find expression in greater or less
degree according to the circumstances.449
We miss the point then if we align either embodiment or desire with original sin. The gift
of integrity not only allows human nature to persists, but it makes of it the material of
one’s “yes” to God. It seems however, that perfect integrity is only to be hoped for
eschatologically; until then, while the subject is capable of saying “yes” to God, she is
always unable to make of her whole life a complete expression of this “yes.” Rahner cites
this struggle as the locus of human participation in Christ’s suffering.450
Because such a gift of integrity is only given to human beings along with
sanctifying grace, asymmetry opens up in salvation history. Whereas Adam and Eve were
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able to dispose of themselves totally in a “no” or “yes” to God, human beings are only
able to totally dispose of themselves in a “yes”: “In Adam the person’s freedom to
dispose of the nature made it possible for him exhaustively to engage his nature both in a
good and in an evil direction. The blessed freedom of disposal possessed by the perfect
Christian, the saint, is the freedom of a man who has succeeded in surrendering his whole
being and his whole life to God totally.”451 Ironically, without sanctifying grace, their
rejection of God is always impartial. Thus while a “no” must be possible, saying “no” is
not formally equivalent to saying “yes” to God, because full self-disposal is not possible
without the restoration of integrity to our concupiscent nature.452
Perfect restoration of that integrity appears to be part of what Christians can hope
for in the resurrection of the body—though Rahner is hesitant to speak precisely about
this mystery. Just as Jesus’ body has eternal significance for our relationship to God, so
also do our own bodies. Rahner is adamant that materiality, as that which spirit actualizes
itself, cannot merely be shorn off, but must instead be redeemed.453 The doctrine of
resurrection of the body entails that our whole lives and our whole selves are brought into
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eternal life: “‘Body’ (Fleisch) means the whole man in his proper embodied
[leibhaftigan] reality. ‘Resurrection’ means, therefore, the termination and perfection of
the whole man before God, which gives him ‘eternal life.’” 454 Given the eternal
significance of the body, we would be wrong to oppose materiality with spirituality in
this life: “We must simply try to realize clearly and soberly that a spiritual union with
God cannot be regarded as something which grows in inverse proportion to the belonging
to the material world, but that these are two quite disparate matters in
themselves…Remoteness-from-the-world and nearness-to-God are not interchangeable
notions, however much we are accustomed to think in such a framework.” 455 It is not
ours to denigrate the human body when God has chosen to create, assume, and
transfigure it: “Whatever has been created by God, assumed by Christ and transfigured by
his Death and Resurrection, is also destined to finality and consummation in us.”456
Freedom as Created Mystery
As spirits-in-world, one’s decision for God is effected bodily in space and over time. This
does not mean, however, that one’s categorical acts exist in an obvious and visible
relationship to one’s transcendental decision for God. One cannot work backwards to
deduce the status of one’s own or another’s fundamental option. We have already seen
that freedom is disposal of one’s whole self. Freedom is not a matter of distinct atomized
acts, but of one’s disposition of the whole self in one’s whole life made irrevocable in
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death.457 In this case, one cannot reason from the parts to the sum. Individual acts are not
equally determinative or representative of one’s self-disposal. In fact, the reverse is true:
an act is only constituted by freedom to the extent that it is part of this total selfdisposal.458 In addition to this, two other characteristics Rahner attributes to freedom
complicate the relationship between one’s categorical acts and one’s fundamental option
for God.
First, freedom is mystery. This means first and foremost that it is not absolutely
objectifiable. Simply put, freedom is not a “datum of empirical psychology.”459 Even the
explicit “yes” one says to God, in prayer or moments of conversion, is an inadequate
objectification of one’s relationship to God. This is more than just the distinction between
intention and acts. Rahner argues that even our true intentions are hidden from ourselves:
“Even one’s ‘intentions’ are themselves external to the heart of freedom. This goes
further than merely the distinction between intention and effect; but the failure to
objectify the intention to begin with, so that even the conscious intention is itself a
matter, like the effect, ‘external’ to the subject’s disposal.”460 When Rahner talks about
embodying one’s fundamental transcendental option for God, he is not speaking about
acting on one’s inward disposition. One’s private thoughts and intentions are also
categorical acts. As such, one is not able to interpret even herself with certainty, but must
instead wait on God’s judgment.461
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Second, freedom is created. Its material is always external to self. What Rahner
means by this is that one’s freedom is always mediated in the given of the a posteriori, in
the “uncontrollable and ultimately unplanned” world constituted by our environment and
intersubjective relationships.462 We are thrown into a world full of personal and
impersonal forces that constrain our possibility for movement within it. Because our
freedom is always effected through the material and historical, it is therefore “still an
interplay with everything that is not free, not spiritual, and so on.”463 Thus when Rahner
speaks of freedom being a necessary and inviolable aspect of subjectivity, he does not
mean that the subject exercises complete autonomy over the decisions that make up her
life.
Rahner’s solution to this apparent contradiction is somewhat paradoxical: one
exercises one’s freedom precisely in relationship to these externally imposed
necessities.464 It is worth reiterating that Rahner’s focus on “self-disposal” and “freedom”
cannot simply be translated as autonomy or freedom from imposed necessities. Rather,
freedom exists precisely in one’s relationship to such necessity. The freedom to effect a
fundamental option is not threatened by general human vulnerability to outside influence,
but is made possible through it. In fact, Rahner connects this interplay between freedom
and limitation in our being for the other. Thus, while freedom is only exercised fully in a
“yes” to God, we arrive at the pinnacle of the paradox of freedom and dependence, as the
only exercise of complete human freedom is simultaneously a giving over to the other.
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Such giving over of oneself becomes irrevocable in death. To will that one’s life
become a “yes” to God is to will death—that is, to face with freedom precisely that which
appears to be the most radical limitation of our freedom. Rahner writes that this
understanding of death is revelatory of the broader way in which freedom and necessity
intersect at all times:
The freedom which is exercised on the embodied plane is, in fact, that freedom by
which man lays himself open to intervention from without, submits to control by
another power or powers. The embodied side of man’s nature constitutes the
sphere in which the interplay takes place of action from within himself and
passion as imposed from without. As an embodied being endowed with freedom
man has to take cognisance of the fact that he occupies an intermediary position.
He is neither wholly self-directing nor wholly subject to control by another, but
half-way between these two. The mysterious interplay between action and passion
in the exercise of human freedom appears above all in the fact that it is precisely
at the very point at which man freely achieves his own perfection that he is, at the
same time, most wholly subject to control by another. The ultimate act of
freedom, in which he decides his own fate totally and irrevocably, is the act in
which he either willingly accepts or definitively rebels against his own utter
impotence, in which he is utterly subject to the control of a mystery which cannot
be expressed - that mystery which we call God. In death man is totally withdrawn
from himself. Every power, down to the last vestige of a possibility, of
autonomously controlling his own destiny is taken away from him. Thus the
exercise of his freedom taken as a whole is summed up at this point in one single
decision: whether he yields everything up or whether everything is taken from
him by force, whether he responds to this radical deprivation of all power by
uttering his assent in faith and hope to the nameless mystery which we call God,
or whether even at this point he seeks to cling on to his own autonomy, protests
against this fall into helplessness, and, because of his disbelief, supposes that he is
falling into the abyss of nothingness when in reality he is falling into the
unfathomable depths of God.”465
Rahner is therefore adamant that any necessity can be made the object of one’s
freedom.466
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What follows from these characteristics of freedom is that not all acts are equally
free, nor is the freeness of a given act available to reflection.467 Two acts may be equal in
form but not in freedom.468 A person’s actions may be so limited, that what is ordinarily
considered objectively wrong may represent the ultimate possible affirmation of freedom:
…The objective material offered to freedom …can be finite, variable and greater
or less. This can, however, go so far that, for example, the material offered for a
concrete free choice embraces only objects which are completely evil and
forbidden according to the standards of objective morality. In such a case, we
could at times no longer talk about freedom of choice and imputability according
to the a posteriori criteria of everyday life and of psychology, although it could
always still remain open whether there could not be a decision for or against God
even with reference to such material.469
The relationship between the freedom of acts (normally, psychologically considered) and
theological freedom is therefore “analogous,”—a critical reason why there can be a
distinction in Catholic moral theology between moral and venial sin, which differ
precisely in the extent that the choice to do evil is a “real self-disposal of the subject.”470
But because freedom is mystery it is therefore impossible to know with certainty whether
an act is the impression of an imposed necessity or a part of one’s authentic selfdisposal.471
In extreme cases, what appears to be an explicit rejection of God and active
embrace of evil may in fact be no decision at all, or even a decision for God.472 As we
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saw above, it is precisely because of the great identity Rahner draws between love of God
and love of neighbor that he is able to argue that a transcendental option for God can be
effected in the absence of an explicit love for God. But because of this analysis of
freedom, Rahner is able to go further to argue that even explicit atheism and an
anonymous or implicit Christianity are not mutually exclusive. Conversely, the
appearance of faithfulness may belie a “no” to God.473
For Rahner, denial of God is not always a matter of personal sin. For one, those
who have “not come into contact with the explicit preaching of the Gospel,”474 cannot be
responsible for it. Gaudium et spes seems to distinguish between an intentional rejection
of God and a widespread default atheism, that in turn suggests not all cases of atheism are
sinful.475 For Rahner, on account of the supernatural existential, even those outside
baptism are in someway graced—no one, even under original sin, is “simply a ‘natural’
man.”476 If someone who is not morally culpable for their atheism follows their
conscience, there is no reason not to hope, alongside Gaudium et spes, that grace can
work “in an unseen way.”477 Insofar as one’s conscious is an absolute moral demand, it
implies an affirmation of God. Therefore obedience to it implicitly affirms God (the
absolute) even under an explicit rejection. Just as an uneducated man can affirm the
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principles of logic without knowing them anytime he “acts sensibly and with insight,” so
too does someone outside Christianity affirm God anytime she freely affirms the absolute
moral demand placed on her.478 Thus Rahner argues for the “possibility of coexistence of
a conceptually objectified atheism and a non-propositional and existentially realised
theism.”479
Rahner states explicitly that such a possibility hinges on drawing a distinction
between one’s transcendental and categorical theism. But this possibility also entails that
those who express faith in God categorically may not, at heart, truly love and depend on
God. Whether someone denies or affirms God at the categorical level does not
necessarily give us any insight into their transcendental affirmation of God—what
Rahner elsewhere refers to as the fundamental option. Rahner maintains however, that a
free, transcendental atheism is possible. One can effect a fundamental rejection of God.480
Thus while one’s fundamental option is effected historically, it remains in a real sense
hidden from both others and oneself.481
On the one hand, the unity Rahner identifies between one’s fundamental option
for God and her concrete activity allows us to locate the decision for God in history, as
ideally effected in a life lived in love of one’s neighbor. Such a unity is so radical that an
“anonymous Christian” may effect a decision for God unknowingly or even unwillingly.
On the other hand, because the fundamental option is effected in history, it is also subject
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to necessity. What appears as a “no” at the categorical level may in fact be an
actualization of an ultimate “yes” to God. As such, Rahner’s theology represents a
departure from classical moral theology, in which the form of the act is prioritized and
one is in constant threat of losing her salvation through mortal sin. It not only makes a
shift from the act to the person as the proper unit of moral analysis, but also is
sympathetic to why it is that people sin (or appear to sin) and the limitations of freedom
that are often involved.482
The Body as Open System
One exercises one’s freedom within a network of necessity. Such limitation is not merely
of the world in which the subject exists, but her very subjectivity itself. Remember that
the “in” in spirit-in-world does not denote location but modality.483 The human spirit does
not inhabit the world as a stranger in a strange land. Rather, spirit-in-world describes one
reality, not two. “Embodiment,” as shorthand for the becoming of spirit through matter,
speaks to the spirit’s self-actualization within the world of possibility, in space and in
time. This means that when we are speaking of the interplay between freedom and
necessity we are not merely talking about a free agent constrained by external necessities.
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Rahner’s subject is not self-contained; she is “in-world,” and thus the interplay between
freedom and necessity crosses right through her center.
When Rahner writes that the objective material of one’s freedom is variable he is
not only speaking of the difference in choices available to people in their lives, but of the
material of their own person. For an example of this we can turn to a short essay in which
Rahner wrestles with the question of why God allows suffering. In it Rahner dismisses
any theory that attempts to explain suffering as necessary for Christian maturity, pointing
instead to the detrimental effect that human suffering can have on the ability for human
persons to develop as moral agents:
The children burned to death by napalm bombs were not going through a process
of human maturing. Elsewhere, too, in innumerable cases there is suffering which
is destructive in effects, despite all good will to endure it in a human and Christian
way, which simply demands too much from a person, warps and damages his
character, leaves him preoccupied solely with satisfying the most primitive needs
of existence, makes him stupid or wicked.484
Rahner does not speak more in this essay about the effects of suffering on one’s
fundamental option for God. Still, we can see here that the objective material of one’s
freedom includes one’s own development. In this example, one’s failure to develop
intellectually and morally is not a matter of free self-disposal, but of the grave evil
inflicted by others. War does not merely take away someone’s options—for education,
healthcare, employment, and overall flourishing—it can also affect the ability to make
good choices. To speak of the interplay of freedom and necessity is thus not only to think
of the operation of a moral agent in the world, but in the very development of that moral
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agent. As spirit-in-world, embodied subjects are constituted in and through materiality—
even if that materiality is hostile to human flourishing.
We must not misunderstand Rahner as saying that one’s free spiritual nature is
trapped within the limitations of the body. Spirit is in-world in such a way that there is no
clear distinction between the two. In “The Body in the Order of Salvation” Rahner
clarifies their relationship. While we can distinguish “spirit” and “body” conceptually,
they exist in a fundamental unity: “What we call ‘inwardness’, our innermost heart, is the
inwardness of an actual, bodily spirit, an incarnate spirit. And what we call man’s
externals are the external form of this very same incarnate spirit.”485 Understanding the
subject as one incarnate spirit, instead of a spirit inside a body, means that,
The loftiest spiritual thought, the most sublime moral decision, the most radical
act of a responsible liberty is still a bodily perception or a bodily decision. It is
still incarnate perception and incarnate liberty—and hence, even by virtue of its
own nature, it is still an interplay with everything that is not free, not spiritual, and
so on. And conversely, even the most external thing about man is still something
that really belongs to the realm of his spirituality; it is still something that is not
just mere body.486
Thus Rahner complicates any spatial understanding of the spirit in the body, or of the
distinction between what is “inward” and “external” to the subject. Just as one’s
intentions are, in Rahner’s moral analysis, external to one’s real freedom, so is what we
consider “inwardness” equally an aspect of our embodied nature.
We come to ourselves only in and through the other, and thus our entire
subjectivity is embodied. Here, Rahner repeats the ontology of human being from Geist
in Welt, naming the body as that matter which spirit emanates:
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What I call the body is the outgoing of the spirit itself into the emptiness of space
and time, which we call ‘first matter’, in which the spirituality now itself appears;
so that outgoing into its bodily form is the condition which makes spiritual and
personal self-discovery possible, not an obstacle in its way. There is no coming to
oneself except by way of exit into the bodily reality into which the spirit first
reaches out and finds itself, forming itself and going out of itself. And it is only
this which makes personal, spiritual freedom possible. Of course this bodily
nature, as the spatial and temporal existence of the spirit itself, is always an
entering into the truly Other.487
Within this ontology, a view of the body as limiting the spirit is incomplete; it is also the
body that makes possible spiritual freedom. But because our spiritual freedom is
accomplished in time and space, in the realm of possibility, Rahner argues that it entails a
fundamental ambiguity (between what is internal to the human being and external) and
vulnerability (to influence from the other).
Rahner addresses this ambiguity most clearly when writing about sickness. He
writes that while extreme sickness appears to be an interruption in our freedom, it is
merely a visible sign of the embodied nature of human freedom, which is always taking
up foreign elements as its object. In sickness, as in ordinary time, the human being
affirms her existence by “integrating this intervention from without which we call
sickness into the single overall meaning which a man has to find in his own existence.”488
Such integration occurs when a sick person accepts the bewilderment of her
circumstances as the blinding light of God rather than the dark void.489 Through her
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acceptance of her own sickness, a sick person accepts the more profound and difficult
truth that her life is “in its final outcome, to be decided for [her] by another.”490
While in sickness we may experience our bodies as something foreign, even
hostile, Rahner reminds us that, “Body [Leib] is not something added on to the soul.
Rather it is a concretisation of it, the projection of soul as basic life-force into an already
existing sphere of space and time. Thus in a certain sense it is that in the soul which
causes it to exist in that concrete dimension of space and time in which it comes
(figuratively speaking) to its due fullness and flowering.”491 Words like “soul” and
“body” ought to be used carefully, so as not to give rise to the impression that they
describe two ontologically distinct elements of human nature. Rather, Rahner argues that
they are more accurately words that describe a unified reality from different perspectives:
“It follows from this that what we experience as soul is in reality our own being which is
objectively speaking a single and whole entity as viewed from within. And what we call
our body [Leib] is ultimately this same entity in its oneness and wholeness as experienced
from without.”492 The words “soul” and “body” describe the starting point of our analysis
of the one human being. This language of interiority and exteriority help to highlight the
fact that embodiment is the actualization of spirit in space and time.
What complicates the exercise of freedom in times of sickness is that the line
between what is a free element of the person and what is a foreign intervention is difficult
to determine. What is experienced personally as a spiritual or mental failure may in fact
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be the sickness itself, such as in the case of clinical depression.493 The intimate
relationship between body and spirit entails that even that which seems on self-reflection
to be an aspect of one’s inwardness may be merely “sickness”—involving no more guilt
than the flu. Even more so, depression and despair may actually be a side effect of a
sound spirit in struggle.494 For Rahner, such interplay and confusion between what is
internal and external to a person is a general truth of human being.495
Rahner states that one’s acceptance of sickness is not merely the acceptance of
limitations placed upon one’s freedom, but also acceptance of the very fact that one
cannot parse with certainty the free from the necessary:
Sickness sharpens a man’s awareness of both factors in his life, both that he is in
control and that at the same time he is subject to control from without. But he
must accept that these are two distinct aspects of what is ultimately one and the
same situation, namely the state of being ill, just as body and soul are two distinct
elements in the single entity that is man himself, and just as an openness to
outside influence and the power to direct himself are intrinsic to his own nature.
And if he does this, if he accepts his sickness as a single reality involving both
action and passion but ultimately a mystery beyond our own personal control,
then both the sick man himself and his sickness are in God’s hands. Then the
sickness acquires a redemptive value.496
Here, the paradox of freedom-in-dependence gains another layer: one exercises one’s
freedom in accepting that the relationship between freedom and dependence is opaque.
In addition to this ambiguity within our own subjectivity, our bodily nature also
entails a vulnerability to others. By entering into the truly other, spirit lays itself open to
forces outside it: “In other words, man utters himself and constitutes himself in his
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concrete nature and thereby opens himself by that very fact to the break-through from
outside. In his bodily nature he enters into a sphere which does not belong to him
alone.”497 And this vulnerability, Rahner argues, goes all the way down. Since it is our
very spirit that actualizes itself in the other, and not merely some exterior projection, even
our most inward self lies vulnerable: “There is no ‘inwardness’ which does not also stand
open, as it were, to what is without.”498 This means that the entire realm of spirit’s
actualization is marked by risk.
Embodiment places one within “the common sphere of space and time.”499 I am
vulnerable to others, but cannot withdraw into interiority or indifference.500 I am,
unavoidably, a part of a common history and one in which God has entered into: “Two
thousand years ago someone died on the cross in all the darkness of his death out of love
for the Father. And this took place from the very outset in a sphere which is my own
reality.”501 Embodiment is thus not a circumscription or an enclosure, bodies are “open
systems” which interact with the world.502 I am not a body in a world, rather my
embodiment places me in continuity with the world:
Through bodiliness the whole world belongs to me from the start, in everything
that happens. Of course we must not get the impression in this connection that our
body stops where our skin stops, as if we were a sack containing a number of
different things, which clearly ceases to be what it is where its ‘skin’, the sacking,
stops…In a certain sense—and I am exaggerating here, in order to make what I
want to say clearer—we are all living in one and the same body—the world. And
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because that is so (and this is really the metaphysical, theological premise)
something of the nature of original sin, and something of the nature of redemption
can exist too. This one total physical existence as the common space which makes
intercommunication between individual spiritual subjects possible from the
start—this one concrete space can of course be accepted by the individual
spiritual subject in various ways: it can be loved, put up with, or hated.503
This understanding of embodiment fundamentally challenges any understanding of one’s
“yes” to God as individualistic. When I affirm myself as one willed by God, I do so
within a network of solidarity, understanding myself as one part of a great human family.
I am not merely responsible for myself, but am so united to others that I am complicit in
their sin and bound up in their redemption.
Thus Rahner provides us with resources for addressing how his understanding of
a fundamental option for God can coexist with the subject’s diminished capacity for selfdetermination. First, he underlines the difficulty we have already stated in determining
the subject’s position toward God. One’s despair or hatred of God may not be an
expression of the subject’s theological freedom and therefore have little to bear on her
ultimate relationship with respect to God. Second, he reiterates that guilt can only be
freely acquired: “Only when someone sins knowingly against God can there be
guilt…Objectively speaking, no situation can force us into guilt.”504 Third, he warns
against the healthy theologizing about the ethical demands placed on the ill. Nevertheless,
Rahner still cautiously hopes that one can make of one’s sickness the material of an
option for God, by integrating it into one’s self-understanding.505 Thus while the
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conscious and explicit acceptance of one’s relationship to self, world, and God is not
identical to one’s fundamental “yes,” it is still a privileged mode of its expression. And
while theological freedom and one’s activity in the world may appear at odds, Rahner
holds out hope for their union.
Questions Remaining about Rahner’s Understanding of Embodiment
Three important questions remain about this understanding of embodiment. First, who—
or what—is the “I” that integrates experiences of limitation into her life? Rahner is
adamant that there is no interiority beyond the reach of external forces. The problem is
that this suggests that the subject who exercises her theological freedom with respect to
external necessities is the same subject affected by those necessities. The difficulty can be
seen most clearly in Rahner’s writing about depression as a sickness. Rahner argues that
the subject ought to somehow accept her own mental illnesses. He even names examples
of what not accepting it might look like, including overcorrecting into false optimism,
and overmedicating in order to suppress anxiety over existential questions that must be
faced honestly and bravely.506 This discussion about one’s moral responsibility toward
one’s own depression appears to posit an inner self untouched by depression.507 As we
saw in Jennifer Beste’s analysis of trauma disorders, integrating events into one’s life,
making proportional healthy choices in the face of grave suffering, are themselves
capacities that can be affected by mental illness.508
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Second, and following from the first, is whether or not Rahner’s language of
“integration” and “acceptance” refers to specific categorical acts or to one’s fundamental
and transcendental freedom. For instance, in practice, Rahner’s discussion of integrating
sickness into one’s life appears to assume a specific kind of behavior. Rahner writes as if
“acceptance” is an emotional and cognitive act on the part of the sick subject. On the one
hand, if intention and act are equally external to one’s freedom, if even the deepest
expressions of inwardness are equally embodied as one’s physical flesh, then such
behavior is only ideally, but not necessarily, linked to one’s fundamental option for God.
On the other hand, if one’s transcendental freedom is so fundamental that it lies beneath
even one’s conscious inwardness, to what extent is it an element of one’s self at all? In
other words, has Rahner lost sight of his commitment that grace can be experienced? The
sum of this line of questions is to ultimately ask our third question: In what ways can
external threats affect one’s freedom to effect a fundamental option?
Rage and Resistance: The Liberative Potential of Spirit-in-World
In their analysis of how transcendental freedom is exercised under the regime of white
supremacy, Carmichael Peters and Bryan Massingale offer some useful tools in thinking
about how freedom is embodied. In Peters’ article “A Rahnerian Reading of Black
Rage,” he identifies black rage as the expression of a freedom under grave threat. While
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rage in itself is morally ambiguous, since it can be expressed in criminal and pathological
ways,509 Peters argues that it can be a manifestation of the struggle of spirit to transcend a
world that is largely hostile to it: “rage ‘expresses finitude from the inside’ for those who
belong to social locations which fundamentally and systematically deny or frustrate the
indeterminateness of their finite transcendence.”510 If the objective material available to
one’s freedom is precisely a world that rejects the operation and possibility of that
freedom, one’s affirmation of God and self can only take the form of a provisional “no”
to the world.511
In Rahner’s anthropology, human openness to the world is constituted so that
even self-presence is mediated by the encounter with the world. Peters argues that if that
world is deliberately hostile, one’s fundamental option will be limited to a choice
between resignation and rage:
If my lifeworld deliberately and fundamentally denies the spiritual character of
my transcendence, it will so intimately qualify my reditio [self-presence] that my
‘fundamental options’ will be accompanied by the moods of resignation or rage.
In other words, I will come to know that I have either to resign myself to the
world’s denial of grace as the content of my transcendental self-presence or to
defy the world by ratifying being’s self-offer as that content.512
Thus the hostility of this world is not just external. In shaping the categorical options
available in one’s lived experience, it strikes precisely to the heart of the subject and her
self-presence. Therefore, Peters argues that it is warranted to translate Rahner’s language
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of the “qualification of human transcendental self-presence” to a more contemporary
understanding of “socialization.”513
For black existence in the U.S. this socialization is one of “colonization” in which
a “double-consciousness” is effected.514 This double-consciousness means that at the
categorical level, the striving for transcendence is experienced as a contradiction. One
understands one’s humanity and blackness as at odds. Peters cites the consequent selfloathing and resignation as causes for the high suicide rate in the African-American
community, especially among teens.515 Insofar as one’s fundamental option is effected
through relationship to the self, it must entail a decolonization of the self. Rage then is a
constitutive element of the decolonization of the self.516 As resistance to all forms of
injustice,517 and as a declaration that one is not who the world proclaims her to be, rage
has great potential for liberation. Thus Peters employs Rahner’s concept of spirit-inworld not only to explain, but also to legitimize, black rage in the United States as
resistance to systems fundamentally in service to ideologies of white supremacy.518
But how is the self that is formed by hostile socialization capable of resisting it?
Where does such resistance come from? In arguing that such decolonization is possible,
Peter appeals to the permanent nature of human freedom and transcendence:
Socialization never has the power to so ontologically alter the structure of human
ex-sistence that it erases the spiritual potential for indeterminate possibilities…On
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the one hand, it is delivered over to a world which deliberately and fundamentally
denies its spiritual potential, and, on the other, it inexhaustibly reaches beyond ‘in
that world’ and necessarily asks about the ultimate whither of its transcendence.519
Mediating between spiritual potential and worldly influence is what Peters refers to as
“mood.” Borrowing the term from Heidegger, Peters argues that, “human ex-sistence
always has a mood.”520 A hostile environment can shape not only the categorical acts
available for the subject’s self-determination (to speak concretely, we might name access
to education and healthcare as prerequisites to making informed decisions about one’s
future), but also, more deeply still, the disposition of the one who acts. In the case of
black ex-sistence in the US for example, double-consciousness coincides with a mood of
resignation.521 If one wishes to engage in the decolonization of the self, one finds oneself
much in the position of “a caged panther.”522 The mood of human ex-sistence reaching
out beyond the bars of societal oppression is rage. Thus while Peters argues that human
transcendence is not erased under oppressive situations, it can be shaped enough by them
so as to be profoundly harmed. What is potentially lost here is the freedom of being able
to effect one’s self-disposal in moods other than resignation or rage. Peters therefore
offers us a way of thinking of the inviolability of human transcendence without glossing
over the real way in which freedom is affected by political oppression.
Massingale extends Peters argument by underscoring “the positive dimensions of
black rage as a medium for social liberation and truth.”523 Insofar as such decolonization
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refutes the denial of one’s freedom and transcendence, it is not merely “legitimate” but is
itself a “categorical mediation of forgiveness, grace, and right relationship with God.”524
Decolonization is therefore a critical locus for Christian perfection. Further, if Rahner is
right that substituting a finite perspective for the transcendent is idolatry, black rage can
therefore serve a protest against the idolatry of white supremacy. It thus has even broader
theological significance than the decolonization of the self. In its affirmation of both self
and God and its protest against injustice, black rage is a Christian virtue. Finally, the
ethically ambiguous nature of rage—that it may be directed in ways not oriented toward
the mediation of grace—must in itself be recognized by the fact that such rage exists in a
racist world, and is therefore co-determined by the guilt of white supremacy.525
If a Rahnerian reading of black rage is to do more than legitimate the experience
of people of color through the writings of white men, Massingale argues that it is then
necessary to assume that black rage also has something to legitimate or correct in Rahner.
To begin with, black rage confirms Rahner’s anthropological assumption that
transcendental freedom is a permanent aspect of human being, even under oppression.526
Without analysis of the passion of human dynamism fighting against its own
decolonization, Massingale argues that we are left with only philosophical musings of
transcendence: “Is it too much to say that without phenomenons such as black rage,
Rahner’s anthropology would be unintelligible at best, or illusory speculation at
worst?”527 Despite frequent statements about the mediation of freedom in history, “the
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exact nature of the constraints that historicity and social location place upon freedom are
largely undeveloped.”528 This lack of development threatens the integrity of Rahner’s
own understanding of the human being as spirit-in-world, as it deemphasizes the “world”
side of human being. As global awareness of the extent of catastrophe grows, such
analysis cannot be placed on the margins, but must be seen as a necessary center of any
discourse on freedom.529
Peters and Massingale demonstrate that Rahner’s theological anthropology is
open to analysis of the social and political constraints on human freedom, though their
analysis also raises critical questions about the relationship between the transcendental
and categorical in Rahner’s understanding of freedom. In their analysis, one’s
transcendental freedom is permanent, but is expressed in different moods depending on
the way in which one is shaped by her environment. A “yes” to oneself is always
possible, but it may entail a corresponding and categorical “no” to a world that is hostile
to it.
“Mood” here becomes something of an intermediary term between one’s
fundamental option for God (and oneself) and one’s categorical acts. In Heidegger,
“human ex-sistence always finds itself (sich befindet) already intimately belonging to a
world (that is, socialized). And it comes across its intimate wordliness always in ‘the
mood (Stimmung) that it has.’”530 Peters also compares it to Kierkegaardian anxiety—it is
“an ontological characteristic of being human,” not merely directed toward specific

528

Ibid., 226-7.

529

Ibid., 227.

530

Peters “A Rahnerian Reading of Black Rage,” 206.

167
objects.531 Rage characterizes a fundamental way of being-in-the-world: “I basically want
to argue that rage ‘expresses finitude from the inside’ for those who belong to social
locations which fundamentally and systematically deny or frustrate the indeterminateness
of their finite transcendence.”532 This concept of mood explains how freedom can be
inviolable without it existing separately or prior to one’s categorical being in the world. It
is not as if the “yes” to oneself precedes the “no” to the world. They are in this case
identical and coextensive. In this way we can speak of the radical way in which human
beings may be socialized, without forsaking an understanding that the human being is
always free and always self-transcending. Most importantly for this work, they
demonstrate how freedom can be inviolable without appealing to some aspect of self
untouched by the external world. They provide a cohesive account of how one socialized
under an oppressive regime can find the motivation to resist it—in short, how the spiritin-world can operate against-world. Thus “mood” helps us talk about the way in which
embodied subjects are constituted by their world while remaining agents within it.
Conclusion: Toward a Christian View of the Body
A young Rahner sought to explain how the grace of God could be experienced by all,
theorizing about a dark touch experienced by spirits-in-world. In Hörer des Wortes,
Rahner clarifies that such subjects await a historical word from God in history, to which
they respond in freedom. As becomes clear in his later theology, Rahner’s anthropology
of the subject as spirit-in-world is part of a larger Christian theology that attends closely
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to embodiment as the site of salvation. Human beings are by virtue of their common
humanity bound up in a common wounded nature. It is this same common nature that
makes it possible for Christ to effect salvation for all human beings. It is in bodily
existence that God offers salvation, and it is in bodily existence that human subjects
effect their “yes” to God in the love of neighbor. Just as Christ made his “yes” to God
and God’s “yes” to humanity irrevocable in death, so also do human beings make their
“yes” to God irrevocable in death.
But this bodily existence also threatens a cohesive account of the self and the
exercise of her freedom. As Rahner develops his theology, he distinguishes between
transcendental and categorical freedom: the “yes” that one utters in the world is not
simply identical to one’s fundamental option for God. In limit experiences such as
anonymous Christianity, suffering, sickness, and dying, there may be a stark contrast
between what one appears to be embodying and one’s actual option for God. On the one
hand one’s free love of God must be made body; on the other hand embodiment is the
realm of everything that is not free. On account of this latter aspect of embodiment, our
understanding of any given fundamental option must be shaped by both apophaticism and
hope. This is not to weaken the call for discipleship, but to claim decisively that our
interpretation of one another’s freedom must take into account our particular
embodiment. It is at times difficult for both Rahner and his readers to hold on to this
tension.
Carmichael Peters and Bryan Massingale have offered a coherent way of reading
Rahner in and through Peters’ understanding of “mood.” They also show the deep
liberative potential in Rahner’s understanding of spirit-in-world. To flesh out Rahner’s
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theology of embodiment requires that we think through this understanding of the freedom
of subjects who are socialized, particularly for those who are socialized in harmful ways
by hostile environments. In doing so, we follow Rahner’s own call for a theology of
embodiment that understands that freedom is accomplished in a world of risk:
The body is therefore nothing other than the self-consummation of the spirit in
space and time. But this self-consummation of everything except God is of such
a kind that it is essentially ambiguous and takes place in a sphere of existence in
which all men and women communicate with one another from the very
beginning.
In the narrower sense of the word, the body is that through which I fulfill
myself in the one world in which all spiritual persons exist. And it is from this
starting point that we should have to think through anew the individual and more
specific features of a Christian view of the body.533
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Chapter 4:
Transactional Bodies
We began this dissertation looking at three challenges to Karl Rahner’s transcendental
theology under the guise of three crises of subjectivity: the Ernstfall, Auschwitz, and
trauma. Each of these crises raises critical questions about the adequacy of any
transcendental account of the subject. For Balthasar and Metz, a theology that places her
always and already in relationship to God neglects that faith, and even subjectivity itself,
are things that must be accomplished. For Beste, the simple identification of relationship
to God with relationship to self and world makes this theology unable to speak to those
whose relationship to self and world are ruptured by severe interpersonal harm. As I have
argued, these concerns are ultimately rooted in the adequacy of Rahner’s account of
embodiment.
Our turn to Rahner’s work in chapters two and three focused on uncovering his
theology of the body. This work indicated there are more resources in Rahner for talking
about subjectivity than one would expect. In chapter two I demonstrated that Rahner’s
philosophical and transcendental account of the subject is a moment within a lifelong
search to speak of the everyday mysticism described in Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises.
What is primary in Rahner’s work is therefore not the particular way in which he resolves
the epistemological problem of how knowledge of God is grounded in the senses, but his
larger concern for how the love of God is embodied in people’s actual, concrete lives.
We see this in his later work, as Rahner’s negotiation of the relationship between
the transcendental and categorical becomes a way to maintain that on the one hand, one’s
faith is not separated from one’s life, and on the other hand, we must remain apophatic in
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interpreting both our and others’ faith. Such a reading is developed by Carmichael Peters
who argues that black rage is a legitimate expression of affirmation of God in a hostile
world, and Bryan Massingale who goes further to argue such rage is a mediation of grace.
In their understanding of spirit-in-world, freedom is persistent as well as permeable. That
is, while living in a white supremacist society may shape one’s own subjectivity so much
that one has a “double consciousness” about one’s own worth, the transcendence of spirit
is inviolable. As such they navigate between the errors of proclaiming the subject as
either impervious to harm or completely vulnerable. If Peters and Massingale are right in
this understanding of spirit-in-world, it may be possible to talk about the inviolability of
the human spirit without neglecting the ways in which subjectivity is threatened. While
they do not use the language of the “body” or “embodiment,” their work attends to the
way in which human beings, as spirits-in-world, actualize their spirituality with respect to
the materiality of their own bodies and within a world that is hostile to certain bodies.
They push us to recognize that speech about embodiment is always speech about
particular bodies. Whether one’s body is read as black or white in a white supremacist
society for instance, will shape one’s connection to self, world, and God.
What still needs to be explained is the precise way in which one’s transcendental
self-affirmation occurs within a world of hostility. That is, what are the mechanisms by
which power structures are replicated, not merely politically, but within the very
production of subjectivity? Such interplay has been the focus of debate in feminist
political thought for decades.534 Inspired in large part by Michel Foucault’s claim that the
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body is culturally constructed, feminist theorists have challenged the idea that human
bodies exist prior or apart from social norms. What they are questioning is not the
facticity or materiality of bodies, but their impermeability to what Metz would call the
Mitwelt. We see in this discourse a desire to theorize about bodies as both vulnerable to
harm and capable of resistance. Thus parallel to (and intersecting) the theological
difficulty in speaking of the Christian subject as both free spirit and politically situated
body is the philosophical difficulty of speaking of the subject as both agent and patient.
As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, placing these discourses in conversation with
one another can yield productive results in thinking theologically about the subject,
embodiment, and Christian identity.
In this chapter I begin by tracing a debate over two decades between Judith Butler
on one side and Martha Nussbaum and Seyla Benhabib on the other. The former argues
for a radical understanding of the construction of the subject, while the latter proclaim
that such construction is not total. In fact, Nussbaum and Benhabib each argue that an
understanding of the subject as radically constructed makes it impossible to theorize
about and hope for resistance to harmful political regimes. My point in tracing this debate
is to demonstrate the possibilities of thinking about the body as constructed and the stakes
in such analysis. As I argue, Butler’s successfully theorizes about the cultural
construction of the body without abnegating moral agency and accountability. Ultimately
however, Butler’s understanding of materiality directs our attention to the ways in which
the construction of identities keeps us from recognizing all human persons as subjects.
She is interested primarily in fundamental claims about how identities work as such,
rather than the way in which any identity is embodied.
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In the second half of the chapter, I turn to the work of Shannon Sullivan, a
feminist pragmatist philosopher. Sullivan’s work builds on Butler’s to focus particularly
on the ways in which identities of race and gender are mapped onto the body. Sullivan’s
language of “transactional bodying” offers a way of thinking about the interplay of self
and world that speaks more directly to the concrete change human beings need to effect
in their forms of bodying in order to offer resistance to forms of sexist and racist
oppressions. Read together, Sullivan and Butler offer a way of thinking about the subject
as both culturally constructed and a moral agent in the world.
Judith Butler and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions
In an early article on Michel Foucault, Butler begins by describing what she calls “the
paradox of bodily inscriptions” that remains in the wake of Foucault’s claim that the body
is constructed: “The body is a site where regimes of discourse and power inscribe
themselves, a nodal point or nexus for relations of juridical and productive power. And,
yet, to speak in this way invariably suggests that there is a body that is in some sense
there, pregiven, existentially available to become the site of its own ostensible
construction.”535 As Butler goes on to say, the grammar of the phrase “the body is
culturally constructed” itself suggests that the body exists prior to construction, at least as
the site of a possible construction.536 Two of Butler’s most central lines of inquiry
develop from this paradox of bodily inscriptions.
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The first line of inquiry is Butler’s dedication to exposing the exclusionary way
discourses function. She does this here in her continued analysis of the phrase “the body
is culturally constructed.” As she explains, what the language obscures is the way in
which even the “the” of this phrase is a product of construction. The use of a definite
article, which points to the particular subject of the sentence, means that a process of
selection has already occurred. The sentence has a particular body in mind, and thus some
sort of criteria for what counts as “body.” In other words, whatever we mean by the body
or the site of construction is itself also a product of construction.537
It is only at the other end of the process of construction that one can speak
meaningfully of definite, individual bodies. To help see what she means, it is helpful to
think of “construction” non-metaphorically. Consider the human development of land. In
Butler’s understanding, the site of construction would not predate the construction. While
a physical place is, of course, temporally and logically prior to any development of it, it is
not the site of construction until construction occurs. For example, how big is the site?
Where is its center? If the site existed prior to construction then answering questions like
this ought to be easy. Instead however, the site of construction only becomes a
meaningful reference a posteriori. In a similar way, Butler is not denying the materiality
of the body, but pointing to the fact that if we are addressing the body—that is, a
demarcated body—then we are already looking at a site under construction. Butler
instead suggests we read the sentence with a different inflection: even what counts as the
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body is culturally constructed, where the body is not something that construction is done
to, but is the product of construction.538
While this grammatical analysis may seem overly pedantic, Butler’s aim here is
not simply to show the extent of construction. Rather, as we will see in her later work,
Butler is concerned that theorists are too quickly jumping to the question of “how are
different subjects constructed?” and ignoring the more critical way in which some are
excluded from subjectivity from the outset. Social norms do not just produce various
subjectivities, they also make only some subjects recognizable as such. They can blind us
to the subjectivity of others, those whom Butler refers to as the “abject.” For example, to
speak of the way in which a culture produces men or women, is to automatically
exclude—indeed be unable to recognize—those who are not captured by these binary
terms. Thus Butler’s exposure of “the” as a product of construction is not a matter of
some epistemological fatalism, but rather a hypervigilance concerning who is made
invisible by the questions we ask.
The second line of inquiry relates to the materiality of bodies vis-à-vis their
cultural construction. Foucault himself, Butler argues, is ambivalent or inconsistent on
the question of the materiality of bodies. While he argues that bodies are not stable sites
of meaning, and sex is nothing more than an “imaginary point,” his description of the
construction of bodies at times appears to assume that materiality does in fact preexist
construction. His ideas that “there could be no body before the law, no sexuality freed
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from relations of power”539 are contradicted by how he develops this theory of
construction. Butler writes:
If the body in its indefinite generality, however, proves to be a point of dynamic
resistance to culture per se, then this body is not culturally constructed, but is, in
fact, the inevitable limit and failure of cultural construction…whereas Foucault
wants to argue—and does claim—that bodies are constituted within the specific
nexus of culture or discourse/power regimes, and that there is no materiality or
ontological independence of the body outside of any one of those specific
regimes, his theory nevertheless relies on a notion of genealogy, appropriated
from Nietzsche, which conceives the body as a surface and a set of subterranean
“forces” that are, indeed, repressed and transmuted by a mechanism of cultural
construction external to that body.
Part of the problem Butler identifies with Foucault’s work is that it employs the metaphor
of inscription in an overly deterministic way—in which history, conceived primarily as
language, is written on the blank slate of the body. But one can envision a blank body
distinct and prior to an inscribed body, one can even mentally work backwards from the
inscribed body to a blank one. Presumably, this is exactly the kind of reasoning that
claiming “the body is culturally constructed” is designed to dismantle. However, when
Foucault imagines such inscription as harmful, Butler suggests that he seems to be
thinking of something like Kafka’s Penal Colony, in which the body is destroyed in its
being inscribed upon. But if the body is culturally constructed, inscription cannot be a
process by which a healthy, meaningful, and meaning-making body is harmed. It would
have to be the process through which such a body comes to be.540
Butler’s metaphor of Kafka’s Penal Colony is a helpful one to keep in mind when
we are judging the adequacy of any theory about the materiality and discursiveness of the
body. On the one hand, if the inscription is the process by which subjects are formed, it
539

Ibid., 603. Here Butler is summarizing Foucault’s thought.

540

Ibid., 603-4.

177
seems difficult to theorize about such formation as harmful, since no prior thing exists to
be harmed, nor any counterfactual to determine what harm means. On the other hand, if
we envision the role of cultural norms upon the subject as an inscription upon a body—
like Kafka’s torture device which slowly kills the one being inscribed upon—then we are
not talking about forces that shape who a subject is, but merely things that happen to it. If
we accept that human persons are deeply constituted by the social world in which they
emerge, then talk of political resistance will need new theories and metaphors to speak
about the self.
Ultimately, Butler argues that Foucault’s description of the body as inscribed by
and opposite to history, and thus as capable in some way of resisting it, undermines his
“stated program to formulate power in its generative as well as juridical modes.”541 If the
body is culturally constructed, then what resources does it draw from in order to resist
cultural construction? Butler encourages us to read Foucault against himself. If we play
the role of Foucault and analyze his own writings according to his genealogical method,
we could make a Foucauldian argument for refusing Foucault’s own reliance on a preexistant and resistant body. We would see that “the culturally constructed body would be
the result of a diffuse and active structuring of the social field with no magical or
ontotheological origins, structuralist distinctions, or fictions of bodies, subversive or
otherwise, ontologically intact before the law.”542
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Gender Trouble
Within a year of publishing this article, Butler released Gender Trouble, in which she
applies Foucault’s insight that the body is culturally constructed to the question of gender
identities. Within this text, we see her trying to avoid the theoretical challenges that
plagued Foucault’s attempt to hold the materiality and discursivity of the body in tension.
Throughout this text, Butler highlights the circular and often self-defeating logic of
theorists who attempt to subvert heterosexism through appeal to either the body as given
or gender as discrete.
Butler begins the by interrogating the stability of the category “woman,” since it
is always discursively constructed in a concrete historical context and varies across
factors like race, class, and orientation. Nor can one simply appeal to the sex of the body
as a given. How one defines the sex of the body—whether it be “natural, anatomical,
chromosomal, or hormonal”543—is itself a product of the discourse surrounding gender,
and bodies are more varied on all of these axis than a binary recognizes. Thus Butler
argues that, “the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at
all.”544 Those who use it for the sake of subversive politics in fact tie themselves to what
she refers to as “Christian and Cartesian” accounts that view the body as either passive or
profane.545 The body therefore cannot secure the stability of “woman.”
In fact, Butler challenges the very search for a stable notion of the category. She
argues that “woman” is not a natural category to which one can appeal in furthering
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political representation, but is itself a construct of the regulatory procedures of the
exclusionary political status quo. Claims about who or what a “woman” is always involve
an exclusionary refusal to recognize certain subjects. For Butler, politics of identity
always function through exclusion—not merely the structural opposition of man and
woman, but the exclusion of those who are not visible as women.546
Because of this exclusionary function of identities, Butler argues that a feminist
political agenda which pushes for the representation of women under the law is therefore
mired in contradiction which threatens not only its success, but opens up the possibility to
inadvertently further exclusionary practices. Even “strategic” appeals to the category of
women fall into this pit.547 A stable notion of “woman” is not necessary for the
justification and development of a feminist political agenda. Rather, a feminist agenda
should aim precisely to interrogate such identities, particularly as they are produced by
“contemporary juridical structures”: “a new sort of feminist politics is now desirable to
contest the very reifications of gender and identity, one that will take the variable
construction of identity as both a methodological and normative prerequisite, if not a
political goal.”548 This interrogation begins by giving up the quest for a unified notion of
“woman” or of “feminism,” instead beginning coalitions of smaller groups that may
discover different notions of these terms and “[taking] action with those contradictions
intact.”549 By allowing, from the onset, an essential or definitional “incompleteness” of
the category of “woman” it may “serve as a normative ideal relieved of coercive
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force.”550 The appeal to “woman” therefore can only be an appeal to a site of contested
meanings, navigated and negotiated by localized groups and discerned from the ground
up.
Butler’s dismissal of the category of “woman” is not a dismissal of gender
identity as such, but the policing of the borders of these identities, which always seeks to
determine who is inside and who is outside them. Inevitably, appeals are made to who is
a “real” woman.551 While as far as I know Butler has not written about this issue, one
helpful example to illustrate what she is describing is Michfest, the Michigan Womyn’s
Festival that proclaims itself as a womyn-only space. In 1991, Michfest removed Nancy
Burkholder, a transwoman, from the festival.552 Butler would argue that because the
philosophy of Michfest appeals to the category of “woman” in its rejection of sexist and
patriarchal cultural norms, it has perpetuated rather than dismantled the systematic
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exclusion of people based on their identities. Indeed, in Butler’s language, it has rendered
transfolk unrecognizable—they are, in this analysis, men invading women’s space.
Ultimately Michfest’s appeal to womanhood functions as a statement not merely about
gender identity, but about subjecthood in general. In their scheme, transfolk simply do
not exist.
In Butler’s diagnosis, contemporary language of gender identity either mistakenly
posits gender as an essential core of one’s identity or as a mere and arbitrary accident.
The problem with both options is that they both assume a true authentic self underneath a
thin layer of construction—the question is only which side of the line sex/gender identity
falls on.553 Either “woman” is a thin artifice, or some essential and unchanging core.554
Part of the problem behind this dichotomy is a tendency to appeal to metaphors of
interiority. For Butler, however, dividing the self into “inner” and “outer” is already a
discursive move. It depends on a metaphysics of substance which assumes “a substantive
person who is the bearer of various essential and nonessential attributes.”555 As Butler
provocatively suggests, such a metaphysics emerges as the justification of exploitation.
One justifies the domination of other bodies through appeal to one’s own superior
identity, which must then be made a matter of essence rather than mere accident.556 In
turn, if one imagines that one’s gender performance is the expression of one’s core
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identity, one does not need to peer behind the curtain to ask where her desires come from
and who or what they serve.557
Butler’s response is not to locate sex/gender under the heading of “nonessential”
but to rather challenge the entire distinction between essential and nonessential. In order
to avoid any confusion, Butler offers the language of “performance” rather than
construction in speaking of sex/gender. Here she is explicitly taking up Nietzsche’s claim
from On the Genealogy of Morals that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting,
becoming: ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.”558
Rather than viewing sex/gender as something that is constructed on top of our given
bodies, as something exterior to our authentic interiority, Butler proclaims that
sex/gender is something that we do: “There is no gender identity behind the expressions
of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are
said to be its results.”559 By arguing that identities are something that are performed,
Butler removes any debate about whether our visible identities correspond to our inner
selves—rather, our lives authenticate themselves in the doing.
One of her clearest definitions of this theory comes in a later preface to the book,
where Butler is clarifying the theory in response to criticism: “In the first instance, then,
the performativity of gender revolves around this metalepsis, the way in which the
anticipation of a gendered essence produces that which it posits as outside itself.
Secondly, performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves
its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a
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culturally sustained temporal duration.”560 In short, it is our anticipation of gender as a
reality that makes it one, as the gendered habits of our life settle into a stable identity.
Within an understanding of sex/gender as performance, there is no true identity or
sexuality that exists apart from, before, or underneath the legal and social networks we
live in. Instead, following Foucault, she argues that sexuality and power are intimately
bound up. A sexuality “free” from the constraints of social norms—what she sometimes
refers to in Lacanian terms as “the Law”—is impossible. Instead of imagining a free
sexuality, what is necessary is to “[rethink] subversive possibilities for sexuality and
identity within the terms of power itself,”—in other words, imagine different ways of
operating within those norms.561
She suggests that a feminist politics must attempt to answer the following
questions: “What possibilities of gender configurations exist among the various emergent
and occasionally convergent matrices of cultural intelligibility that govern gendered
life?”562 “What kind of subversive repetition might call into question the regulatory
practice of identity itself?”563 Butler urges her readers to “make gender trouble” in order
to call into question the notions of identity propagated by the “masculine hegemony and
heterosexist power.”564 Such “practices of parody” would expose the lie of the
epistemologies and ontologies that undergird compulsive heterosexuality, opening up
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new ways of seeing and being which, in turn, would make a new form of politics
possible.565
Removing the Doer from the Deed: Seyla Benhabib’s Critique of Butler
At first glance, such an understanding of the construction of the self may appear to
threaten even the thinnest sense of freedom (or even the existence of a self at all). Here
there appears to be no spirit but only a tabula rasa shaped by in-worldness. In her 1992,
Situating the Self, Seyla Benhabib argues that Judith Butler’s philosophy removes the
doer from the deed and therefore abnegates any moral responsibility or impetus for
change.566 In Benhabib’s estimation, Butler is one of many feminist theorists who have
wrongly appropriated the postmodern turn and its prohibition against identity politics.
While Benhabib recognizes that certain postmodern turns are helpful insofar as
they critique mainstream philosophy from the margins, she resists what she calls “strong
postmodernism” that hails the death of “Man, History and Metaphysics.”567 As she points
out, women have never been able to narrate their lives or act autonomously to the same
extent that men have. It is contradictory, therefore, for feminist politics to hail the death
of the subject at the same time that so many women have fought and are still fighting for
the recognition of their subjectivity. What’s more, given the fact that so many women are
gendered precisely to be selfless, the removal of the “self” as a stable category is even
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more problematic.568 Thus she laments that in their excitement over the dismantling of
much of the philosophical ideals that have undergirded colonialism and patriarchy,
feminists have sabotaged their own theoretical foundations in working towards gender
justice.
Benhabib singles out Butler in particular for employing an argument that is
ultimately self-defeating. If there are no identities behind our performances, then who or
what is it that is performing? Such a position is philosophically incoherent as a
foundation for female emancipation. Benhabib goes further to question the practical
effect of Butler’s theory. With only deeds, but no doers, what sort of talk about moral
responsibility is possible? How can Butler hold people accountable—either for being
complicit in regimes of power that marginalize people or for engaging in acts of
resistance?569
Rather, Benhabib suggests that feminist politics does in fact demand a notion of
“woman.” While Benhabib argues that a strong postmodernism is incompatible with
feminism, she suggests we take the death of “Man, History, and Metaphysics” not to
mean that the pursuit of knowledge is false or that the subject doesn’t exist but that the
quest for knowledge must be proceduralist and interactive. Much like the scientific
method demands both the positing of a hypothesis and its subjection to testing and
critique, Benhabib argues that we must be willing to say something about the self, even if
it must also be suspicious and open-ended.570
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Benhabib’s criticism both exemplifies one major tradition of reading Butler, and
identifies what is at stake in addressing theoretical understandings of the self, in general,
and of gender identity, in particular. For Benhabib, the dangers of a call for humble
apophaticism with respect to the identities of human persons is that we will be timid in
demanding justice for the particular identities that are excluded in any given moment.
Does Butler’s suspicion of identity politics hamper her ability to accomplish her goal of
radical inclusion?
Bodies that Matter
In her 1993 book Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” Butler responds
to criticisms like that of Benhabib’s’ by arguing that her understanding of the cultural
construction of the body does not ignore the materiality of the body nor preclude the
possibility of political resistance.571 As she argues in the introduction, many of the
accusations directed toward her continue to assume a division between the natural and the
social. Construction, however, is not an imprint of the social upon the natural, but the
very condition of our making such distinctions. That is, gender is not simply a network of
meaning constructed on top of a foundation of natural and biological sex difference.
Rather, she argues, the appeal to the “natural” is already in and of itself a move that
operates within a given discourse.
In addressing the appeal to “sex” as a category pertaining to the simple
identification of real bodies, Butler argues:
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The category of “sex” is, from the start normative; it is what Foucault has called a
“regulatory ideal.” In this sense, then, “sex” not only functions as a norm, but is
part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, that is, whose
regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to
produce—demarcate, circulate, differentiate—the bodies it controls. Thus, “sex”
is a regulatory ideal whose materialization is compelled, and this materialization
takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly regulated practices.”572
For example, female secondary sex characteristics include a lack of body hair and
slightness of frame. These are allegedly natural differences that mark off the female
body. But the amount of money the cosmetics industry makes on hair bleaching and
removal combined with the strength of the diet and fitness industry indicate that being
small and relatively hairless is actually the end result of a rigorous and often expensive
bodily practice. Ironically, it is precisely the perceived naturalness of these characteristics
that make faking them so important.
In short, there are no human bodies that exist apart from human cultivation. The
materiality of bodies is therefore not opposed to the social construction of those bodies.
Our materiality itself is a product of construction. The social construction of femininity
affects the materiality of bodies labeled “female”—for example, when women work out
so as to stay thin but not gain muscle mass they are intentionally conforming their bodies
to an image of what a “natural” woman is. There is no materiality we can access prior to
or apart from such shaping. On top of this, the turn to materiality as an indicator of the
real is itself the product of a given social location. In other words, neither the body nor
the theorist exists before or apart from social construction. One cannot turn “away” from
reflection on social construction to the materiality of the body.
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To avoid confusion Butler shifts here from language of “construction” to
language of “materiality” to describe the ways bodies are regulated. The reference is not
to some original passive material which is then imprinted upon by cultural norms, but to
the way in which our materiality is itself shaped by cultural norms: Materiality is “a
return to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization
that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call
matter.”573 What I consider to be my material existence is itself effected by cultural
norms (through practices designed to produce allegedly “natural” gender markers).
Within such an analysis both what is referred to more commonly as “gender” and as
“sex” are the legacy of a process of materialization.
Far from being merely inaccurate, appeals to the natural with respect to sex
difference always function to secure some forms of subjectivity at the expense of others.
Naming of a biological womanhood that can be accessed apart from social norms
depends on the exclusion of the abject: “The abject designates here precisely those
“unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life which are nevertheless densely
populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the
sign of the “unlivable” is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject.”574 In other
words, one is not just living in contradiction if she maintains that women are not bearded
while plucking her chin. She is also substantiating the claim that to be a bearded woman
is an unlivable situation. I can maintain the illusion that I am a natural woman only by
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positing others as unnatural. After all, without such comparison, without the dismissal of
what is seen as “natural,” what is the point of the appeal?
Butler returns here to the notion of performance, but clarifies that what is meant is
not roleplaying—as if one could hide an authentic identity under a costume for a spell—
but J.L. Austen’s performative speech-acts: statements like “I promise” or “I do take you
as my wife” which enact what they describe. These statements themselves are
productive—they effect what they say, and are thus always self-authenticating. Here,
Butler is following Jacques Derrida’s specific reading of speech-acts, which highlights
the way that they are made possible only through practices—for example, the legal codes
surrounding marriage—that are then reiterated: “Performativity must be understood not
as a singular or deliberate “act,” but, rather as the reiterative and citational practice by
which discourse produces the effects that it names.”575 Speech-acts gain their power not
from any willing agent, but by the citation (and therefore sedimentation) of regulating
norms. That is, the answer to the question, “Are they really married?” is a question of
whether or not a given set of norms was enacted. To stand in front of a justice of the
peace and perform a set of actions is not to pretend to be married, but to be married.
Declaring that all identities operate in this way means that we must shift from
thinking about authenticity as a matter of correspondence between one’s “inner” and
“outer” self, but to the accomplishment of identity through social norms. Butler here is
shifting the metaphors we use in thinking about identity from that of substance to
activity, and from that of the individual to the social. Identities are not interior facts about
the self that are discovered over time. Identities are something we do within our given
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social world. The sedimentation of materiality is therefore accomplished through
performance—that is the citation of social norms.576
What this entails is the paradox, recognized by Foucault, that those who resist a
given set of norms have themselves been produced by it. But, as Butler points out, not all
of them are produced as subjects within it. Since the Law shores up identities through
exclusion—by creating a boundary which defines some as “inside” and others as
“outside”—it creates abjects as well as subjects. However, those that are produced as
abject under the law are themselves indication that another law is possible. Thus the law
contains its own undoing. From the standpoint of the abject, one sees the Law not as
unnecessary or inevitable, but as one possibility. Thus Butler poses the following
question—one that works well in summarizing her work as a whole: “What challenge
does that excluded and abjected realm produce to a symbolic hegemony that might force
a radical rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as
“life,” lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving?”577
The Professor of Parody: Martha Nussbaum’s Criticism of Butler
In the late 1990s, much of Martha Nussbaum’s research challenged the reign of poststructuralists who had critiqued liberal feminist political thought and its emphasis on the
individual and her rights. In her 1999 article “Professor of Parody,” Nussbaum offers a
scathing critique of Butler in particular. The essay lambasts her prose, her lack of
originality in speaking about the subject as constructed, her inability to engage with
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social science research, and, most importantly, what Nussbaum identifies as the political
impotence of Butler’s project. As Nussbaum argues, the lack of any stable self prior to a
regime of power makes it impossible to talk about resistance to that power: “What should
be resisted, and on what basis? What would the acts of resistance be like, and what would
we expect them to accomplish?”578 At the practical level, she finds Butler’s own political
proscriptions woefully inadequate. What is the use of making “gender trouble” when girls
do not receive education? Nussbaum particularly laments the rise of feminist theorists
whose political activism is reduced only to gender play, with little concern for the lack of
healthcare, education, and material goods that affects women all over the globe.
At the beginning of the essay, Nussbaum laments that,
It is not only that feminist theory pays relatively little attention to the struggles of
women outside the United States. (This was always a dispiriting feature even of
much of the best work of the earlier period.) Something more insidious than
provincialism has come to prominence in the American academy. It is the
virtually complete turning from the material side of life, toward a type of verbal
and symbolic politics that makes only the flimsiest of connections with the real
situation of real women.579
The problem is, in large part, due to certain readers of Foucault—particularly Butler.
According to Nussbaum, Butler’s problems are varied: she writes poorly, never clearly
defining her own position; she casually alludes to thinkers without justifying what is
often a minority or otherwise contentious read of them, so that the general reader is
bewildered and the specialist reader disappointed; and it offers nothing to those outside
the academy concerned with the material reality women face. Nussbaum can only
surmise that her texts are written for “young feminist theorists in the academy who are
578

Martha Nussbaum, “Professor of Parody: The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler,” The New
Republic 22 (February 1999): 37-45.
579

Nussbaum, “Professor of Parody,” 38.

192
neither students of philosophy, caring about what Althusser and Freud and Kripke really
said, nor outsiders, needing to be informed about the nature of their projects and
persuaded of their worth.”580 Such readers must be “remarkably docile,” Nussbaum
continues, to not ask questions of Butler’s work—since Butler imagines no interlocuters,
nor rebuttals. Indeed, the reader does not even mind the lack of answers since, as
Nussbaum argues, Butler rarely owns her own positions, but rather couches them in
statements of possibility or probability.581
Butler’s initial insight, that gender is constructed, is nothing new.582 It is an idea
that, as Nussbaum reminds us, goes back at least to John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of
Women, and had been developed by many feminist philosophers, natural scientists, and
social scientists—notably Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Nancy Chodorow,
Anne Fausto Sterling, Susan Moller Okin, and Gayle Robin. To these accounts,
Nussbaum alleges that Butler adds nothing but the claim that gender, since not tied to
sex, need not be a binary.583
The primary focus of Nussbaum’s critique is the fact that Butler’s unoriginal
claims regarding gender are tied to an understanding of the self as “completely inert”
prior to its construction via social norms. Such an understanding of construction offers a
depressing account of the possibility of moral agency, particularly resistance to social
norms: “Butler does in the end want to say that we have a kind of agency, an ability to
undertake change and resistance. But where does this ability come from, if there is no
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structure in the personality that is not thoroughly power’s creation?”584 For Nussbaum, it
is rooted in the human striving evident in the pre-cultural desires “for food, for comfort,
for cognitive mastery, for survival.585
Butler however, in arguing against the possibility of any desire apart from the
law, has no such foundation to stand on. Nussbaum also challenges Butler’s claim that
the body is constructed. While she agrees that the division of bodies into two sexes is
overly simplistic, exclusive of certain bodies, and perhaps only one of many more
relevant ways of categorizing bodies in society, she asks provocatively whether or not it
would make a difference if we “had the bodies of birds or dinosaurs or lions.”586 At some
point, real human bodies matter.
Bracketing the accuracy of Butler’s understanding of the body and self as
constructed, Nussbaum continues asking about the political potency of such a theory:
Suppose we grant Butler her most interesting claims up to this point: that the
social structure of gender is ubiquitous, but we can resist it by subversive and
parodic acts. Two significant questions remain. What should be resisted and on
what basis? What would the acts of resistance be like, and what would we expect
them to accomplish?587
As she points out, Butler studies no actual forms of resistance. And her refusal to speak
normatively places those who seek justice in a passive and reactionary position. Butler
cannot name an ideal for which to strive, but only wait on a particular context within
which to speak out. Nussbaum goes on to say that many things fall under the category of
“subversive”: refusing to pay taxes for libertarian reasons, poking fun at feminists in
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one’s law class, or tearing down pro-gay posters. Butler, Nussbaum argues, offers no
norms to show why these acts of parody are not to be welcomed.588
Naming “parody” as the only form of political resistance is woefully inadequate,
and not merely because it can be used for any cause. It is radically unfair to those who
suffer human rights abuses and other assaults to human dignity. As Nussbaum asks,
Isn’t this like saying to a slave that the institution of slavery will never change,
but you can find ways of mocking it and subverting it, finding your personal
freedom within those acts of carefully limited defiance? Yet it is a fact that the
institution of slavery can be changed, and was changed—but not by people who
took a Butler-like view of the possibilities. It was changed because people did not
rest content with parodic performance: they demanded, and to some extent they
got, social upheaval. It is also a fact that the institutional structures that shape
women’s lives have changed. The law of rape, still defective, has at least
improved; the law of sexual harassment exists, where it did not exist before;
marriage is no longer regarded as giving men monarchical control over women’s
bodies. These things were changed by feminists who would not take parodic
performance as their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and
would, yield before justice.589
Rather than identify the injustices in our day, and motivate her readers to effect change,
Butler merely invites them to “focus on cultivating the self rather than thinking in a way
that helps the material condition of others”590—a priority Nussbaum argues is particularly
easy for self-involved middle-class Americans to get on board with. Perhaps the most
damning criticism Nussbaum offers is the simplest, in one of her closing sentences of the
essay: “Hungry women are not fed by this, battered women are not sheltered by it, raped
women do not find justice in it, gays and lesbians do not achieve legal protections
through it.”591
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In Sex and Social Justice, which was published the next year, Nussbaum offers a
fuller defense of the liberal project against feminist and postmodern critiques. She argues
that the hyper-vigilant respect for difference that has become characteristic of
postmodern thought actually aligns with conservative, rather than progressive,
approaches to human rights, leaving feminists with no concrete tool to help women.592
Liberalism, however, provides a way of speaking of the inherent value of the individual
as an end in herself—all the more important to women, who are often considered as
represented and subsumed under groups (for example, the family) or as means to other
ends (for example, reproduction). Nussbaum defends a conception of feminism that is
international, humanist, liberal, and concerned with the social shaping of preference and
desire, and sympathetic understanding.593 Through this conception she attempts to escape
the troublesome victim/agent dichotomy which she argues plagues feminism, by paying
attention not only to the role of choice, but encouraging the conditions for people to make
real choices.594
Nussbaum’s criticism most clearly articulates some limits to Butler’s approach,
particularly her inattention to analysis of the way in which sexism is codified legally.
However, I do not think that Butler leaves us with as little resources as Nussbaum
alleges. Nowhere in her summary of Butler’s thought does Nussbaum mention the
distinction between the production of the subject and the abject. But Butler’s concern for
those who are created as abject does, in fact, offer an implicit norm. Butler is not merely
calling for subversion as such. Recall that in Gender Trouble Butler describes “practices
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of parody” as those that expose the lie of the epistemologies and ontologies that
undergird compulsive heterosexuality.595 In Bodies that Matter she asks more broadly,
and more provocatively: “What challenge does that excluded and abjected realm produce
to a symbolic hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of what qualifies as
bodies that matter, ways of living that count as “life,” lives worth protecting, lives worth
saving, lives worth grieving?”596 Butler is not concerned with subversion for subversion’s
sake, but for recognizing those whose subjectivity are denied under the present social
norms. The acts that Nussbaum describes as subversive—refusing to pay taxes, making
fun of feminist, vandalizing pro-gay posters—do not constitute what Butler would
identify as “parody.” The abject is not merely defined by statistical minority. Being
libertarian, or anti-feminist, or anti-gay are visible, livable positions in our society.
Popular or not, one can successfully run for office with such opinions, and one’s chances
of becoming a victim of violent crime does not increase when one converts to any of
these positions.
This in itself may change, however. As Butler’s own suspicion about the word
“woman” highlights, she is sensitive to the ways in which popular social justice
movements—like feminism—can themselves become exclusionary. Who the abject is
will change given the time and place. Thus for Butler the ideal is not to lift up a given
identity or identity politics, but to develop habits of vigilant listening to the other, that
keep us examining any given politics for who it excludes, and whose lives it renders
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unlivable. Parody open up what lives are thinkable. This in itself is a type of justice for
the marginalized.
As Butler defends herself in the 1999 preface to Gender Trouble,
The aim of the text was to open up the field of possibility for gender without
dictating which kinds of possibilities ought to be realized. One might wonder
what use “opening up possibilities” finally is, but no one who has understood
what it is to live in the social world as what is “impossible,” illegible,
unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to pose that question.597
As she goes on to clarify, her call is not to let all flowers bloom with respect to gender
and sexuality—but to render such positions thinkable so that one’s ethical reflection is
not merely governed by taboo.598 This explains why at the end of Gender Trouble she
does not name “practices of parody” as a political movement unto itself; rather such
practices—in exposing the lie of the epistemologies and ontologies that undergird
compulsive heterosexuality—would open up new ways of seeing and being which, in
turn, would make a new form of politics possible.599 Nussbaum is mistaking what Butler
is identifying as the condition for the possibility of a liberative politics for the politics
itself.
Butler’s work in her 2004 Undoing Gender show the possibility of this system to
serve as a norm for concrete issues facing gender and sexual minorities. Describing
human being as ec-static—that is, as something always going out from itself—Butler
argues that the desire for recognition is a fundamental aspect of the human experience.600
But both the recognition and the desire for it can function in such a way to exclude the
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recognition of others. In other words, we shore up our own humanity by denying it to
others.601 This creates a situation where many have to choose between being recognized
as human or recognized as themselves602—here Butler alludes to Frantz Fanon’s
statement “the black is not a man” as an example of such contradiction.603
In this text, Butler also provides a greater challenge to the liberal feminism, the
kind of which Martha Nussbaum is a proponent. The problem with appeal only to rights
language is that it depends on an understanding of the self as solely autonomous. But, as
Butler argues, members of the transgender and intersex community do not merely want to
assert their rights—particularly their bodily autonomy—but want to be members of
communities. They want to be recognized. Language that only appeals to the subject as
sovereign, without being joined by language of the subject in mutual dependence with
others, cannot help these broader conditions of flourishing.604 It is the body for Butler that
offers up “a different conception of politics”:
The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose
us to the gaze of others but also to touch and to violence. The body can be the
agency and instrument of all these as well, or the site where “doing” and “being
done to” become equivocal. Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies,
the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. The body
has its invariably public dimension; constituted as a social phenomenon in the
public sphere, my body is and is not mine.605
This placing of the body in the liminal space between the world and me challenges us to
think about challenging exclusive political systems without appealing to false
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understandings of ourselves as solely our own. Insofar as Butler’s system attends to a
more honest account of the body, and seeks the full recognition of persons in community
rather than just legal protection, her goals can be seen as much broader and more
ambitious than Nussbaum’s.
As an example of what it means to falsely shore up one’s identity through selfenclosure, Butler points to U.S. policy and social trends since September 11, 2001. In the
face of our vulnerability to great violence, “the dominant mode in the United States has
been to shore up sovereignty and security to minimize or, indeed, foreclose this
vulnerability,” but Butler argues that “the fact that our lives are dependent on others can
become the basis of claims for nonmilitaristic political solutions, one [basis] which we
cannot will away, one which we must attend to, even abide by, as we begin to think about
what politics might be implied by staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability
itself.”606 Choosing to see our own vulnerability as impetus for protecting others who are
vulnerable—rather than to partake in actions that directly and indirectly harm those in the
world who are already particularly vulnerable—requires that we recognize certain lives
as grievable. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of Butler’s claim that some
bodies are seen as valuable and others are not: “Certain lives will be highly protected, and
the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war.
And other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as
‘grievable.’”607 In addition, Butler mentions the examples of lives in Africa lost to
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Aids;608 the invisibility of “drag, butch, femme, transgender, transsexual persons” and
those seeking other forms of kinship in the Human Rights Campaign’s push for gay
marriage;609 the murders of gender and sexuality minorities that in turn go
unprosecuted;610 the surgical “correction” of intersex children;611 the life of David
Reimer, who after having his penis burned as an infant was raised as a girl by his
parents—his parents finding the idea of a man without a penis as unlivable;612 and the
medical pathology of certain gender identities in DSM-IV.613 In turn, I think Nussbaum
downplays the ways in which recognition of one’s life is prerequisite for flourishing. Not
all of the factors that contribute to the lives of gender and sexual minorities being
unlivable are related to policy. Thus, defending her call to open up possibilities of gender,
Butler writes: “Some people have asked me what is the use of increasing possibilities for
gender. I tend to answer: Possibility is not a luxury; it is as crucial as bread.”614
Giving An Account of Oneself
Of Seyla Benhabib’s and Martha Nussbaum’s criticism, the most relevant concern for
this dissertation is their claim that it is impossible to theorize about political resistance
while maintaining that the body is culturally constructed. Butler responds directly to this
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charge in her 2005 Giving an Account of Oneself.615 This book collects Butler’s 2002
Spinoza Lectures at the University of Amsterdam.616 In it, Butler uses a number of
continental philosophers and psychoanalytic thinkers—who each, in their own way,
attempt to show how the subject is constructed precisely in and through the encounter
with the other—to dismantle the idea that one’s moral agency is threatened by one’s
social construction. She ultimately argues that we are all intimately bound up with one
another. Such binding is not completely thematizable—I am ignorant for instance of all
the social factors that contributed to my infant development, which preceded and
produced this “I” writing right now. Perhaps counterintuitively, Butler argues that this
inability to fully give an account of oneself calls us to greater and more vigilant ethical
behavior. It is precisely because I am constituted by my relationship to others that I am
obligated not to behave as if I am an individual automaton. It is precisely because I
become myself in the face of the other that I am obligated to respect the face of the other.
The apophatic nature of our own self-knowledge requires that we resist full and final
judgment on ourselves and of others. In short, the inevitable failure to be able to give an
account calls for us to refrain from ethical violence.
She begins by tracing a tension in continental thought in talking about the
individual. On the one hand, figures like Kierkegaard, Adorno and Hegel have warned us
of the violence a universal ethics—which does not take into account context and
particularity—can exert over the individual. At the same time, such thought has
challenged the idea of an individual “espoused as a pure immediacy, arbitrary or
615
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accidental, detached from its social and historical conditions—which, after all, constitute
the general conditions of its own emergence.”617 That is, a suspicion of the ways in
which society constricts the individual has developed alongside a growing recognition of
the function of society in constituting the individual. The first imagines the individual
opposite cultural norms; the second as produced by them. The question is of particular
importance for theorizing about morality. As Butler responds to Adorno:
[Adorno] is clear that there is no morality without an “I,” but pressing questions
remain: In what does that “I” consist? … there is no “I” that can fully stand apart
from the social conditions of its emergence, no “I” that is not implicated in a set
of conditioning moral norms, which, being norms, have a social character that
exceeds a purely personal or idiosyncratic meaning.618
Butler does not have in mind here a pure determinism. The emergence of the self is not
formulaic or predictable. As Butler writes, “the ‘I’ is not causally induced by those
norms.”619 Rather, the problem is of a self who is implicated in social norms:
We cannot conclude that the “I” is simply the effect or the instrument of some
prior ethos or some field of conflicting or discontinuous norms. When the ‘I”
seeks to give an account of itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this
self is already implicated in a social temporality that exceeds its own capacities
for narration; indeed when the “I” seeks to give an account of itself, an account
that must include the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a matter of
necessity, become a social theorist.620
Thus, in giving an account of itself, the “I” which emerges from social forces reflects
upon those social forces. Moral agency requires a reflection not only upon oneself, but
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also on the wider social milieu. Engaging ethics therefore requires engaging in social
theory.621
In seeking to give an account of oneself, one realizes that she can only do so
impartially. For Butler, as bodies, we are opaque to ourselves: “To be a body is, in some
sense, to be deprived of having a full recollection of one’s life. There is a history to my
body of which I can have no recollection.”622 Consider how much of our subject
formation is a product of forces not only that we cannot control, but that we cannot
remember (early childhood development, for instance). In addition, the account we give
of ourselves is always to another. We are constituted by an address that calls us to be
accountable. In this way the subject is multiply ungrounded, her past in a shadowy mist,
her present part of a relationship bigger than herself.623 My exposure to the other, the
primary relations that contributed to the forming of my personhood, a past I cannot
retrieve, the norms within which I operate, and the “structure of address” are all indices
of my failure to give an account of myself.624 Thus we are left with the following
question: “Does the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding, that is, whose
conditions of emergence can never fully be accounted for, undermine the possibility of
responsibility and, in particular, of giving an account of oneself?”625
We are not our own. But this does not absolve us from our moral responsibilities.
Butler writes, “I am interrupted by my own social origin, and so have to find a way to
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take stock of who I am in a way that makes clear that I am authored by what precedes and
exceeds me, and that this in no way exonerates me from having to give an account of
myself.”626 Whatever responsibility is, “it cannot be tie to the conceit of a self fully
transparent to itself.”627 So what does responsibility without an ability to fully give an
account of oneself look like?
For Butler this inability to fix the subject is not a problem for speaking about
ethical responsibility; in fact she argues that it is quite the opposite. It is precisely because
we are bound up with each other—in ways that we may not even know—that makes us
responsible to one another: “…A theory of subject formation that acknowledges the
limits of self-knowledge can serve a conception of ethics and, indeed, responsibility. If
the subject is opaque to itself, not fully translucent and knowable to itself, it is not
thereby licensed to do what it wants or to ignore its obligations to others. The contrary is
surely true.”628 That we are unable to completely reflect upon or thematize our own
development of subjects is but one part of the fact that we are truly beings who develop
in dependent relationships on others. That we come to consciousness already set in
motion by our interactions with others ought to highlight rather than dismiss the necessity
of careful consideration about how we interact with others. If for example I believe that I
am a subject who is a product of socialization, I have every reason to invest my efforts
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into creating positive social worlds.629 Thus Butler offers an “ethics based on our shared,
invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves.”630
One’s failure to give an account of oneself serves as motivation to develop
capacities for humility, generosity, and forgiveness:
Can a new sense of ethics emerge from such inevitable ethical failure? I suggest
that it can, and that it would be spawned by a certain willingness to acknowledge
the limits of acknowledgment itself. When we claim to know and to present
ourselves, we will fail in some ways that are nevertheless essential to who we are.
We cannot reasonably expect anything different from others in return. To
acknowledge one’s own opacity or that of another does not transform opacity into
transparency. To know the limits of acknowledgement is to know even this fact in
a limited way; as a result, it is to experience the very limits of knowing. This can,
by the way, constitute a disposition of humility and generosity alike: I will need to
be forgiven for what I cannot have fully known, and I will be under a similar
obligation to offer forgiveness to others, who are also constituted in partial
opacity to themselves.631
We should likewise be cautious if we think we have given an account of ourselves or of
others. As Butler argues, our desire to be recognized and to recognize is one that cannot
be resolved. Any full recognition we think we have come to is in fact false. Thus Butler
urges us, “So if there is, in the question [“Who are you?’], a desire for recognition, this
desire will be under an obligation to keep itself alive as desire and not to resolve
itself.”632 In other words, the other is always more than I am able to sum up. No matter
how much I desire to know someone, thinking I already know them is a form of violence.
Instead, a life characterized by an acknowledgement of the limit of acknowledgement is
non-violent—“If violence is the act by which a subject seeks to reinstall its mastery and
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unity, then nonviolence may well follow from living the persistent challenge to egoic
mastery that our obligations to others induce and require.”633 The failure for me to narrate
my own life completely, or for anyone else to narrate his or her own, ought to compel me
not to exert any sort of violence upon the other. I cannot seek to master or control; such
activity is a lie.
What Butler is describing here is not apathy, but a deep encounter with the alterity
of the other in an almost spiritual practice of seeking to relinquish one’s control over
others. Butler calls for such a response even in the face of violence itself. Employing
Levinas to show how one can be responsible for what is done to them,634 Butler argues
that even being the victim of violence is a situation in which we ought to be non-violent:
What might it mean to undergo violation, to insist upon not resolving grief and
staunching vulnerability too quickly through a turn to violence, and to practice, as
an experiment in living otherwise, nonviolence in an emphatically nonreciprocal
response?…It might mean that one does not foreclose upon that primary exposure
to the Other, that one does not try to transform the unwilled into the willed, but,
rather, to take the very unbearability of exposure as the sign, the reminder, of a
common vulnerability, a common physicality and risk (even as “common” does
not mean “symmetrical” for Levinas).635
Here, Butler proceeds carefully. She does not want to attribute positive meaning to
violence itself, neither committing it nor suffering it. At the same time, it is proof of our
vulnerability to one another: “Violence is neither a just punishment we suffer nor a just
revenge for what we suffer. It delineates a physical vulnerability from which we cannot
slip away, which we cannot finally resolve in the name of the subject, but which we can
provide a way to understand that none of us is fully bounded, utterly separate, but, rather,
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we are in our skins, given over, in each other’s hands, at each other’s mercy.”636 My
responsibility to not exert violence upon the other comes precisely from the fact that
neither of us is fully accountable for our selves, and such a responsibility persists even if
the other exerts violence over me.
Butler includes in her argument an important proviso regarding trauma. While we
cannot give a full account of ourselves, integrating one’s life into a cohesive story is an
important aspect of crafting oneself. So while she is suspicious of psychoanalysis that
seeks to give a complete account of the self, Butler is not calling us to leave off
narratives, or judgments, but is rather calling for recognition that all such are incomplete
and provisional. What she is calling for is humility in the faces of ourselves and of the
other. That there are people who desperately need to integrate dissociative aspects of their
self-experience should keep us from being blasé about the need to give an account for
oneself.637 Though we will fail to give a complete account of ourselves we must try: “No
one can live in a radically non-narratable world or survive a radically non-narratable
life.”638
While this text does much in the way of defending the possibility of agency and
moral responsibility in light of an understanding of the self as given over to the other,
Butler does little to provide concrete assistance in navigating the ethical dilemmas of
one’s life. How does one discern for instance the difference between the way in which we
are all given over to one another, and the ruptures of self that are the result of grave
harm? Given that gender and sexual minorities are at higher risk of violence being done
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to their bodies, and that women’s bodies in particular are seen to be public objects of
scrutiny, the stakes are high in how we talk about our bodies as being constituted by
vulnerability to the other.
Constructing the Body after Butler
In thinking about Michel Foucault’s claim that the body is culturally constructed, Judith
Butler argues that we must recognize that the body does not exist apart from such
construction. On account of this, any resistance to harmful political regimes cannot be
described as resistance to or removal from social construction as such. Rather she argues
that since laws always function through exclusion, the perspective of those who are abject
under them offer the vantage point necessary to imagine new worlds. In other words, she
focuses not merely on the fact that bodies are culturally constructed, but in the ways that
cultural construction makes some bodies unrecognizable.
Of note is the particular way in which Butler’s solution to this problem echoes
Rahner’s. Remember that Rahner argued that the subject as spirit-in-world accomplishes
her freedom via the other, which is therefore dependent upon rather than threatened by
the other. In a similar move, the paradox of the individual-in-community is that one’s
moral agency is developed because of not despite being constituted in relationship with
the other. Our identification of threats to freedom must correctly diagnose the problem as
one regarding the nature of one’s relationship to others, not the fact that one is so related.
As we will see in the next chapter, her answer to the paradox of bodily inscription is a
helpful way of thinking of the paradoxes that run through Rahner’s understanding of the
relationship between the transcendental and categorical.
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Contra Martha Nussbaum, who faults Butler for not speaking concretely about the
demands of activism on behalf of women, I have argued here that Butler’s thought is best
understood as fundamental moral philosophy. Making gender trouble, or engaging in
practices of parody, open up our ability to recognize all lives as livable. This is in itself is
a moment of justice for those whose subjectivity goes unrecognized. But as Butler
reminds us, this is merely the condition for the possibility of ethical and political
reflection that is not governed solely by taboo. In her later work, Butler offers better
examples of what this second moment of ethical reflection looks like. Ultimately,
Butler’s interest in the materiality and discursivity of the body is oriented at analysis of
how identities operate in exclusionary ways and the ways in which such exclusion
supports harmful politics.
For the sake of this dissertation however, I want to focus on what this
understanding of the discursivity and materiality of the body has to bear on individual
bodies in the world, particularly with regard to how subjects navigate freedom. Butler
does not give much attention to this kind of discernment. What, for example, constitutes
harm in Giving an Account of Oneself? What is it that we are called to forgive, and what
does generosity look like? As we will see in the next section, Shannon Sullivan’s
understanding of the body as “transactional” offers a way of preserving Butler’s insights,
while directing our attention to the concrete lived experiences of bodies and the ways
they are constructed under given social norms. By developing Butler’s ideas in tandem
with John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy, she offers both a theoretical account of how
resistance is possible and more practical attention toward the effecting of such change.
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Shannon Sullivan and Transactional Bodying
In Living across and through Skins, Shannon Sullivan employs the concept of
“transaction” to speak about the ways in which subjects relate to the world. She contrasts
this understanding with a more simplified understanding of the subject as merely
interacting with the world. Whereas “the term ‘interaction’ suggests two independently
constituted entities entering into an exchange or relationship with one another,” Sullivan
argues,
The term ‘transaction’ reflects a rejection of sharp dualisms between subject and
object, and self and world, as well as a rejection of the atomistic,
compartmentalized conceptions of the subject and self that often accompany such
dualisms. The boundaries that delimit individual entities are permeable, not fixed,
which means that organisms and their various environments—social, cultural, and
political as well as physical—are constituted by their mutual influence and impact
on one another…Thus “transaction” designates a process of mutual constitution
that entails mutual transformation, including the possibility of significant
change.639
The word “transaction” thus signifies a process in which the subject and her world are
mutually co-constitutive. In this transactional understanding, the subject is both
vulnerable to outside influence and the agent of influence on the world—but not in such a
way that one can conceive of “subject” and “world” as two categories pre-existing such
transaction. Indeed, the process of transaction means that the division between these two
categories is not clear: “To think of bodies as transactional… is to realize that bodies do
not stop at the edges of their skins and are not contained neatly and sharply within
them.”640
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John Dewey and the Habits of Transactional Bodying
Sullivan’s understanding of the body as transactional comes from John Dewey. For
Dewey, the word “body” refers to all physical beings. All bodies are psycho-chemical
and transact in the world with “bias”—that is, “in a selective manner.”641 Consider for
example the way a black cloth converts light into heat, copper conducts electricity, or
water resists changes in temperature through its covalent bonds. Animate bodies are those
that act in such a way as to preserve themselves. Dewey refers to such organization as
“psycho-physical.”642 Some psycho-physical beings are capable of meaning—for
example, when a dog experiences fear. Dewey identifies consciousness, or a mental life,
when such a psycho-physical organism is sufficiently “complex enough for it to be aware
of meanings.”643
It is important to note here that for Dewey, this is not a taxonomy of things but of
different ways of functioning in the world.644 As Sullivan writes, “For Dewey, mind,
including consciousness, is not something radically divorced from the physical. Rather,
mind marks a particular way for some physical bodies who are organisms to transact with
the world.”645 Bodies are themselves a doing. They are not lumps of matter, but
organizations of biased transaction with the world. This is why Dewey suggests using
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gerunds and verbs rather than nouns: one does not have a body, she bodies.646 Mind is
one way of bodying.
Thus for Dewey mind and body are not two separate substances. For this reason
“body-mind”—alongside “organism”—is one of the ways in which he designates the
unified human person. Sullivan offers the following text from Dewey:
Body-mind simply designates what actually takes place when a living body is
implicated in situations of discourse, communication and participation. In the
hyphenated phrase body-mind, ‘body’ designates the continued and conserved,
the registered and cumulative operation of factors continuous with the rest of
nature, inanimate as well as animate; while ‘mind’ designates the characters and
consequences which are differential, indicative of features which emerge when
‘body’ is engaged in a wider more complex and interdependent situation.647
Such a designation of the person as body-mind does not collapse the mind on to the body.
Rather, as Sullivan argues, “Body is the activity out of which mind emerges.”648 The
relationship, however, is not unidirectional. The mind itself refigures the physicality of
the body, for instance in memory creation.649 In referring to the human person, Dewey
used the phrase “body-mind” or “organism” in order to avoid any dualistic account of the
self. As Sullivan interprets him, “both terms designate bodies as transactional, that is, as
constituted by and constitutive of their various environments, mental, social, cultural, and
political, as well as physical and natural.”650
In Dewey’s thought, what gives bodies their stability is not matter, but habit. As
Sullivan describes, “Bodying is constituted by habits, which are an organism’s acquired
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styles of activity that organize the energy of its impulses.”651 Over time the initial
impulses that govern one’s bodying are organized into habits. “Broader and richer than
mere repetition or routine,” Sullivan quotes Dewey’s definition of a habit as “an acquired
predisposition to ways or modes of response.”652
Sullivan offers the examples of language and walking to explain what Dewey
means by “habit.” Consider the way in which a child might learn to speak. Her initial
language learning involves much effort for apparently little gain. She must learn to make
complicated movements with her tongue and mouth at the same time modulating her
breathing. She must constantly refine this activity using the feedback from her own
hearing and the communication she receives from others. Over time however, such
movements become natural to her. A fluent English speaker does not consciously think
about how to form the “[p]” sound. Rather, she is able to respond quickly to her
interlocutor, likely without giving any thought to the mechanics of her speech. This is
because speaking has become habitual. Out of habit, a number of discrete and
complicated activities have become consolidated into a routine activity of her bodying.
What once was the product of conscious effort is now automatic.
What this example highlights is the necessary role that habits play in our lives.
We would be able to accomplish very little if every discrete activity required our
conscious attention. Within this understanding of bodying as habitual doing, a certain
duality of the self emerges, between that which is conscious and intelligent and that
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which is routine and automatic.653 The two relate however. While our moments of
creativity and innovation depend upon the sedimentary habits of our bodying, such
moments may also lead to their modification. A transaction can serve to reinforce or
undermine a particular habit.654 Change therefore occurs via a spiraling process in which
modified habits make possible transactions with greater modification potential.655
Sullivan distinguishes in turn “rigid” and “adaptive” habits depending on the likelihood
of their adaptability. This relationship opens up a possibility that one may change both
one’s own habits and one’s own environment. Sullivan warns us not to map this on to a
false distinction between the body and mind, however. Habits are activities of the bodymind.656
While it is easy to think of habits as constraining our activity—for instance, when
we think of all the bad habits one can develop—habits are what make possible all
meaningful activity. Only when the child has made speech a habit can she wield it
creatively and freely. In a similar way, the habits entailed in walking enable one to move
where one pleases. Habit is not imprinted upon a free self; habit is the condition of the
self’s free activity. One achieves agency precisely in and through habit.657
Thus, while Sullivan leaves open the question of whether or not there are prediscursive impulses and drives—it is unclear, whether or not Dewey believes that there is
a moment in a human being’s life where they exist before or apart from habit—she
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argues that the question is ultimately irrelevant. If such a moment exists where one’s
impulses are not shaped by habits, it exists only briefly in infancy. Impulses only become
meaningful through habit, which are discursive.658 Impulses are unintelligible and unable
to be acted upon. This leads us to one of Sullivan’s most important insights into the
construction of bodies: what needs to be aspired to is not a self “free” from habits, but a
self organized by appropriate habits.
Habits do not arise spontaneously from an act of the will—rather, they are formed
by the body’s transaction with the world: “Habits are formed in and through an
organism’s transaction with its various environments.”659 Since habits are themselves
conditions for agency, this means that bodying is always and already transactional: “To
conceive of bodies as atomistically sealed up within themselves or as existing as a lump
physical thing is to misunderstand them.”660 Common environments encourage common
habits of bodying. That is, cultural consistency comes from individuals transacting with
similar habitats. As Sullivan argues, Dewey’s understanding of habit can therefore be
compared to Foucault’s understanding of discipline: “the lines of cultural and
institutional power relations that crisscross and thereby constitute an individual’s body
[in Foucault’s thought] can fruitfully be understood as habits.”661
Sullivan identifies a number of benefits in thinking of the body as transactional.
First, it fosters a “non-reductive recognition of the significance of bodily materiality to
human lived existence” since the environment of transaction is not merely physical but
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also cultural—as she writes, “bodies are primary” but they are not all there is.662 Second,
it avoids a false dualism between nature and nurture. “If bodies are transactionally
constituted,” Sullivan argues, “then bodies are not lumps of passive matter imprinted with
significance and meaning by an active culture. Nor are bodies sealed off from culture
such that, at least on some level or in some respect, they remain untouched by culture.”663
Transaction offers a way of viewing the relationship between subject and world as
mutually co-constitutive and therefore avoids conceiving of the subject as either a purely
passive victim of her environment or as an agent unaffected by it. Third, it does this
without collapsing self onto culture or vice versa.664 A mutually co-constitutive
relationship does not abolish all differences between the bodies in play. Fourth, it resists
conceiving of the subject in terms of a dualism between body and mind. The transactional
body is not opposed to the mind. Rather, the mind is something that the body does. For
Dewey’s, bodies are “patterns of behavior” that cement into habit: “Thinking of bodies as
patterned activities that come to have complex and multiple meanings, which on Dewey’s
terms constitute “mind,” undercuts mind-body dualism without positing a monism of
either body or mind.”665 Fifth, recognizing that the subject, including the mind, is an
activity of the body, directs our attention away from the body as a static lump to be
analyzed but toward the act of bodying.666 Finally, this attention to the body also directs
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us always to be mindful of “the significance of the concrete, lived experience of
bodies.”667
How can a transactional understanding of the body intervene in the debates over
the construction of bodies in feminist theory? As Sullivan notes, one of the biggest points
of contention is whether or not a pre or non-discursive body exists. As we saw above, this
is the source of both Seyla Benhabib’s and Martha Nussbaum’s criticism of Butler. For
both Benhabib and Nussbaum, a pre or non-discursive body is necessary to theorize about
and hope for subjects resisting oppression.
In investigating this question, Sullivan uses the word “discursive” to refer to a
broad sense of discourse as “the entire interlocking web of cultural, societal, and other
meanings, most of which are contained not in speech or grammar, but in institutions,
buildings, habits, etc.”668 We are not talking merely about linguistic construction, but the
entire social world in which persons exist. To ask whether or not a pre or non-discursive
body exists is thus to ask whether or not the human person exists in a meaningful way
apart from such institutions: “The heart of the matter is the more substantial issue of
whether there is anything bodily, material, or natural to be found apart or outside of the
wide range of discursive formations.”669
The question is not an exercise in epistemological tedium. On the one hand, she
points out, appeals to a “natural” difference across bodies has funded some of the greatest
atrocities in history: “the social and political oppression of some groups over others, such
as men over women, white people over people of color, the ‘civilized’ European over the
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native ‘savage,’” were all seen to be appropriate consequences of allegedly natural
differences.670 Of course, from our viewpoint we recognize that such differences are not
natural at all. Belief in a natural hierarchy of race is in fact a highly specific cultural
product. Thus, we should be suspicious therefore, of the ways in which contemporary
understandings of what is natural may in fact be motivated by our personal and cultural
biases.
Sullivan takes this suspicion one step further. The appeal to the natural in itself is
an argumentative move that only makes sense given a certain set of operating cultural
assumptions. Pointing to the natural as a bedrock axiom obscures the need to ask more
fundamental questions: Who arbitrates what is considered natural? What sources are
authoritative and what disciplines are appropriate? Why is the natural to be prioritized? It
iss not merely that we can be wrong about what is natural. Sullivan argues that the appeal
to the natural tends toward conservation of the status quo. Simply speaking, it is not a
neutral category to begin with. It privileges the way things have been. Thus Sullivan
argues that,
resistance to oppressive normative standards is not likely to be achieved by
positing a natural, noncultural body if the way in which the body is delineated as
natural is itself a product of culture. In such a case, rather than to transform
culture, appeals to a body outside of cultural influences, meanings, and
understandings tend to have an effect opposite of that which is desired: they
further secure, rather than undermine, the cultural, social, and political status
quo.671
For example, if we want to counter the idea that men are naturally more intelligent than
women, or that homosexuality is unnatural, Sullivan would urge us not to accept the
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terms of the debate. If we argue, for instance, that men and women are naturally equally
intelligent, or that multiple forms of sexuality are equally natural, we have won a battle at
the cost of our ability to ask more serious questions: Who determines what is “natural”?
Why is “natural” synonymous with “good”? And who does this benefit? We will have
accepted that the quest for gender justice must justify itself through the physical sciences,
and more broadly, that the ethics of human sexuality are determined only by biology. In
Sullivan’s words, “The attempt to think of bodily materiality as prior to or
nonconstitutively outside of the cultural or social is already to make a political claim.”672
To be clear, Sullivan’s proclamation that there is no non or pre-discursive body is not to
say that all is merely language. Rather, quoting Butler, Sullivan argues that “to claim that
discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes
that which it concedes; rather it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure body which
is not at the same time a further formation of that body.”673
On the other hand, without such a pre or non-discursive body it is difficult to
conceive of the possibility of political resistance. Is the “no” one voices to an oppressive
regime possible without an understanding of the self apart from that regime? Doesn’t the
process of decolonization that Peters and Massingale discuss require a moment in which
one says, “I am not what you say I am?” And doesn’t such a statement require that we
are, deep down, really something regardless of the world in which we live? Sullivan is
particularly concerned with the difficulty in theorizing about how one exercises freedom
against a system if they are defined by it: “If cultural norms totally imprint a body in their
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disciplining of it, if they “go all the way down,” as it were, then resistance to them
appears to be impossible.”674
While Sullivan argues that there is no pre or non-discursive body, she ultimately
proposes, following Butler, that the most important question is not whether, but how the
body is discursive—“the disagreement over whether a non- or prediscursive body exists
ultimately is redirected here to questions about the particular ways in which bodies
transact with the world.”675 That is, the ontological question about the facticity of the pre
or non-discursive body actually derails conversations about how discourses shape bodies
and which bodies are harmed. As Sullivan notes, Butler is more concerned not with
debating whether there is such a body but the political interests that benefit from appeals
to it: “When theorists stop dwelling on questions about the ability of bodies to stand
outside of discourse, they can then redirect their energies where they should be, that is,
into examining and transforming, if needed, the effects of current discourses about and
attitudes toward bodies.”676
Yet, Sullivan points out, Butler herself neglects to attend to concrete ways in
which discourse produces bodies.677 While Butler argues that we need to direct our
theoretical and political analysis toward the ways in which concrete material bodies are
shaped by discourse, she herself rarely attends to this kind of close attention to the body
itself, as much as she does to what bodies count. As Sullivan argues, the body that Butler
is analyzing does not appear to be a body that sneezes or bleeds. According to Sullivan,
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the flaw in Butler’s argument is largely that it omits “the concrete experiences of lived
bodies.”678 Of course for Butler, that is because she doesn’t care about the content of
gender identities—their “realness”—but of the policing of identities that necessarily
involves political exclusion. Political action involves bringing subordinated identity into
the public domain, while also being careful not to replicate, through identity politics, the
same exclusion. Rather than attending to particular identities, Butler is calling for
vigilance in recognizing the ways in which all identities can function exclusively.
However, Butler’s concrete proposals—for subversive parody, for instance—are weaker
on account of a lack of this sort of analysis of how gender is mapped onto the body, and
for how such parody can be achieved. Thus Sullivan positions herself as an inheritor of
Butler’s suspicion of the appeal to the “natural,” while recognizing the need to theorize
better about the possibility of moral resistance.
On the other hand, she argues, a number of theorists “have emphasized bodily
lived experience by conceiving of bodies as atomistically sealed off from the cultural
world.” According to Sullivan, thinking of bodies as transactional allows for a third way,
in which “the importance of both recognizing the discursivity of bodies and attending to
lived bodily experience can be acknowledged.”679 That is, the concept of transaction does
not make one choose between the materiality of the body and the productive value of
discourses. Rather, in a transactional understanding of the body, the body holds a primary
position while being understood to have been shaped—even materially so—by the world
in which it transacts.
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Thus Sullivan modifies Butler’s understanding of performativity, enriching it with
Dewey’s understanding of habit: “habit is an organism’s constitutive predisposition to
transact with the world in particular ways, and performativity is the process of repetitive
activity that constitutively stylizes one’s being. Together these ideas provide powerful
tools with which to understand the composition and transformation of gender.”680
Employing habit in tandem with Butler’s performativity corrects a tendency of Butler’s to
analyze performativity only with respect to speech acts.681 The concept of habit reminds
us that our entire bodies are the performances of citations: “Holding that bodily activities
are shaped by transactions with their environments is valuable to philosophy in particular,
and to life in general, because such an understanding of bodying encourages people to
ask whether, when, how, and for whom those transactions are beneficial.”682
The Transactional Body and Identity Politics
How can the concept of “habit” help us understanding identities like gender? In Butler’s
thought, saying that gender is constructed is not to say that it is arbitrary or at will: “A
construction is, after all, not the same as an artifice.”683 That is, it is constitutive of one’s
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identity.684 The difficulty is explaining exactly how something can seem to be imposed
from without (as is implied when we talk about the ways people are constructed
harmfully) while also recognizing the ways in which gender identities are for many
people real aspects of their self-understanding, not merely costumes put on every
morning.
But as we’ve seen before, Dewey’s understanding of the body allows for a more
nuanced understanding of how subjects are formed. For one, understanding that selves
are constituted by habits developed in transaction with the world reminds us that even
agency is itself dependent on a relational understanding of the world. I can only direct my
body according to my will if, beforehand, I have mastered a number of complicated
maneuvers which are developed in transaction with my environment. This means that on
the whole we must reject any schematic that sees agency as deriving from some pure,
unaffected, aspect of the self. Agency is made possible precisely in relationship to the
other.
As Sullivan argues, this allows a way of speaking—more precisely than Butler
can—of the way in which, on the one hand persons are gendered and on the other hand
that gender identities are real. Habits are not merely facades. They are constituent of the
self. The fact that they are the result of interaction with the outside world, learned from
other, or passed on through centuries of tradition, does not mean that they are not also
who the self really is. Butler, for example, in an attempt to find a way to talk about
gender, describes it as a “domain of constraints” by which we become who we are.
Sullivan suggests a better metaphor—one in which the productive, and not just
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constraining, aspect of gender is clearer. Here she provides Dewey’s analysis of
“structure” as a concept to explain how habits are organized and constructed:
A house has a structure; in comparison with the disintegration and collapse that
would occur without its presence, this structure is fixed. Yet it is not something
external to which the changes involved in building and using the house have to
submit. It is rather an arrangement of changing events such that properties which
change slowly, limit and direct a series of quick changes and give them an order
which they do not otherwise possess…Structure is what makes construction
possible and cannot be discovered or defined except in some realized
construction, construction being, of course, an evident order of changes.685
It would be too far afield to examine how, in Dewey’s pragmatism, this example is part
of a larger critique of the idea of forms, and indeed, of any traditional metaphysics in
general. Rather, let us examine it for what it might say about the construction of
identities.
To begin with, this understanding of construction help shifts the metaphor away
from a stamp imprinting upon wax, carvings on a blank slate, or tattoos on a body a la
Kafka’s Penal Colony. In Dewey’s understanding, neither the person nor the constructed
identity exists in any meaningful way apart from each other. Here, construction is
precisely that which organizes material into a meaningful order. One’s impulses are
meaningless without a structure of habits, in a similar way that raw materials strewn
across a field are. It is not that the form of a house is imprinted upon something that has
already form. The wax and blank slate metaphors are unhelpful because they imply that
the structure given is itself stable and whole unto itself. For Dewey however, the structure
does not exist apart from the particular construction. In fact we could add that the
structure will exist in a transactional relationship with the materials and surrounding
environment. One must build different houses with wood than with brick, in wet
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environments than in dry. Here in the house metaphor we see a distinction between more
and less stable habits. While one may knock out walls or extend a porch, some elements
of the house will remain—a roof, exterior walls. Thus the metaphor also helps us see how
the construction of identity allows both stability and flexibility.
Of course, human beings are not houses. How does this metaphor help us
understand gender identity? It reminds us that construction is itself a necessary part of the
self. Our impulses are meaningless without more stable organization. As we saw above,
such organization occurs in transaction with our greater environment, including the social
world that we exist in. One’s own identity emerges in transaction, and thus there is no
fully-formed stamp of “woman” imposed from without. Rather, gender identities,
developed transactionally, offer a structure through which we become ourselves:
As is the case for all cultural constructs on Dewey’s terms, gender is not some
external, accidental characteristic overlaying the allegedly internal, essential,
nongendered core of ourselves. It instead is one of the ways in and through which
we arrange and are arranged as the selves that we are. Relatively, but not
absolutely fixed, one’s gender constitutes one of, but not the only, key
arrangements of the changing events that are one’s self.686
This arrangement occurs bodily. Sullivan provides the example of walking in high heels.
Such a habit does not merely involve putting on high heels in the morning. To walk in
them well, one must develop particular core and leg muscles, as well as adjust one’s
posture in order to maintain balance. These are not merely skills, but the rearrangement
of one’s skeletal and muscular structure—so much in fact that there are many health risks
related to walking in high heels. Our habits are embodied. Thus even for what at first
appears to be costume—walking in high heels—is something that affects our material
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existence to the core. The style of one’s life is not a thin “veneer.”687 We could add to
Sullivan’s analysis that such a habit is itself culturally variable. The semiotics of walking
in high heels and its corollary with any given gender identities is a product of a specific
social system. The reality of gender identity (and other identities) in this system is not
built upon a permanent metaphysical essence, but because it describes something real
about the way in which bodies transact with the world.
Transforming Habits
As we saw above, our habits are embodied, and only such bodying makes agency
possible. The alternative to harmful construction is therefore not freedom from
construction, but alternative constructions: “The constitutive role of habit means that
one’s response to the problem of rigid gender categories should not be a pronouncement
that all cultural structure is oppressive and thus in need of elimination so that one can be
“free.”688 The idea of a self free from any construction is a false illusion. Quoting Dewey,
Sulivan pushes us to understand how freedom can be exercised in and through
construction: “Freedom from restriction, the negative side [of freedom] is to be prized
only as a means to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely,
to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power
to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation.”689 Years before Foucault
would argue the same thing, Dewey recognized that freedom is not the absence of power
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but its manipulation in and through a given structure.690 In Sullivan’s words “the habitual
structures of my life are the means by which I transact with my world, not mere obstacles
to that process.”691
Because of this, Sullivan argues that the focus of political resistance to harmful
gender constructions should be on renegotiating gender rather than abolishing it: “in
order to free ourselves from the current ways in which we are gendered, we should try to
change how we are gendered,”692—that is replacing destructive habits with new ones.
Here she sees Dewey’s argument supporting a common sense adage: that bad habits are
only replaced with good ones. There is no being outside of habit or structure. Attempts to
exorcise one’s bad habits out of one’s life without replacing them with new ones
inevitably invite the return of the “old” habits.693
The necessity of habit is therefore due not only to the human being’s existence in
a social world but also in the need for structures to organize and give meaning to
impulses. How then do we replace old habits with new ones? And more fundamentally,
how is it that a subject desires to replace habits, if he or she is fundamentally shaped by
them? Is not the possibility of a person identifying his or her own construction as harmful
akin to an eye examining itself? Thus we have challenges at both the theoretical and the
practical level.
Sullivan’s answer lies in her understanding of the plasticity of the self. In
Dewey’s thought, the self is being constantly remade because each iteration of a habit
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modifies that habit in some regard. Every time I engage in a given activity of bodying I
am either reinforcing that habit or modifying it in some way. Habit is a process, a way of
bodying over time. Sullivan notes the strong similarity between Dewey’s concept of the
iteration of habit and Butler’s use of “performativity” as a term to describe one’s citation
of social norms.694 In both theoretical models there is an opportunity for a spiral
interaction, in which a given iteration modifies a habit in such a way to make more
iterations possible. In this way, habits are like muscles that, through stretching, become
more flexible. A subject can develop and refine her habits just like she might, over time,
increase her flexibility.
As we saw above, Butler is often critiqued for her fatalism. Nussbaum in
particular is concerned that Butler can only encourage activists to subvert norms. But as
Sullivan notes, translating Butler’s theory into Dewey’s understanding of habit helps
demonstrate and support what Butler means when she says we cannot escape the norms
in which we are constructed. If gender is not just a legal reality, but something which
affects us to the core—our desires, our postures, our emotional responses—if indeed it is
a habitual way of bodying in the world that not only constrains us but makes our agency
possible, it makes sense why Butler does not call for the abolition of gender, but of its
subversion. In short, understanding gender as habit affirms two of Butler’s largest claims:
that one can subvert norms only from within them and that agency and construction are
not opposed.695 But it also extends her works by offering more than just parody:
Thinking of corporeal existence as composed of habit recognizes that the
gendered and other habits that structure a person are the person. Habit makes
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human existence possible, as well as constrains it to the particular forms of
existence that constitute it. Reading habit in conjunction with Judith Butler’s
notion of performativity shows how an organism and its cultural and other
environments can be altered even though they might reinforce each other in ways
that can make substantial change seem unlikely.696
Though any change in one’s bodying must occur through spiral transaction, Sullivan’s
understanding of the flexibility of habit demonstrates that there is actually great potential
for the improvement of both self and world. Given such flexibility, Sullivan suggests then
that we think of the construction of bodies using the category of “hypothetical
construction.” A transactional account of the body entails that both one’s habits and the
meaning one attributes to those habits are co-constituted with the world. Both the person
I become and the person I think I am develop in relationship with the other. Hypothetical
construction entails that one limits oneself to hypothetical meaning-making about one’s
bodily comportment. Because my bodying exists in public, the semiotics of my activities
are not dictated by my intent alone. I exist in a community and my actions will be
interpreted not only according to my intent, but also in their relationship to other people
and the relevant social and cultural institutions. Thus my understanding of my own
bodying must be hypothetical—that is, open to revision according to new information.697
Sullivan provides an example of what she means in her analysis of her
relationship with a colleague. At first their relationship is difficult. When conflict arises,
the colleague raises the volume of his voice, speaks in such a way that makes interruption
difficult, and leans in. Sullivan on the other hand lowers the volume of her voice, speaks
less often, and finds herself backing away. Sullivan’s initial interpretation of these
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interactions had been that her colleague was overtly aggressive and hostile. Reflection on
her own posture however leads her to consider the ways in which her own behavior
during conflict is unproductive. She locates her diminutive bodying as a result of a
certain regional gendering. Sullivan is a southern woman, and she reflects in what ways
her actions with her colleagues are products of habits that have developed in transaction
with a certain environment. But here the habits are being cited in a new environment, and
she must ask whether or not the scripts of polite Southern femininity are intelligible and
appropriate in this context. That is, are her activities even being read as polite in the
context of an academic debate with a colleague? Even if so, is politeness the most
relevant trait to be bodying?698
The category of transaction allows Sullivan to recognize that she herself is a
member of multiple communities, and that she is bringing habits from one into another.
In effect, it allows her to understand conflict in more nuanced terms than “my intent is
good; this other person is being rude,” but to investigate the difference between her own
understanding of her activity and how others might understand it. Sullivan considers for
instance that what she considers polite behavior may seem bewilderingly passive and
even apathetic to others. Could her colleague be frustrated because her behavior—few
words, lowered voice, body pulled back with arms crossed—signal boredom and
disinterest rather than deference? Likewise she wonders whether her own habits of
bodying allow her to easily distinguish passion from aggression, since both equally
violate the social mores of polite Southern femininity. As she writes, the point of
hypothetical construction is “to negotiate meaning in bodily and verbal ways that
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acknowledges and respects the different protomeanings that individuals bring to one
another.”699
Sullivan decides to approach her relationship differently with the colleague, and
begins keeping her volume, rate of speaking, and posture level while they converse. What
she finds is that he responds by likewise easing off on the behaviors she had initially read
as aggressive. Sullivan’s theory of “hypothetical constructivism” thus refers not only to
the fact that we can only tentatively arrive at the meaning of our own bodying, but also to
the process of testing hypothesis precisely in activity like this.700
Sullivan is able to develop a more healthy relationship with her colleague once
she recognizes that neither of them are the sole arbiter of the meaning of their bodying—
not merely that they can each be misread by the other, but that they cannot control the
semiotics of shared spaces. This does not lead her into despair about the ability to ever
communicate with her colleague. Rather, this honest appraisal of the way in which we
transact with the world allows her to initiate change in what she perceives as unhealthy
transaction. The open-endedness of hypothetical construction is an opening to break the
circle of misrelating to one another.701
Though her work does include analysis of specific habits and prescriptions for
change, Sullivan follows Dewey in calling for the development of flexible habits.702 Thus
Sullivan’s call for the subversion of habits is not a matter of a one-time replacement
(even understanding that such replacement would occur over time). Rather, we should
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fight any form of inflexibility in our habits. In Dewey’s words, “what is necessary is that
habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed
with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly
responsive than those now current.”703 This is not to do away with habit altogether, which
is impossible, but to develop habits that are flexible. For example, the habit Sullivan is
developing—engaging with others according to her understanding of hypothetical
construction—is one that better prepares her for the possibility of understanding another
person than her habits of southern feminine deference did. What we might call “metahabits” are postures of listening and adaptability that in turn can help fund the
development of new habits for new situations. Thus Sullivan asks us to “seek out the
reconfiguration of habit and the configurations of gender, sex, and sexuality, that
structure human existence. Only by doing so can we free ourselves of the rigidity and
stagnation of the self that accompany gender binarism.”704 Only in this way would we not
just create new gender roles, but challenge the over-determination of the roles themselves
in fixing identities. That is part of the problem is not merely the content of gender roles,
but the overdetermination and rigidity of them.
Such change is not only possible in one-on-one relationships. Sullivan argues that
“hypothetical construction” can help us facilitate political change. In this text she refers
to radical transformations at the end of the 20th-century regarding the visibility, inclusion,
and protection of gender and sexual minorities. Sullivan cites the increase in employers
offering benefits to same-sex partners and spouses as a clash of rigid habits—the desire to
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attract and retain competitive employees and the normative heterosexism of most
institutions in the U.S. It is precisely this clash that makes transformation possible, just as
the clash between Sullivan and her aggressive colleague opened up the possibility of
embodying new habits. In transaction with a world in which gender and sexual minorities
are demanding full inclusion, the habits of institutions have changed.705
For Sullivan, such a change cannot be affected merely at the individual level: “A
person’s habits are always in transaction with and thus have an impact on the institutions
in which she engaged. The impact of one person, however, many times does not carry
enough force to counter the inertia of cultural custom, and thus, an individual’s impact
often is absorbed within or co-opted by cultural institutions.”706 What is necessary are
coalitions of individuals, operating through “feminist cultural structures.” Thus in
addition to developing flexible habits, Sullivan calls on people of good will to develop
the habit of organizing around the transformation they wish to see in the world:
“Recalling Dewey’s somewhat paradoxical sounding advice that people need to form the
habit of not forming fixed habits, we could say that a person who is concerned about
social and political change needs to cultivate the individual habit of not focusing solely
on her or her own individual habits.”707 It is important to note here that both of these
ethical imperatives demand that persons engage in habits that are mindful of the fact that
human beings are constituted in and through the other.

705

Ibid., 107-8.

706

Ibid., 109

707

Ibid.

234
Habits of Race and Racism
In her second book, Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege,
Shannon Sullivan applies her understanding of transactional bodies to the subject of
white privilege. In doing so she develops the concept of “unconscious habit” by fusing
the thick notion of habit in Dewey’s pragmatism and a psychoanalytic understanding of
the unconscious. We are habitual beings; the interrogation of our complicity in white
privilege cannot merely be an intellectual process. It is not a matter of willpower or
changing one’s thought, but “altering the political, social, physical, economic,
psychological, aesthetic and other environments” that feed our unconscious habits of
racism.708 By referring to these habits as “unconscious” Sullivan is attempting to combat
the way in which structural and interpersonal racism is often perpetuated without
explicitly racist intent and by those who would not self-identify as “racist.” She is also
attempting to redirect anti-racist activity from a focus on the intellect or will—not
thinking white people are better, or not wishing black people harm—but to the ways in
which white privilege is embodied. The former are easy for people of good will to pat
themselves on the back for having accomplished, but Sullivan pushes white people to
engage in deeper reflection about the ways in which their transactional bodying in the
world contributes to white supremacy.
As she argues here, white privilege is not a matter of intent but of bodying:
“White privilege is best understood as a constellation of psychical and somatic habits
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formed through transaction with a racist world.”709 Sullivan mentions a number of
examples throughout the book of what such unconscious psychical and somatic habits
look like, many from her own experience. Growing up in West Texas, she recalls white
people referred to Mexican-Americans, Chicano/as and other Latino/a Americans all as
“Mexican”—when they weren’t using a racial slur.710 As a result, Sullivan herself cannot
use the word without wincing: “As an adult, I have trouble hearing or saying the word
“Mexican” without anxiety because it sounds like a racial slur to me, and I do not seem
able to discard that auditory habit.”711 The problem here is not a lack of education or
good will—Sullivan knows “Mexican” is not a bad word, and she does not actively think
poorly of Mexicans (or those labeled incorrectly as “Mexican”). But the associations she
has with the word are so strong that even to this day she has an intense, embodied,
reaction.
While this may seem a rather small matter, this example is helpful for explaining
not only how these habits have little to do with the will, but the way in which they are
replicated across generations. Sullivan recalls in particular the sound of her grandmother
hissing the word “Mexican” as if it were a slur.712 Her psychosomatic unconscious habits
of repulsion at the word “Mexican” come from somewhere. They are an inheritance. We
are not culpable for the creation of such habits—many of which are initiated in
childhood. But the fact that these habits are embodied does not mean that we are not
responsible for changing them. As Sullivan argues, just as we can hold someone
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responsible for remaining in ignorance, we can hold someone responsible for refusing to
do what is necessary to change these racist habits.713 Unfortunately, habits resist
change.714 Since habits are transactional, such activity has to reflect not only on the way
in which one performs such habits, but also the environments in which they develop.
Without reflecting on both habits and environment, anti-racist activity is doomed to
fail.715
Following Du Bois—particularly his analysis of World War I as emerging from a
belief in “the duty of white Europe to divide up the darker world and administer it for
Europe’s good,”716—Sullivan identifies the unconscious habits of white privilege as
rooted in “ownership of the earth:”
Unconscious habits of white privilege manifest an “appropriate” relationship to
the earth, including the people and things that are part of it. The appropriate
relationship is one of appropriation: taking land, people, and the fruit of others’
labor and creativity as one’s own. Failure to embody this proper relationship with
the world marks one as a subperson, as a quasi-thing that is then legitimately
available for, even in need of, appropriation by full persons. Somewhat ironically,
an inappropriate relationship to the earth renders one indistinguishable from it as a
natural resource waiting to be put to proper use.717
In other words, whiteness is the practice of dominion that only acknowledges the
humanity of those also exploiting the earth and its people.
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Such habits of white privilege emerge for instance when white people co-opt the
cultures of others;718 when gentrification offers safe spaces for white people to enjoy the
credibility and exoticism of poor black neighborhoods without any solidarity against the
structural injustices that plague such neighborhoods;719 and when white people refuse to
acknowledge race and racism, as if recent limited civil rights gains ought to be enough.720
These are not individual activities undertaken by isolated ignorant individuals; rather,
they emerge from a posture of ownership that constitutes a highly stable consolidation of
habits capable of replicating itself in institutions and across generations. These racist
appropriations are whiteness.
Viewing whiteness this way neither limits race to a historical accident nor appeals
to an understanding of “fixed racial essences.”721 As Sullivan argues,
Racial categories are historically, socially, economically, and psychologically
constructed—and are nonetheless real for being so…The being of white people
qua white, for example, often is malicious, possessive, and destructive. These
characteristics are fundamental to what it is today to be white, although this fact
of the white world need not always be the case in the future.722
Because the unconscious habits of white privilege involve dominion over the earth and
people of color, Sullivan calls for those who exercise white privilege to recognize that
there are spaces that are not theirs, that they do not deserve access to the culture, history,
and land of other people. This does not necessarily mean that a white person ought to
retreat into an all-white enclave—rather, white folk need to adopt habits of listening to
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the other. In short, if the future of whiteness is not going to be racist, Sullivan argues that
it must leave its colonial spirit behind and wait for welcome, knowing that it might not
come.723
The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression
In her 2015 The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression, Sullivan emphasizes the
physiology of habits developed in transaction with and sexist and racist world. What she
means by “physiological” does not reduce to the physicality of the body isolated from the
world in which it transacts. Rather, she is pointing to activities like blushing, which are
simultaneously “governed by the autonomic (sympathetic) nervous system” and yet are
intersubjective. A blush, while not a product of the will, is a product of a given
relationship to the world—in what one is embarrassed by and whom they are
embarrassed in front of. Sullivan writes, “Blushing is a physiological habit, a way of
transacting with the world that illustrates how other beings are entangled in the
psychosomatic functioning of a person’s body.”724 So while Sullivan is focusing
particularly on human physiology, it is not in such a way that views it in isolation from
the world in which it transacts.
Sullivan’s thesis in this book is that our bodies are in a real way constituted by
sexism and racism, and such constitution can be seen in the operation of our physiology:
By “constitution” I intend a dynamic, transactional relationship between the social
and the biological in which the two are inextricable…The physiological effects of
racism and sexism are different for members of dominant and subordinate groups.
723
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The effects of racism are not the same for white people and people of color, for
example. But both groups are affected physiologically by social-political practices
of white domination. In a racist and sexist world, racism and sexism get inside the
physiological bodies of all of us in some fashion or other, no matter what our
gender or race.725
To support such a claim, Sullivan provides an account of the body “whose unconscious
habits are biological. They are located in the physiological materiality of not only (or
perhaps even primarily) the brain, but in the hips, pelvic floor, stomach, heart, and other
bodily tissues and organs.”726
As she develops this thesis, Sullivan extends William James’ claim that emotions
are not mental states but bodily reactions, which can explain in turn why certain forms of
bodying, like a yoga posture, can “unlock” emotional responses to childhood traumas;727
that trauma manifests in the gut, as women who have suffered sexual abuse have an
increase in Irritable Bowel Syndrome and Crohn’s disease—and can even pass that
physiological response to trauma to their children;728 and that racial disparities manifest
in health disparities.729 Social location is not merely a description of our world or our
interaction in it, but is constitutive of the very minerals in our bones, tightness of our
muscles, and the state of our cardiac and digestive health: “The effects of sexism and
racism can go all the way down to the bone, as the saying goes, and also down to the
tissues, hormones, and genetic markers that constitute human beings. The effect of
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sexism and racism are not only social, political, and economic, but also physiological—
which is to say psychological, affective, and often emotional.”730
A turn to the body demonstrates that oppression does not just occur in the space
between the individual and the political, it shapes the very constitution of human bodies.
In such a way, race and gender are real biological identities, insofar as the raced and
gendered habits of transactional bodying affect the very physiology of bodies.731 This
diagnosis of the extent of the effect of racist and sexist oppression entails that
overcoming racism and sexism must also involve attention to the body, and vice versa:
…the primary root cause [of higher incidences of cardiac problems among black
people] is white people’s institutional and (inter)personal habits of racial
supremacy and privilege. Likewise, the root cause of many women’s
gastrointestinal health problems is not a malfunctioning gut or pelvic floor
considered in an isolated fashion. It is a sexist and male-privileged world that
generally licenses the domination and abuse of women, girls, and other feminized
people.732
We must recognize that oppression affects the operations of people’s bodies, and we
cannot effect change in health without recognizing that such disparities are caused by
structural injustice. Similarly, in addressing white supremacy and white privilege, white
people must under go “psychosomatic soul work”—changing the gut reactions that lead
them to, for example, fear black bodies.733 Sullivan thus calls for anti-racist and antisexist work to transform institutions and engage in body work—yoga, dance therapy, or
other forms of psychosomatic therapy—to combat the effects of racism and sexism
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against individual bodies.734 In fact, each of these activities ought to affect the other
positively, so that habits of racist and sexist bodying can be transformed.
Conclusion: The Body as Transactional
Shannon Sullivan’s work provides a framework for thinking about the cultural
construction of the body without falling into a number of paradoxes that have plagued
feminist political thought. Her theory of transactional bodying allows us to talk about the
way in which subjects are formed by their social worlds and also capable of resisting
them; how human freedom and agency operate in and through the structures of social
mores; and how material bodies can be discursively constructed. Most importantly, it
does so without depending on dualistic understandings of the self. Thus Sullivan is able
to appropriate Michel Foucault’s statement that “the body is culturally constructed"
without falling into the trap Butler identifies of thinking of construction as a form of
imprinting on a blank slate, or of the torture instrument in Kafka’s Penal Colony. In
addition, understanding the human person in terms of “transactional bodying” highlights
the role of the body in moral formation. Anti-racist and anti-sexist activism demands
attention to the ways in which oppression affects actual concrete bodies; in turn, white
and male privilege must be recognized as forms of transactional bodying that require
more than conversions of the will or intellect to eradicate.
As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, debates about the production of
subjectivity within feminist political thought parallel those around how Rahner’s spirit is
in-world—particularly how one’s transcendental affirmation of God, self, and world is
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“still an interplay with everything that is not free, not spiritual, and so on.”735 Thus
Shannon Sullivan’s understanding of transactional bodying is not merely useful for
carrying feminist political philosophy forward, but for thinking theologically about the
human being as spirit-in-world. In the following chapter, we turn to analysis of Rahner’s
theological anthropology in terms of transactional bodying.
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Chapter 5:
Returning to the Subject as Spirit-in-World
Rahner’s understanding of the subject as spirit-in-world who is always and already in an
unthematic relationship to God has been criticized from all sides—as relinquishing the
need for Christian witness, failing to challenge the subject to be responsible for the
suffering of the other, and offering little hope for those who are traumatized. As I argued
in Chapter One, this criticism ultimately focuses on whether or not Rahner successfully
theorizes about how the subject is embodied in-world. In Chapter Two we saw that
Rahner’s early work is motivated by the insight that mystical experience is not reserved
for the few. It is in working out how grace operates in the lives of ordinary people that
Rahner writes Geist in Welt, his treatise expositing Thomas’ declaration that all
knowledge is rooted in sensory experience. Thus Rahner’s philosophical tome is
grounded by a concern to show how the knowledge of God is embodied. How are we as
embodied spirits able to know the unbound God? Rahner’s answer in Geist in Welt is that
the human spirit is actualized in and through the other and thus fundamentally oriented to
to God. While in Geist in Welt Rahner emphasizes the other of materiality—spirit
actualized in time and space—his later work develops an understanding of spirit
actualized in the social world. Thus Carmichael Peters and Bryan Massingale find it a
helpful way to analyze black rage as an exercise of freedom in a hostile, white
supremacist world. While such work demonstrates the utility of carrying Rahner’s
understanding of the subject forward, it also exposes a critical place where his work
needs to be developed: the precise way in which one’s transcendental and categorical
freedom relate.
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The challenge is to maintain Rahner’s insight that one’s freedom and one’s (albeit
unthematic) relationship to God are inviolable—this is, after all, what it means to Rahner
to be spirit—while also following Rahner in his understanding that the transcendental is
always embodied in the categorical. Balthasar and Metz have each read Rahner as if the
actualization of spirit in matter is of secondary importance: for Balthasar the demands of
Christian witness are relegated to merely the expression of one’s permanent faith, which
is now itself contentless; for Metz the security of the always and already relationship with
God prevents us from prioritizing the catastrophes that the other has been subject to.
What each of these thinkers neglect is the union of spirit and matter in Rahner’s work, so
that there is no transcendental apart from the categorical. The world of space and time is
the real world in which salvation occurs. Meanwhile Beste has pushed Rahner in the
opposite direction. In taking his word seriously that the transcendental does not exist
apart from the categorical, she has understood him as saying that a visible categorical
“no” to the world—for instance, from those who on account of trauma disorders do not
love the finite objects that could open them up to the greater mystery of God—is
necessarily a transcendental “no” as well.
As we saw in Chapter Four, this difficulty in speaking about the way in which
freedom is embodied is not unique to Rahnerian, or even theological discourse. A similar
paradox is central to contemporary feminist political discourses on the nature of the
subject. Judith Butler’s work demonstrates a concern to maintain an understanding of
moral responsibility in the face of Foucault’s insight that the body is culturally
constructed. She argues that it is precisely because we cannot fully give an account of
ourselves that we are ethically responsible to one another. Shannon Sullivan offers a way
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of thinking about the subject as both produced by and resistant to socialization, without
appealing to a false notion of some inner, essential self. As I will argue in this chapter,
both Butler and Sullivan offer ways of pushing Rahner’s work forward in talking about
embodiment in general, and in the formation of Christian identity.
Spirit-in-World as Transactional Bodying
What does it look like to interpret Rahner’s spirit-in-world through the lens of Judith
Butler’s materiality and Shannon Sullivan’s transactional bodying? What new ways of
envisioning the embodiment of spirit—and more particularly the relationship between the
transcendental and the categorical—do these theories provide? How does this help us
understand and/or modify Rahner’s understanding of spirit-in-world? And vice versa?
The Self as Constituted by the Other
As I argued in Chapters Two and Three, one of Rahner’s fundamental anthropological
claims is that the human being is constituted in and through the other. This is the most
simple definition of his identification of human being as spirit-in-world. As compared to
other kinds of beings—for example angels, who Rahner identities as pure spirit—human
beings actualize themselves in space and over time.
For Rahner, this understanding of human being helps resolve a number of
philosophical and theological problems. The fact that human beings are not self-enclosed
is the condition for the possibility of knowledge of the other. More importantly for
Rahner, this openness to otherness is the foundation of the possibility of knowledge of
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the Other, God. Thus, in Rahner’s anthropology, the materiality of human bodies does
not inhibit our knowledge of God but makes it possible.
As we saw in Chapter One, much of the criticism directed at Rahner hinges on
how we interpret this relationship between God, self, and world. For Balthasar, it reduces
the world to the material of self-actualization and relativizes the revelation of God in
Christ. For Metz it shores up one’s relationship with God against the world and against
the recognition of those in the world who are fighting for their subjectivity. For Beste, it
collapses God onto world so our categorical capacities—to love, trust, discern, each of
which are vulnerable to interpersonal harm—become determinate of our relationship to
God. Each of these interpretations alleges that Rahner has failed to develop a theological
anthropology that is truly open to alterity: the alterity of God, the alterity of others, and
the alterity of self.
That each of these figures sees Rahner’s thought as collapsing in on itself in
different ways highlights the difficulty in interpreting his work and—as I have argued in
this dissertation—an underlying ambiguity in how he speaks about the subject as
embodied. In an interview with Paul Imhof late in his life, Rahner concedes that he has
not always adequately theorized about the relationship between the transcendental and
the historical, particularly when attempting to apply it to more concrete situations.736 In
Chapter Three, we saw that Rahner’s theology comes to a critical impasse in speaking
about the subject as constituted by an inviolable freedom and vulnerable to external
forces. As I argue in this chapter, Judith Butler and Shannon Sullivan offer a way of
thinking about these two aspects of human nature without contradiction.
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Part of Rahner’s difficulty in maintaining his thesis that the subject is constituted
by the other is that occasionally his language about the relationship between the
transcendental and the categorical implies an opposition between them. Between the
foundational claim that the self is constituted by the other, and his ultimate argument that
freedom and dependence increase in direct proportion, Rahner occasionally talks about
transcendental freedom as if it is trapped or delimited by one’s bodily freedom.
Remember his hope for persons to integrate mental illness into their “yes” to God. Such a
practice only makes sense if we posit an inner self, untouched by illness, who can look
upon herself as afflicted. But there is, even according to Rahner in the rest of his writings,
no such self. It would be more consistent within his work to say instead that integrating
mental illness into one’s life is merely one visible—perhaps privileged—way in which a
transcendental “yes” can be made.
Ultimately, while Rahner is quick to maintain that there is no self prior to the
encounter of the other, he is better at describing this at the more fundamental level—
spirit’s pouring itself into matter, for example—than in the way that one navigates one’s
transcendental freedom within the network of interdependence within which one lives.
Rather, his writing best accomplishes a call for humility and patience in discerning the
exercise of human freedom. What is necessary is a way to carry these insights forwards
into the messiness of concrete lives, without resorting to a false understanding of the self.
As Butler diagnoses in an analogous debate in feminist political theory, part of the
problem that plagues discussions of agency and subjectivity is reliance on metaphors of
interiority. If we disabuse ourselves of the notion that there is any self apart from social
and political structures, and therefore of an “inner” or “essential” self, then we are in a
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better position to understand Rahner’s statements about freedom. What is it then that
constitutes “spirit” if there is no self under, in, or behind my materiality? Thinking about
Rahner in light of Butler and Sullivan reminds us that spirit, for Rahner, is not some inner
spark or inner mind. It is transcendence—or to avoid the confusion that comes from using
substantives, spirit is transcending.737 Such spirit is present whenever human persons see
beyond the limits of their present situation: when they imagine a different world is
possible, when they sympathize with another, when they strive to become a better
person.738
For Rahner, this spirit is inviolable. And yet, in what appears to be a
contradiction, spirit can only accomplish itself in and through the material world, in such
a way that “There is no ‘inwardness’ which does not also stand open, as it were, to what
is without.”739 One way to understand how both of these things can be true is to think
about how they are (at least in analogous ways) both maintained by Butler and Sullivan.
Butler’s argument in Giving an Account of Oneself is particularly helpful here. As
she writes, giving an account of oneself requires an attention to the various forces that
have shaped who one has become. But this leads to two difficult insights: first, that we
737
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are not ourselves. Our origin stories are located before and beyond us. Second, we cannot
even fully theorize about the way in which we are shaped by outside forces. In other
words, in seeking to give an account of myself, I encounter myself not only as one who
has been formed from without, but even this formation is not transparent to me. I
ultimately cannot give an account of myself.
As Rahner argues, one cannot speak authoritatively about the motivations of an
action—whether they were in freedom in such a way as to be a meaningful decision not
only of finite goods but also of the infinite Good, or whether they were constrained.
Butler helps us see why, for Rahner, this is not the end of theological reflection on the
person but the beginning. As she argues, it is precisely because I cannot have that
knowledge about myself or about others that ought to direct me to act with sympathy and
solidarity. Humility about our ability to theorize precisely about the exercise of
theological freedom does not mean refraining from ethical judgment. Rather it calls for it.
I must forgive as if the other is not free; I must also recognize myself as having the power
to affect others for ill.
As Butler argues, and Sullivan develops, constitution by the other is not limited to
what psychoanalysis can tell us about infant development. The practices of our daily lives
are socially and historically mediated. Even my mundane habits bear the mark of a
particular social location. They are learned citations of codes and mores that exist before
and apart from me.
As we saw in Chapter Four, that we are constituted in such a way does not
threaten our ability to uphold human agency—since an understanding of agency as
freedom from such constitution is a false ideal. Recall Sullivan’s discussion of the habits
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of talking, walking, and driving. Each of these habits consolidates years of practice and
learned muscle movements into smooth and automatic motion. In doing so they enable
one to move and communicate according to one’s will. That these are learned habits
passed on through communities and developed in transaction with the particularities of
the physical environment in which one lives do not detract from the freedom of the one
engaging in them. Rather each of these habits of body enable a certain activity. The
exercise of human agency is only possible in and through habits developed in transaction
with the world.
As Sullivan briefly suggests at the end of The Physiology of Sexist and Racist
Oppression, her understanding of transactional bodying does not preclude discussion of
transcendence. In fact, she argues that, “the remarkable level of its biopsychosocial
capabilities means that the body could be considered a site of transcendence. Rather than
flatten or eliminate the transcendental and spiritual aspects of human life, an account of
emotional and affective habits as thoroughly physiological can refresh our sense of what
the transcendental and the spiritual might mean.”740 Employing Victor Kestenbaum’s
work on transcendence in Dewey’s thought, Sullivan proposes an understanding of
transcendence rooted in human habits rather than “something supernatural or formally
religious.”741 Kestenbaum offers the metaphor of the horizon, in which transcendence is
“the source of what comes into view and…the limiting condition of what is viewable,
that is, of what transcends my view.”742 As Sullivan explains:
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A person’s “view” involves much more than what she can literally see. It is that of
which she is consciously aware, conditioned by an immeasurable number of
things of which she is not. Our physiological habits are part of that horizon, one
of primary sources and limiting conditions of what transcends conscious life. In
and through her physiological, affective life, a person transcends him- or herself.
There is always more to his or her life, “an existing beyond” as William James
poetically put, and that “more” can be found in the physiological functions and
character of the body. Far from being reductive, physiological habits can be a site
of transcendence that is thoroughly engaged with one’s social and political
environments. This is why they also can be an important site of social and
political change.743
Speaking of the human being in terms of her habitual transaction with her environment
does not deny the possibility of transcendence. In fact, we might add to what Sullivan
writes here and say that it is the condition of it. It is precisely because the human being is
always in relationship with something other than herself that allows her to transcend
herself. As demonstrated in her own work, habitual beings are capable of imagining and
enacting new ways of transacting with the world.
More so, these are not simply activities that I do; ultimately these activities are
who I am. Recall that for Rahner being spirit-in-world means that the self accomplishes
itself in and through the other. There is no self apart from such accomplishment.
Likewise for Butler, there is no self underneath one’s performance. In Sullivan’s
framework, the self is precisely our habits of bodying. Sullivan’s troubling of grammar
helps to highlight the need to rethink our language of the self. It reminds us that we
cannot interpret Rahner’s theological anthropology in such a way that would violate his
fundamental anthropological insight that spirit is actualized in and through the other. By
speaking of transcendence as located in the body’s transaction with the world, we avoid
dualistic interpretations of spirit-in-world.
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Of course, unlike Sullivan and Kestenbaum, I am seeking to talk about
transcendence specifically in a “supernatural or formally religious way.” The critical
distinction between my and Sullivan’s understanding of the body’s transcendence is that I
agree with Rahner that the world we live in is precisely already the supernatural one.
Rather than thinking of the supernatural as some miraculous intervention into the
everyday, I follow Rahner in recognizing that in Christ God has already made the
everyday miraculous. Thus while my motivations are most likely at odds with Sullivan’s
in seeking a non-dualistic account of the self, her understanding of the body is not
inimicable to a theological anthropology. As I argue in this chapter, if we translate
Rahner’s fundamental anthropological claims into language of transactional bodying, we
are in a better place to talk about the exercise of transcendental freedom in our daily
lives. In what follows I argue that such a translation is helpful in understanding
traditional theological themes in Rahner’s work with respect to the acknowledgment that
human beings accomplish themselves in space and over time.
Spirituality as Historically Mediated
As I argued in Chapter Two, Rahner’s motivation for developing such a metaphysics of
knowledge is to explain and justify the Ignatian insight that knowledge and love of God
is not reserved to the spiritually elite. The Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge in Geist
in Welt is in service to an understanding that all can know and love God. It is a
metaphysics of knowledge that makes possible an everyday mysticism. Rahner wishes to
support the claim that the experience of God is offered to all—and, further, that it is
constitutive of one’s identity.
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In his 1937 “The Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in the World,” Rahner places his
argument in Geist in Welt in the overall context of an Ignatian theology, where he lifts up
the Exercises as a way of attending to God’s word in the world.744 According to Rahner,
this kind of practice allows the subject to make thematic her own immediate experience
of God and, in doing so, understand the specific moral imperatives within her own life.
As Rahner himself argued, one’s duty to God demands particular activity in certain times
and places. In one of his only statements about the holocaust, Rahner himself highlights
the insufficiency of a universal ethic in a time of crises:
Think back to the time of the Third Reich. I think there were relatively few priests
whom you can really prove to have clearly transgressed moral principles in their
dealings with the ideology prevailing at the time, with the persecuted Jews, etc.
But can you then say with equal clarity that we all always really did the right
thing (and I don’t except myself here)? That much is certainly not clear to me.745
A particular context brings with its own demands, and an event like the rise of the Third
Reich brings with it a call to a radical witness. Only in careful attention to the world can
we understand the moral imperatives placed upon us.
But, as Endean notes, in offering practical advice for Ignatian discernment,
Rahner’s theology falters: “Rahner is not precise about the sense in which our experience
of God yields certitude, and he does not clarify the relationship between our ongoing
experience and the traditions we inherit.”746 He is unable to speak with certitude about
the way in which one’s reflection on one’s transcendental relationship with God is itself
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mediated in and through the categorical.747 How, exactly, does God speak to us in these
particular contexts? And how do we listen to that speech? Rahner’s commitment that
such a relationship with God will look different in different times and places—indeed
demand different things of us at different times and places—makes such a process of
discernment all the more important.
If spirit is in-world, then any spiritual discernment must engage in a twofold task:
recognize the moral imperatives of one’s particular context, and discern how one’s own
subjectivity is the product of a process of construction that takes place in that context.
What are the crises of this generation and in what way am I called to meet them? How am
I blinded to situations of injustice by being a product of my social world and what can I
do from where I stand? In other words, one must give an account of oneself and of the
world in order to discern how to live in it.
Precisely because the transcendental is mediated in the categorical—precisely
because we are spirits-in-world—spirituality must be governed by an attention to the
political structures of one’s time and to the production of subjects under them. Just as
Butler argues, we cannot give an account of ourselves without attending to the social and
moral norms that have constructed us. Likewise, any account of our relationship with
God must attend to the construction of our identities. If my relationship with God is
mediated in and through my relationship with self and world, and therefore through my
own identity, then a life of Christian discipleship demands that I interrogate the origin of
my habitual bodying. Sullivan invites us to think more concretely about the ways in
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which these habits have developed in transaction with the world, and the ways in which
we can go about effecting their change.
The process of decolonization that Carmichael Peters and Bryan Massingale refer
to in their discussion of black rage is precisely this form of self-interrogation. Recall that
Peters argued that rage is ambiguous in itself, and can be a legitimate response to a
hostile world. Black rage can therefore be seen as an exercise of transcendental freedom
under the constraints of a white supremacist world. Massingale argued that in such a
situation rage is not merely legitimate but actually a mediation of grace, in which one
affirms one’s own dignity and protests a system that harms the dignity of others and is
idolatrous. Thus rage is actually incumbent on persons as a moral duty. To the extent that
rage can be unproductive and negative, we must focus our diagnoses of the problem on
white supremacy itself, not in the failures of those who resist it.
For the most part Peters and Massingale are dealing with black rage as a public
phenomenon, but their analysis has great implications for understanding spirituality.
Their work highlights the way in which even our most seemingly primal emotions—like
rage—are constituted by broader social and cultural norms. In turn, growing in
recognition of the mystery of God, and therefore the mystery of humanity, will involve
not only combatting white supremacy at the structural level, but in resisting the way in
which one has been socialized under it. Thus spiritual discernment, insofar as it involves
interpreting one’s own mood and the moral imperatives incumbent upon one’s life,
requires political and social analysis.
Butler and Sullivan helps us think generally about the “materiality” of the self—
that is, of the accomplishment of the subjectivity of the spirit-in-world in and through the
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other. Rahner’s anthropology directs our attention to this other as both the world we live
in but also as constitutive of our identities. Speaking of the construction of identities
within systems of power is therefore a natural byproduct of thinking seriously about
Rahner’s theology. In turn, Rahner’s theology situates the discussion of identity
construction within the broader relationship of subject, world, and God. This offers love
of God as a norm that governs one’s relationship to both self and others. It also, as Bryan
Massingale has argued, recognizes political resistance as a mediation of God’s grace.
Habit and Concupiscence
As we saw in Chapter Two, embodiment for Rahner entails that human being is marked
by concupiscence, which creates a certain distance between freedom and its exercise. Our
self-disposal is never complete. According to Rahner the origin of concupiscence is in the
spontaneity of one’s own desires, which precede any rational and intentional act of the
will. This is further compounded by the fact that we actualize ourselves over time.
Understanding concupiscence in light of transactional bodying allows us to greater
understand its operation in the Christian life.
First, thinking of concupiscence in terms of habit allows us to focus on the way in
which concupiscence is social. While this is technically true in Rahner’s theology, it is
not in the foreground. Much of his writing about concupiscence is restricted to the
difficulties matter poses to self-actualization. When he highlights the social character of
concupiscence it is to point out the fact that humans are bound to one another in such a
way that they share a human nature. This nature is what makes redemption through Christ
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possible, since it is the way in which his humanity relates to ours. There is little attention
given to the way in which a given social world shapes one’s concupiscence.
Sullivan’s theory of transaction allows us to understand how even our
spontaneous desires are themselves products of the social world we live in. As she
argues, habits of bodying are received. By the time I am conscious I have already
developed habits in transaction with the world in which I live. If such a world is sexist
and white supremacist, then these values have likely replicated themselves in my habits
of bodying. I may consciously reject the ethics and social mores of a previous age while
reproducing them in my daily life. A given social world will reproduce different habits.
So then, while concupiscence may affect us all, in offering resistance to our selfactualization, the shape of our concupiscence will be affected by the world in which we
are formed.
Correspondingly, a sin like white supremacy reproduces itself differently based
on the identity of the individual. Shannon Sullivan’s description of a white person’s
attempts to change her racist habits or W. E. B. Dubois’ description of the decolonization
of the self each represent resistance to white supremacy. This is not to suggest that these
activities are parallel morally. White people, as the benefactors of white supremacy, bear
the guilt of its reproduction.
Second, this understanding of the way in which structural injustice can be
replicated unthinkingly allows us to better understand the way in which sin can be
transmitted. The doctrine of original sin can appear paradoxical—as if human beings are
in some way responsible for sins they did not commit, or cannot help but commit.
Transaction allows us to understand how sin is passed down from generation to
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generation as a result of the interdependence of all human beings, and how it is that I may
be responsible for something I have never intentionally willed. While I did not seek out
habits of white supremacy, for example, I am responsible for changing them. In a similar
way each of us is thrown into a world, mired by sin, in which we are somehow
implicated.
This brings us to our third point. Thinking of concupiscence in terms of
transactional bodying highlights the way in which moral responsibility is not limited to
conscious and intentional activity. If I am aware of the way in which sins like racism and
sexism shape my world, the work of redemption is not finished when I have intellectually
renounced these worldviews. I still have to take up the material of my life and shape it
according to the intellectual conversion I have had. I have to interrogate my habits and, in
attempting to change them, I will encounter difficulty and resistance.
Fourth, transactional bodying more clearly protects against the idea that the
relationship between freedom and concupiscence maps onto that of the soul and the
body—or, more precisely in Rahner’s language, spirit and matter. As Rahner states, in
concupiscence “the whole ‘nature’ given prior to freedom offers resistance to the
‘person’s’ free and total disposition of himself, so that the boundary between ‘person’
and ‘nature’ stands as it were vertically in regard to the horizontal line which divides
spirituality from sensibility in man.”748 In other words, concupiscence is not the
resistance spirit encounters in matter; it is the resistance the unified spirit-in-world
encounters in effecting self-disposal. This distinction is important in countering any
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pernicious understanding that specifically links the body, as opposed to the soul or mind,
with sin. One’s “yes” to God is not made despite, but through embodiment.
Hope and Redemption in the Body of Christ
Redemption is therefore not a matter of flight from the body. Redemption is corporal. In
speaking of redemption in Christ, Rahner argues, “it took place, and could only take
place, in this entirely concrete, bloody reality, given over to death. The place where this
love and obedience are to be found is therefore this bodily existence, if love and
obedience are what they are intended to be—i.e. redemptive.”749 Christ actualizes his
“yes” to both God and us in the material of the world. His love and obedience become
redemptive in “concrete, bloody reality.” Likewise our love and obedience to God must
be materialized in “this bodily existence.” The theory of transactional bodying helps us
understand just how this materialization happens.
First, transactional bodying helps us attend more specifically to the development
of moral subjects as agents in a world in which they are also passively vulnerable to
outside influence. As I argued in Chapter Three, Rahner’s theology does not provide an
adequate understanding of how it is that subjects can offer resistance against the very
environments in which they are formed. Butler’s work points to the failure of discourses
to replicate themselves, as the very power of the law is the creation of the separation
between those inside and outside it. As such, it funds its own subversion. We do not need
to imagine an aspect of the human person as inviolable to external influence in order to
see how spirit operates in-world to resist and transcend hostile regimes. As Sullivan
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demonstrates, habits also collide in productive ways: she can gain perspective on her
southern femininity vis-à-vis forms of academic socialization and vice versa. Thus we
can maintain two of Rahner’s fundamental anthropological premises: that human being is
spirit—always striving, always transcending—and yet is constituted in and through the
other in such a way that no part of the human person is impermeable.
Meanwhile, Rahner’s theology places the analysis of the self that Butler and
Sullivan perform within a broader context of orientation to the divine. While Butler has
difficulty naming the foundation of her ethical system—the largest piece of which is the
inclusion of those who are considered abjects—Rahner’s theological anthropology places
such work in the context of relationship with God. If human beings are oriented to the
mystery of God in Christ, if God has assumed humanity into God’s own life, I contradict
my own very humanity by failing to recognize it in others.
Second, thinking of redemption in terms of transactional bodying highlights the
role of habit in the life of discipleship. Recall from our discussion of concupiscence in
Chapter Three that growth in Christian discipleship and the grace of God entails
mastering (though never completely) one’s concupiscence. Over time, one develops the
integrity that allows one to dispose of oneself more fully. This is not a matter of the spirit
conquering the body, but of the unified spirit-in-world who, by the grace of God, is able
to make one’s life a “yes” to God. Integrity is not the removal of the desires of the will,
but the ability to take them up as the material of one’s freedom.
The theory of transactional bodying helps us see why it is that our redemption
must occur this way. Without impulses and desires, and their consolidation into habits,
our bodying would be meaningless. As Sullivan argues, these elements of human
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existence do not threaten or constrain freedom, they are the condition of its possibility.
Further, when we recognize in ourself desires or habits that we would prefer to change,
the solution is not to flee from desire or habit as such, but to cultivate new habits and
desires. Though we may phenomenologically experience them as inimical to our
salvation—crying out like Paul that “I do not understand my actions. For I do not do what
I want, but I do the very thing I hate” (Romans 7:15 NRSV)—our habits and desires are
also the material of our salvation. Conversions of the heart and mind toward greater love
of the mystery of God and the mystery of humanity must be actualized in the quotidian
habits of one’s life. In other words, conversion must be a matter of the entire person,
made real in her bodying.
This understanding of embodiment brings into focus the role of Christian practice
in shaping the life of discipleship. Recall that against the idea of Christianity being a
religion of the soul, Rahner states quite strongly that, “Christianity is continually
concerned with the body. It is a bodily, concrete, shaping, speaking, acting, organised,
ecclesiastical, sacramental religion, a religion which concerns itself in its dogmas with
concrete things, and expresses something through these dogmas.”750 Regular and
ritualized activities performed alongside a community—and to be clear, I include in this
category aspects of cultic practice as well as political activism—are effective forms of
reshaping one’s most consolidated habits of bodying and even—according to both
Sullivan and Rahner—one’s desires. In turn, placing Sullivan’s call for anti-racist and
anti-sexist habits of bodying within Rahner’s broader theological anthropology offers
greater resources to support such work: wisdom traditions that recognize the difficulty of
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the good life and the need for constant vigilance; comfort that there are others who travel
along the way; rituals (like reconciliation) that highlight the importance of moral
development and the inevitability of failing that standard; communities that practice,
support, and hold one another accountable; and hope that the evil suffered on earth is not
the end. Together, these two discourses offer a way of thinking about Christian identity in
st

the 21 -century that concentrates our ethical activity on the concrete demands of a life of
discipleship—including social analysis of the conditions of human flourishing.
Third, redemption is therefore not only corporal but corporate. We develop habits
in transaction, and thus they are best supported in communities and environments which
encourage them. Both Butler and Sullivan helps us flesh out what it means to speak about
the exercise of human agency while maintaining that human beings are constituted in
their relationships to others. A world in which all human subjects are capable of
accomplishing their “yes” to God is not a world in which subjects are no longer mired in
networks of interdependence. It is rather one in which such interdependence supports and
sustains the kinds of practices and habits that allow human beings to act with integrity.
In Chapter Three we saw that human persons, embodied as they are in and
through the other, are bound up in a common story of sin and redemption. The very
materiality that makes us vulnerable to harm, connects us to one another and—through
the incarnation—to God. Human beings are not self-enclosed, but are instead open
systems. While he admits that he is exaggerating, Rahner even says that, “we are all
living in one and the same body—the world.”751 Thus it is not merely that my individual
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relationship to God is lived out in and through my relationship to others; there is a real
way in which salvation is worked out collectively.
In writing about human finitude, Rahner points out that it is only at the level of
humanity as a whole that we can talk about the realization of human potential. Rahner
argues that speech about human nature is “a referring to a multitude of human beings, to
a humanity which, only as a whole, can really make manifest that which is essentially
given to each of us single persons deep down in our possibilities, but only as possibilities.
We are actually human only in a humanity.”752 We can therefore say that human beings
effect their “yes” to God in relationship to one another, and it is only fully effected as a
collective “yes.”
This means that other persons are not merely the material of my self-realization.
We truly need one another for redemption to be possible. In his direction of the Spiritual
Exercises Rahner argues all human beings—including Christ—accomplish themselves in
relationship with those who are other:
If human persons are to find their own existence, they need those who are human
with them genuinely to be other, to be different, i.e. precisely not clones
(Doppelgänger). Human beings find their own perfection only in the otherness of
those who are human with them, an otherness acknowledged, affirmed and
sheerly loved. This applies also to Christ, indeed especially so. We must say also
of him: through the Word made human loving human beings as others and
because they are others, he too attains the fullness of his nature.753
As Phillip Endean comments on this passage, “Through our responses to him, individual
and inalienable as they are, Christ can realize unique and unrepeatable potentials in his
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own existence.”754 It is precisely in the sum of human existence that a true “yes” to God
is possible. As Tiina K. Allik summarizes Rahner’s conception of the human person,
“Because of their materiality and interdependence with the world, human persons can
never be totally autonomous, self-integrated, or self-aware agents. This is not a condition
that needs to be overcome, but is rather a part of the goodness of God’s creation.” 755
The Praxis of Christian Identity
In Chapter One we examined three critiques of Rahner’s theological anthropology, that of
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Johannes Baptist Metz, and Jennifer Beste. These criticisms
demonstrate where Rahner’s transcendental account of the subject is potentially
problematic. But these criticisms also point us to the adequacy conditions of an
understanding of Christian identity. First, it must call Christians to a rigorous form of
discipleship. Christian hope and consolation must not merely pacify, but encourage and
embolden those who face their own Ernstfall. Second, such discipleship must live “in
memorium Christi,” motivating Christians to solidarity and accountability in the face of
the other. It must respond to those who struggle for their own subjectivity and remember
those who suffer. Third, it cannot collapse Christian identity into understandings of
agency and autonomy impossible for those suffering from severe interpersonal harm. If
the second condition calls Christians to be in solidarity for those fighting for political
autonomy, the third calls for solidarity with those who lack the integration of self
necessary to exercise such autonomy. In this section I wish to return to these criticisms,
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in order to show how reading Rahner’s spirit-in-world as transactional bodying can
satisfy these adequacy conditions.
Rahner and Balthasar
In The Moment of Christian Witness, Hans Urs von Balthasar critiques Rahner’s
understanding of the anonymous Christian because it attempts to free the subject from the
demands of Christian vocation: a life lived in gratitude toward God, a willingness to take
up one’s cross, and ultimately to die for one’s faith.756 For Balthasar, this failure is an
inevitable result of Rahner’s argument in Geist in Welt, which he alleges reduces the
world to the material of self-actualization rather than the place of divine revelation.757
Because Rahner’s answer to the question of “how, according to Thomas, human knowing
can be spirit in the world,”758 lies in the metaphysics of knowledge—and therefore the
constitution of the subject, rather than the objective ability for the material world to be
the site of divine—Balthasar is worried that Rahner’s philosophical foundation either
precludes or relativizes the revelation of the Christ event. Once Christ is only one of
many possibilities of revelation, Balthasar argues that the demands of martyrdom, and of
Christian discipleship in general, are undercut.
I do not wish to offer an apologia of Rahner’s theology, however. As I argued in
Chapter One, I find more compelling Karen Kilby’s and Phillip Endean’s suggestions
that we look at the clash between Balthasar and Rahner as a way of seeing the potential
dangers in carrying Rahner’s theology forward. Doing so not only recognizes Balthasar’s
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own statement about the real target of his criticism,759 but is more productive in thinking
about the future of Rahnerian theology.
In addition, while I ultimately do not think Balthasar’s critique of Rahner’s
understanding of revelation or soteriology is based on anything but caricature, this does
not mean that Rahner is at all times successful in supporting the radical demands of
Christian discipleship that Balthasar rightly calls for. While I have argued in this
dissertation that Rahner’s larger theological frame is Ignatian, and therefore even his
happiest theology must be read within a context of renunciation and the cross, one can
read hundreds of pages of Rahner without being reminded of this.760 Phillip Endean has
pointed to the particular way in which Rahner’s theology falters in theorizing about
discerning God’s revelation in the world. Even Johann Baptist Metz, whose sympathies
and intuitions are often diametrically opposed to Balthasar, argues that Rahner’s
transcendental approach inoculates the subject against the world. What does it look like
then, to push Rahnerian theology forward while listening to Balthasar’s warnings? In
other words, is there a Rahnerian subject who can persevere in The Ernstfall?
In this dissertation I have attempted to pull out the writings of Rahner’s which
best flesh out how the human being is spirit-in-world—particularly how our love and
knowledge of God is mediated in our concrete embodied existence. I have argued that a
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tradition of feminist political thought, particularly Shannon Sullivan’s understanding of
the self as “transactional bodying,” offers a helpful way of interpreting what it means to
be spirit-in-world. Of particular relevance here is the way in which it reminds us that
there is no self underneath or apart from our actual being in the world. For Rahner, the
human spirit only exists as that which constitutes itself in and through the other.
This means that our “yes” to God does not exist beneath or apart from our bodily
existence. We must shape our entire lives as a “yes” to God. Christ, and the Church, are
not merely instances of divine revelation among many. Rahner’s understanding of Christ
as the realsymbol of God identifies the person of Christ as the real and objective presence
of God. This presence is extended through the Church and particularly present in the
sacraments. If one seeks to know and love God, God is particularly and objectively
present here. That Rahner is not willing to limit God’s activity and presence does not
mean that he is de-centering the role of Christ or of the Church, but is attendant as well to
the operation of grace in the margins. Indeed, it is only through Christ, he argues, that the
rest of the world as assumed by him, is capable of manifesting the divine in such a way,
and capable of mediating both the divine and human “yes.”
This calls forth a radical understanding of discipleship, since there is no love of
God apart from that which is embodied. The other side of this is that anyone who
embodies the love of God truly loves God, whether they know it or not. An atheist guard
in Balthasar’s scenario, who chooses to be killed rather than execute a Christian, has
indeed followed the footsteps of Christ who died for his friends, regardless of what he
consciously reflected upon along the way: “For he who lets go and jumps, falls into the
depths such as they are, and not such as he has himself sounded. Anyone who accepts his
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own humanity in full—and how immeasurably hard that is, how doubtful whether we
really do it!—has accepted the Son of man, because God has accepted man in him.”761 In
other words, our relationship to God is an objective fact not limited by our understanding
of it.
Rahner’s belief that atheism is not necessarily sinful, as well as his more general
claims that we cannot deduce from categorical acts to one’s relationship to God, do not
contradict this general understanding of the need for faith to be embodied. Rahner is
motivated by three particular principles: belief that the human person is mystery,
recognition of the way in which human freedom is limited precisely because human
beings are embodied, and hope that all may be saved. They do not constitute a claim that
one’s material existence is superfluous to one’s relationship for God. Rather, they are
ways of acknowledging the surprising ways in which a “yes” can be embodied under
threatened freedom, and of the ultimate freedom of God to save. But between the humble
acknowledgement that both the human and divine are radical mysteries, Rahner lays a
clear path of Christian discipleship: the fashioning of one’s life as a “yes” to God.
In fact, Endean argues that this hesitance to speak too definitively about the Godworld relationship makes Rahner’s epistemology more not less God-centered: “This Godcentredness leads Rahner into a disciplined tentativeness. The kind of security von
Balthasar seeks in Christianity is an idolatrous illusion.”762 As for the Ernstfall, Endean
makes a compelling case that real martyrdom, like that of Alfred Delp, often involves
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doubt of both God and self against which faith becomes difficult and ambiguous. Delp’s
correspondance exposes Balthasarian martyrdom as a kind of hagiography:
For von Balthasar, Christianity offers some kind of miraculous exception to the
human condition's insecurity and unfinishedness, and hence will always be a
matter of clear lines and authority. God's last word has been spoken, in
unsurpassable beauty. It is for us to contemplate, to respond in obedience-but
never to doubt. Rahner's vision is structurally different. Christianity offers a
promise empowering us to live and accept that insecurity without denial, in faith
and patience.763
Reading spirit-in-world as transactional bodying allows us to theorize about the real ways
in which human persons accomplish their “yes” to God in and under conditions of great
despair not only in apocryphal displays of strength; it allows us to recognize black rage as
a radical moment of Christian witness; and encourages us to interrogates the particular
demands upon our habits of bodying for our given political context.
Rahner and Metz
As we saw in Chapter One, Metz’s theology—initially Rahnerian in its trajectory—was
“‘interrupted’ at key junctures by a deep and disturbing consciousness of God’s presence
to the world of late modernity” that pushed his theology away from his mentor’s
transcendental approach.764 In his now famous comparison of Rahner’s theology to the
German folktale of the hare and the hedgehog, he accused Rahner of speaking of the
subject as always and already with God in such a way that obscures the struggle of those
who die fighting for their subjectivity and which artificially shores up the identity and
complacency of those whose races have already been run for them. In turn, Metz himself
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seems to have critically interrupted Rahner at various points in his theology. In his 1963
edition of Hörer des Wortes, he pushed Rahner’s theology not only to examine the
subject as spirit-in-world [Geist in Welt] but as spirit-in-personal-world [Geist in
Mitwelt]. Indeed, he reframes the entire project under the heading of the subject and her
historicity. Recall that in his introduction of Hörer des Wortes, he reframes the text as
addressing the relationship between the subject and history, rather than philosophy of
religion and theology.765 It is precisely this relationship in Rahner’s theology that I have
traced in this dissertation. Perhaps Rahner’s approval of Metz’s revisions was motivated
by recognition in retrospect that it is this theme for which Geist in Welt is fundamental to
Rahner’s theology. Any interpretation of the relationship between Rahner and Metz must
recognize this dialogue between them. What I propose to do in this section is to continue
this dialogue—to allow the future of Rahnerian theology to be interrupted by Metz.
One helpful way of thinking about the difference between Rahner’s and Metz’s
theologies, according to J. Matthew Ashley, is in terms of direction: Rahner argues from
the Seinsfrage and the transcendental to human historicity; Metz argues from the
historical to the transcendent.766 This is not an unimportant distinction. It is likely the
reason that the writings of Rahner’s that most helpfully address the historicity of
subjectivity are scattered and lack cohesion. It is not that they are afterthoughts to his
theology, nor is such attention to historicity precluded by his theology, rather it is that his
most systematic thinking is directed first and foremost at questions of fundamental
theology.
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As we investigated in Chapter One, Rahner’s response to Metz’s criticism
involves pointing back to the relationship between the transcendental and the categorical.
Admitting that Metz’s Faith in History and Society points out where his theology is
incomplete, Rahner argues that his understanding of the relationship between the
transcendental and categorical aspects of human experience provides an answer to much
of Metz’s criticism:
…it has always been clear in my theology that a “transcendental experience” (of
God and of grace) is always mediated through a categorical experience in history,
in interpersonal relationships, and in society. If one not only sees and takes
seriously these necessary mediations of transcendental experience but also fills it
out in a concrete way, then one already practices in an authentic way political
theology, or, in other words, a practical fundamental theology. On the other hand,
such a political theology is, if it truly wishes to concern itself with God, not
possible without reflection on those essential characteristics of man which a
transcendental theology discloses.767
For Rahner, the fact that the transcendental is always embodied in the categorical means
two things: first, that Metz is misreading him by focusing on the transcendental as if it
was not intimately connected with the categorical and second, that Rahner’s theology is
always and already political.
Thinking about spirit-in-world in terms of transactional bodying however reminds
us that spirit is only ever accomplished in-world. The human spirit is precisely that form
of spirit that cannot and does not exist outside of its actualization in space and time.
While a transcendental analysis of the nature of spirit begins by making universal claims
about spirit, ultimately these claims are subverted by the definition of spirit precisely as
that which is constituted in and through the other. In fact, Francis Schüssler Fiorenza has
argued that the prominent difference between Rahner’s and Metz’s theological
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anthropologies is merely the nature of this “other” and of the human concupiscence in
which it results.768 Ashley agrees, noting that where Metz is concerned about the ways in
which one’s Mitwelt frustrate personal freedom, Rahner is more concerned with one’s
nature:
For Rahner, too, freedom is the capacity to come to self-presence and selfrealization in and through embodied existence. For both, no one action can fully
incarnate my self-realization and self-presence. But, whereas for Metz
concupiscence arises from the dialectical nature of our self-realization within an
ambiguous Mitwelt, for Rahner the relevant dialectic is that of nature and person.
‘Nature,” as the counterpart to the freedom that makes us persons, has a certain
innate spontaneity and inertia which resists the integrating will of the person. It is
this inner reality of human becoming that is the primary threat to self-realization,
not the social constitution of the person in a Mitwelt. Metz’s concern to place his
anthropology in a more social and historical framework is evident in this early
difference with Rahner.769
This however, seems to collapse world and body in Rahner’s thought. The “other”
through which human spirit accomplishes itself is not merely the materiality of one’s
body, but through the body, the entire world. Body is precisely the location of spirit’s
entering into materiality as a whole. As I have argued in this dissertation, this entails the
cultural construction of bodies in the Mitwelt. One’s nature is not simply given, but
constituted in relationship with others.
If spirit only accomplishes itself in the world, then there is no hedgehog on the
other side of the track. Spirit exists neither as something apart from the subject in her
historicity, nor as something already accomplished that only needs to be expressed. The
inviolability of spirit does not represent a space apart from suffering and responsibility. It
is not the transcendence of one who is safe from the world, but the transcendence present
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in any negative contrast experience where one says “no” to grave injustice, and dies
fighting against it. God’s presence in Christ ought to confirm such an understanding of
transcendence. Christ himself does not get to skip over the cross but must go through it.
Nor is he granted freedom from its memory. Rahner argues that Christ holds his past
together with his present as one. His cross is not “behind him.” The glorification of his
body—which remains scarred—is the further taking up of this history into God’s.770
It is the hare in the story, not the hedgehog in whom spirit is moving. In fact,
since the human spirit realizes itself most fully when it is open to the mystery of God in
and through the privileged form of the mystery of the human person, the option to cheat
rather than to run is a grave violation of spirit. The cheating hedgehogs are only an
appropriate analog for Rahner’s theological anthropology if one assumes that “spirit” in
his work is an essence or substance that has already been accomplished—or which one
knows will be accomplished. But understanding spirit-in-world as transactional bodying
reminds us that spirit is an unaccomplished dynamic present only in the concrete striving
of individual subjects in the world.
Rahner and Beste
What do we do though, when it appears that it is precisely this capacity to resist and fight
that is vulnerable to harm? As Jennifer Beste has argued, the unity between the
transcendental and categorical suggests that those we don’t see fighting—who have
indeed lost the capacity of self-integration as a result of severe trauma disorder—are no
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longer capable of the love of God. For Rahner, the loss of such capacity would make one
cease to even be human.
But a number of aspects of spirit-in-world challenge such an interpretation of
Rahner. As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, the fact that human freedom is exercised
in the world means that is always to some extent in interplay with what is not free.
Whether or not a given categorical act is an expression of one’s freedom is not available
to reflection—either to oneself or to another. Limits to human freedom may also mean
that what looks like a “no” is actually an affirmation of the mystery of God. Thus the fact
that spirit is in-world and thus that the transcendental is only expressed in the categorical,
entails that one cannot reason back from the categorical to the transcendental. One’s
relationship to God is ultimately a mystery.
This opens a space between what we would understand as the capacity for selfintegration at the categorical level—involving those human capacities affected by severe
interpersonal harm—and the self-disposal required to make one’s life a “yes” to God.
Thus Rahner’s theology says nothing about whether or not someone who appears to no
longer be capable of loving finite goods is capable of loving God. In fact, it demands a
certain amount of humility in speaking at all about such connections. In addition, I would
argue that within Rahner’s understanding of spirit—because it is not limited to what one
can consciously intend or reflect on—we can see the symptoms of trauma disorders
themselves as coping mechanisms for dealing with grave evil, and therefore as the human
spirit struggling against the most horrific of conditions.771
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But to defend Rahner’s theology against accusations that it implicitly damns those
with severe traumatic disorders is faint praise indeed. What resources does Rahner’s
theology offer, if any, in thinking about the lives of those whose capacity for selfintegration is damaged by interpersonal harm? In other words, in the face of grave evil,
for what can we hope?
As Rahner argues, the condition of the possibility of grave harm is also the
condition for the possibility of human redemption. That we are connected to one another
is the possibility of our being connected to God through Christ. Perhaps the strongest
Rahnerian response to trauma that can be offered is to make this move from analysis of
grace at the individual level to the corporate.
When trauma disorders are the result of interpersonal harm they are not merely
the result of one individual’s actions. This is easy to understand when the cause is war,
but even sexual abuse is enabled by communities—who do not listen to victims, who
protect hierarchy at all cost, who raise children to believe they do not have the right to
control who touches their bodies.772 Recognition that, as spirits-in-world, our bodies are
open systems ought to highlight the radical demand that we build healthy communities—
which support the habits of bodying that help prevent abuse and better enable survivors to
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receive the support they need.773 Not only does Rahner’s theological anthropology
demand that we refrain from pronouncing judgment against those whose apparent sin is
the result of trauma, it entails a radical imperative to stand in solidarity with those who
are traumatized and to prevent the traumatization of others.
As Rahner says in his direction of the Spiritual Exercises, as a result of our unity
in the mystical body of Christ, sin against one another is a sin against Christ and vice
versa.774 When human bodies are denigrated, so also is God’s body: “The body of Christ,
which is being disfigured in the Roman prison by the scourging, the mocking, the
crowning of thorns, and the bodily exposure, is the body in which God wants to give
Himself to us. And the essence of sin is the violation of God in the body of the world.”775
This solidarity between God’s body and ours means that we cannot deny the presence of
God in those who are harmed: “By following Him, we achieve a true humanism that has
value in God’s eyes—a humanism that has no illusions about what man is, but rather is
able to perceive the face of God in this disfigured man.”776 To be clear, to say that the
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face of God is in those disfigured by violence is not to justify that violence but to
condemn it. This is why Rahner argues that the Eucharist, as the sacrament of Christ’s
presence on earth and our unity in his body, is both the source and the judge of our love
of one another.777
Conclusion: The Mystical and Political Body
Using Rahner’s understanding of the body as a lens to read his anthropology focuses our
attention on 1) the way in which the transcendental is always categorical, 2) Rahner’s
goal to understand how human beings, as material, are capable of knowing and loving
God, while 3) highlighting the lesser known writings on vulnerability and catastrophe.
Under the category of the “body” these are not merely ad hoc pieces of Rahner’s
theology, but one unified understanding of the human being who becomes herself in
space and time. Such attention to the difficulties and vulnerabilities of human life is not
given despite Rahner’s transcendental anthropology but because of it.
Interpreting Rahner’s understanding of embodiment or spirit-in-world as
“transactional bodying” better enables us to speak of Christian identity not opposed to,
but through, the concrete materiality of the life of discipleship. As bodies we are
intimately connected to one another and so called to care for one another—so much that
neighbor-love can be an authentic way of loving God. Here the face of the other becomes
an icon for God. But such connection is also vulnerability—in more generalized ways
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(socialization in a hostile world) or more acute (trauma inflicted by interpersonal harm).
This entails an ethical imperative: not to live in the false lie that my life is unaffected by
and does not affect others. Christian discipleship demands that I care for the bodies of
others as if they were my own. Such an ethic requires that I examine the ways in which
subjects are produced and therefore requires precisely the kind of social analysis that
would direct my attention to the intersecting ways in which some bodies are recognized
as subjects.
If, as Rahner argues, the human being is spirit-in-world, then her relationship to
God is always embodied in a particular context. The mystical is political. My experience
of God is not a magical interruption of my life, but takes place in and through my
relationship to finite goods—and in particular, my relationship to myself and to others.
But this entails that the political is also mystical. The activities I engage in which lead to
the flourishing of subjects—which invite me to greater recognition of the mystery of
humanity and the mystery of God, and which promote such recognition of others—are
the site of my relationship with God, not merely an expression of it.
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Conclusion
Rahner himself, speaking later in life of his experience as a Catholic theologian, offers us
advice in how to approach his theology. Admitting that his theology may at times
contradict itself, he invites his readers to focus more on his approach than its results:
Of course I know that perhaps a great deal of what is said in my theology in no
way fits together clearly and unambiguously, for a human being is in no way in a
position to carry through an exhaustive and comprehensive reflection on how the
particular things they say hang together, given that the sources of their knowledge
are from the outset pluralist. A theologian can therefore only ask supporters and
opponents of their theology to come at this theology with an indulgent
benevolence, to see its approaches, basic tendencies, ways of putting questions, as
more important than its ‘results’—results which, in the end, cannot after all be
definitively valid.778
One cannot help but notice the similarities of this method of reading to Rahner’s own
method of reading Thomas in Geist in Welt.
Rahner himself wrote often of the fleeting relevancy of any philosophical system.
In more than a few places he worries that his own theology may itself already be
outdated. But Rahner does not hope for some universal philosophy. Rather he speaks of
the urgency that theologians wrestle with the philosophical questions of their day.779 This
is what Rahner does in dialogue with Thomas’ theology and it is what Rahner asks us to
do with his own theology. In writing this dissertation I have sought to follow this method
myself, offering a new reading of Rahner that is still consistent with his questions and
commitments. I have tried to imagine just what Karl Rahner would say to a
(post?)modern theologian today. What does it look like to do what Rahner did: reflect
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theologically on the experience of God in dialogue with philosophical questions of today?
How can we hold fast to the belief that grace is available to all? That it does not merely
come upon us from without, but also constitutes our own identity?
Answering these questions for today demands that we take up the question of the
cultural construction of human bodies. While I do not think that Rahner himself would
have seen the body as a central category of his own thought, it offers a unique vantage
point from which one can understand much of the rest of his theology. A manmade
structure may offer as complete a vista as a mountaintop. If there is any artifice in reading
Rahner from the lens of questions that began to dominate the humanities only after his
death, I hope this project will be judged by the view it offers rather than how naturally it
is grounded in Rahner’s own theology.
There is a certain logic that pervades Rahner’s arguments when he is operating in
his most systematic and philosophical mode. Traditional theological antinomies between
the divine and human increase in direct rather than inverse proportion. Love of God and
love of neighbor grow together; the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice
versa; the same theology is theopocentric and anthropocentric; finally, Christ’s natures
are perfected by and through one another. This same logic shapes Rahner’s understanding
of the human person, in whom spirit and matter are unified rather than opposed and who,
as a result of being embodied spirit, actualizes her freedom precisely in necessity.780
This logic is not self-grounding. It arises from reflection upon the praxis of
Ignatian spirituality, particularly Rahner’s understanding that grace is available to all and
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affects the experience of one’s own identity. It is this tradition through which Rahner
attempts to understand Christian doctrine. Committed to doing theology that makes sense
of that grace, which is not merely extrinsic to the human person but also rises up from
within,781 Rahner approaches theology with an understanding that through Christ, God
reaches the human heart.
This means that from the perspective of Rahner’s understanding of the body, we
can see the contours of his larger theological project. The proportional relationship of
spirit and matter in the human person is a recapitulation of the cosmic story of God’s love
for humanity. This aspect of Rahner’s understanding of human embodiment has been
missed by many of his readers, who view the relationship between spirit and matter as
one of opposition, simple identity, or oscillation. Indeed, Rahner himself often fell into
such traps in attempting to speak about the embodied nature of human transcendence.
It is critical today to hold on to both of these aspects of the human person. It is
precisely the denigration of real human bodies that demand we attend to the significance
of human embodiment in the Christian theological tradition. Insofar as human persons
cry out “no” to such denigration, they embody transcendence. Theology must witness not
only to those who suffer but also to those who resist suffering. According to Rahner, we
do not have to prioritize one of these over the other. As paradoxical as it seems, the
human person is precisely the being who accomplishes her transcendence materially. A
theological account of the human being as free spirit is therefore also an account of the
human being as vulnerable to tragedy.
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Reading Rahner through Judith Butler and Shannon Sullivan offers a way of
speaking about the human person that preserves the fundamental insight of this logic. In
dialogue with these thinkers, I have chosen to talk about this transcendence as a form of
bodying. My goal is not to reduce the human person to her materiality, but to do
anthropology from below. Using language of “the body” and “embodiment” to speak of
the unified human being forces us grammatically to wrestle with Rahner’s claim that
spirit does not exist apart from pouring itself into matter, and to draw our attention to the
concrete lives of subjects constructed by the worlds in which they live.
Loving a thinker demands holding them to the highest standards, and I have tried
to read Rahner alongside some of his most provocative critics. Hans Urs von Balthasar,
Johann Baptist Metz, and Jennifer Erin Beste each question the adequacy of Rahner’s
theological anthropology. In different ways, they challenge his method of transcendental
analysis as well as his understanding of human transcendence. By focusing on Rahner’s
understanding of embodiment, I hope to put forward an understanding of Rahner’s
theology that does not relegate the demand for Christian witness, accountability to the
face of the other, or hope for the traumatized.
Rather, when we understand that human beings are precisely those spirits that
accomplish themselves in and through matter, what follows is an understanding of the
human body as simultaneously the site of the experience of God and political
transformation. Our identities as Christians do not float above our heads as spectres, they
are shaped in the concrete here and now, by the worlds in which we are formed. This
understanding of the human person ultimately calls forth a way of life—one that demands

283
solidarity with those who suffer, vigilance over our habits of bodying, openness to
mystery, and hope in the world to come.
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